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BO RDEN PARKER BOYVNE 'S TREATMENT 
OF TEE PROBLIDJ OF CHANGE AND IDENTITY 
I NTRODUCTION 
A. STATEI<vffiNT OF THE PROBLEM A_TifD 
METHOD OF THE D ISSERrATION 
In the dialogues which follow the Republic Plato speaks of 
the business of philosophy as that one of rising from differ~ 
ence to unity and again from unity to difference and multi-
1 plicity. Already in the Republic where the philosopher is 
primarily characterized as one "who thinks things together", 11 
it is indicated that after he has reached the highest idea, 
he must seek to develop all other ideas from it. But in the 
I Phaedrus the two processes of synthesis and analysis,~uY~yw3~ 
and &u:~. !. pt-f"rs , are distinctly put on a level, and only he who 
is able rightly to perform them both is thought worthy of the 
name of a philosopher. "He must be able", Plato declares, 
''to t ake a comprehensive view of the multi tude of scattered 
particulars and to bring them under one form or idea, for the 
purpose of defining the nature of the special subject which 
1 Edward Caird, ETGP, 174 f. 
Symbols in footnotes are explained in the BIBLIOGlliiPHY, 
infra, I 5'1- ICZO. 
1 
=----- ~F======================== 
2 
he wishes to discover ••• but he must also be able to divide 
into species, carefully attending to the natural joints by I 
which the parts are severed and connected, and not breaking any 
part like a bad carver." • • • "Of these processes p" says the 
Platonic Socrates, "I have always been a lover, seeking by 
their means to make myself able to speak and to think~ And if 
I can find anyone who is thus able to see up to the one and 
down to the many, I am ready to follow in his footsteps as if 
he were a God. " 2 
These words of Socrates embody the fundamental ideal that 
will guide us in our investigation, for it is our conviction 
that great help will be found if only we can read a meaning 
int o things and events, and define permanence by determining 
what really is, what it is that counts, what it is to be done. 
What is that permane·nt element, that ever ... abiding truth 
in the light of which we must behold all change? This is one 
of the most fundamental problems in the life and thought of 
man; and humanity would gladly say with Socrates: "If we can 
find anyone who is thus able to see up to the one and down to 
the many, we are ready to follow in his footsteps as if he 
were a God."3 
More concretely, is there any satisfactory solution to 
2 Phaedrus, 266 B. 
3 lac. cit. 
-~~~=-=*- ~=-========-----===--~~--==~==================~==============~F======= 
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the problem of change and identity? Ours is a constantly 
changing world, the most changing feature of which, perhaps, 
3 
is we ourselves as persons. Changing experience and experience 
of change are fundamental items of our being and our self~ 
knowledge. But we also know ourselves as continuous and iden~ 
tical through our flux of experience, and the becoming world 
around us eloquently speaks to us in the language of the un-
changing. Indeed; change itself we experience as abiding 
change. Yet, when taken abstractly, change and identity are 
logical contradictories. How, then, can we possibly reconcile 
them? Both are asserted to be factors of objective reality, 
and reality is postulated as consistent. 
As Borden Parker Bowne deals especially with this problem 
in many of his philosophical works, it is our purpose: 
firstly, to investigate his treatment of the problem; second-
ly, to see what light does historical philosophy shed on 
Bowne•s position with respect to the issue; thirdly, to infer 
the essential implications that may be derived from his funda~ 
mental solution. 
The investigation of this problem calls for a concise / 
history of the problem of change and identity, for a review of 
the available literature on the field, for an exhaustive read~ 
ing of Bowne's works and works about him, and for a prelimin-
ary consideration of his pedagogical method and his procedure 
in the revision of his books. 
4 
B. WORK OF OTHER INVESTIGATORS 
Among the investigators who have written on the philosophy 
of Borden Parker Bowne, very few have given serious attention 1
1 
to Bowne's treatment of the problem of change and identity. 
George Thomas White Patrick seems to have been his earliest 
critic. As far back as 1888, six years after the first edition 
of Bowne's Metaphysics, Patrick criticized Bowne's solution to 
the problem of change and permanence on the grounds of Bownets 
unfairness to Heraclitus.4 Patrick's point of view will be 
presented and criticized in connection with Bowne's metaphysi~ 
cal treatment of the problem of change and identity. 5 
In 1915, five years after Bowne's death; Dr. Ralph Tyler 
Flewelling published a little book on Personalism and the 
Problems of Philosophy with the purpose of "tracing the lead ... 
ing philosophical ideas down to modern times and discovering 
their r elation to the thought of Bowne."6 The importance of 
Bowne's solution to the problem of change and identity was 
emphasized from five different sides: First, it avoids the 
subjectivity that necessarily follows from Kant's critical 
4 George Thomas Vfuite Patrick, The Fragments of the Work of 
Heraclitus of Ephesus on Nature, (Baltimore: N. Murray, 
1889. Reprinted from the Am. Jour. of Psych., 1888), 
PP• 65-68. 
5 Infra, 
6 Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Personalism and the Problems of 
:Philosophy , (New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1915), 
P• 11. 
------ c=tt==== 
I 
II 
philosophy. 7 Second, it saves thought from all suicidal 
8 pluralism or atomism. Third, it makes history possible and 
9 knowable. Fourth, it renders Bergson's "Elan Vital" intel-
1 . "bl 10 1g1 e; and his principle of "Duration" admissible.11 In 
another little book which appeared five years later, strength-
ening his previous views on Personalism,12 which he now calls 
Personal Realism, he adds: 
Personality presents the common ground of 
reconciliation demanded by modern thought. 
It presents an unmistakable example of 
self-causation, and of identity in change. 
In a world of mystery we must choose the 
mystery least incompatible with the whole 
of life. Is it better to be thrust back 
upon a lawless unintelligible ground of 
being, or shall we recognize its identity 
with the supreme mystery of all life, the 
mystery of personality? This standpoint 
gives distinct relief in the solution of 
the deepest problems which are ultimately 
those that gather about the meaning of per-
sonality.l3 
The investigator who has given most serious attention to 
Bowne's treatment of the problem of change and identity is 
Professor Albert c. Knudson, who has published the most com-
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Ibid., 90-91. 
Ibid., 133..;.135. 
Ibid., .138-139. 
Ibid., 155 .... 163. 
Ibid., 183 .... 185. 
Ralph Tyler Flewelling, Bergson and Personal Realism, 
(New York: The Abingdon Press, 1920), 15. 
Ibid., 15; 217-222. 
II 
I II 
I 
I 
I 
!i 
ll 
I 
I 
1. 
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of his system, made Persona lity the key to reality. Professor I 
Knudson says: 
Two things must be provided for in any 
adequate world-view. One is unity and 
identity , the other is plurality and 
change . But on the impresonal and 
necessitarian plane there is an impas-
sable gulf between the m, and a s a result 
the causal idea falls into contradiction 
with itself. In order to explain change 
we affirm a permanent thing, but no 
thing can explain change without ceas ing 
to be permanent. Or we affirm the One 
in order to explain t he many , but no 
thing-like unity c an explain the many 
without ceasing to b.e One. This log ical 
impasse we can escape only as we ris e to 
the personal plane .16 
•••• (for the soul) has a way of har-
monizing conceptions that seem logically 
cant radictory •••• Unity and plurality, 
• • • • identity and change, • • • .when 
interpreted in the light of the soul's 
own experience are seen to be entirely 
harmonious with each other. One indeed 
implies the other.l7 
Professor Knudson adds: 
How this is possible we do not know. The 
contrad iction is removed by two miracu-
lous powers of the soul , namely, its 
unifying and self-identifying conscious-
ness, and its power of self-determination. 
These are facts of experience. We change , 
we think , and do many different things, 
and yet we remain the same be ings . Through 
consciousness and memory we constitute 
ourselves one and self-identical;lB (and 
as) it is something empirical, something 
16 Knudson, POP ; 223-224. 
17 Ihid., 425. 
18 Ibid, 224. 
• 
• 
8 I 
19 Knu4aon, POP, 39'1. Cf. also Knudson, A:rt. (1939., 256~266. 
20 Duval, NEC• 10•11t 
21 Strickland, PER, Chap. V, 
----H---
·--- -
I 
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into Bowne 'a supposed solution of the problem;• Dr. Gilbert H. 
Jones is merely interested in the similarity of terms and eon-
22 
cepta used by Bowne and Lotze in their treatment of the case~ 
23 t Dr. R. :P. Pi.per · quo es unoonneotedly in his dissertation a 
considerable amount of ma-terial from Bowne on Change, Identity, 
and Time, but is not even aware of the contradictory statements 
which he quotes and does nQt even come to any conolue,ion as to j 
Bowne •s treatment of tlle p·roblem~ Dr, Gail Cleland24 ia IQ8.inly· 
interested in the historical SI!IPeot of Bowne •e thought, tracimgl
1 
moe t of his fundamental is sues, and among these,. that of change l 
I 
and identity, to the philosQpby of Bishop Berkeley, inasmuch ! 
lueione to the unity and creativity of IQind in the philosophy 
of Bowne as pragmatic elements, 26 The unity of mind by waJ of 
contrast with the plulSlity of mental experie11ces, oorrtspona.• 
to the . identity of !Dind oontimtoue thrl!ugh its oonstsnt ohl!nge. l! 
Prederick Robert Isaoksen mentions in his Master's thesie 
Bowne's treatment of the problem of change and identity with 
22 Jones, LB, 74~76. 
23 Piper, liP, 139-148. 
24 Cleland, BB, 102•108~ 
25 JlET2, 423• . 
26 Ramsdell, PEBt 37-39. 
=======-
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the purpose of showing the interdependence of Bown~'s ethics 
27 
and metaphy~ics. So far as our problem is concerned, 1lr. 
10 
Isacksen does not show the interdependence very clearly. Pro- I 
feasor Carrol Hildebrand has written a dissertation on Bowners 
Teaching Concerning the SpeculatiTe Significance of •reedom, 
the purpose of which is to show that the validity of freedom 
lies at the very heart of all knowledge• In connection with 
the mind as a free agent, Professor Hildebrand mentiona28 
Bowne's treatment of the problem of change and identity~ but 
does not go far enough into the study of the matter to notice 
the inte~al contraiiction that lies at the heart of Bowne's 
theory of self, theory of fre,do~ and theory of time. 
shall consider in the obapter of Bowne's treatment of the 
problem of cha~ge and identity from the point of view of mota-
29 physics. 
C. BOWNE'S PEDAGOGICAL METHOD 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
two main feat~res charaoter1•• Bowne's ~thod of exposi~ 
tion: hie beginning of all discussion from the point of View oi 
common sanae or naive realil:lm, and his focusing of given sub- I 
~ecte from a variety of angles in the light of different pe·r• I 
spectives. The former accounts for Bowne's :frequent allusions 
27 Isaoksen, IBEK, 8~11. 
28 Hil.deb:rand, SSFB, 186•192. 
29 Infra, Chap. V. 
I 
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30 to uncritical thought. !he latter accounts for t~e repeti~ 
tion of material in m~n~ of his works. The ~se of common eens 
as the s.tarting point :of discussion; Bowne himaelf acknowledge 
31 
as due to the infiuenc'e of Herbart, whose method Professor 
Knudson has described as follows: 
I 
Herbart woul.ci start with the "concepts" 
given to us in our common senae experi-
ence. ~ examination these concepts 
were seen ' to contain contradictions. To 
remove these contractictions b-~ worlting 
over the concepts of common sense be. 
came then the task of philosop:tJ,y and 
parttcularlY of metapbJsios. Herbart 
called thia method "the Dlethod of rela-
tions." PhilosophJ 1 tael.f he defined as 
"the working over of concepts;" This 
was, of course, also Bowne's mathoa.. and 
ia no cloubt what he bad in .mind when he 
said that , "Herbart supplies the method." 
The particular contradictions that Her-
b.art found in oommon•aenae philoa·ophy 
were these especially: the concept of a 
thing with a number of qualities; of 
ohan~e, of the self', etc• Thi first two 
o:t t ese are essentially the same as 
Bowne's problems of unity and pl~ity, 
and identity and change. !rhe kinship of 
Bowne to Herbart Gt this point is closer 
than I su.p.posed. 3~ 
nus Bowne adhered closely to Herbart •s pedagogical metho 
But it is doubtful, however~ whether thie method ie actenti• 
' fically sound. One might suggest, it is true, the hnothesis 
that this method fundamentallJ aime to move from the )Qlown 
30 '~T 253• 353• KET2 . 44• 46• 31 aD t ' ' t , t 
D'f, rti. I 
32 Personal letter of Dr. xnudeon to Bishop McConnell quoted 
in )[oConnell, BPB, ~2·243. 
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facts of everyday life to the unknown realm of speculation; bu~ 
if so~ the method is still questionable, for, Do we really kno~~ 
the facts of everyday life? O:r is 1 t through and after $pecu-
lation itself that facts begin to gain meaning at all? It is 
not very probable, though, that Bawne intended to uae this I 
method for such a pu~ose. It is very interesting that as an I' 
11 
exception to what has already been commented, on one occasion, / 
I 
even if the on1y one, Bowne declares that a certain conception 
of spontaneous thought ', ia correct. "In spontaneous thought," 
1
1 
he says, "• •• the mental subject is given as active and \ 
I 
abiding •••• nis conc1eption of the meptal sub3eot we believe I 
I 
to be correct."33 
D. BOWNE'S REVISIONS OF HIS OWN BOOXS 
Bowne's revisions of his Philosophz of Theism and his 
Ketapbzsioe h&ve attracted our interest. 
revision is adopted in each one of these books. In his book 
'l!heism which is a revision of his Pbilosophz .. of_ Theism, he 
I 
simply adds new material to that already found in the previous 
edition. Frequently entire paragraphs of this previous edition 
find resetting in different chapters of his book Theism. The 
fundamental line of argument in the two books, however; is the 1 
,, 
same. 
I 
33 IPT. 11. 
c-:-=--=-=-=---:=-tt===-- - ---- t 
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The case of his Jletap,hysios is much di:fferent. The first 
e4ition of this b~ok was pablished in 1682. In 1898 it was 
revised, introducing among other teatves the following 
changes: complete alteratio~ of the original introduction; 
omiasion of the entire section on Epistemology, fussion of the 
ma.terial of the laf:lt three chapters of the first part i~to 
three new corresponding c~apte~, •nd addition of three chap• 
ters on Psychology. The revised edition of Bowne's lletaphJ• 
sics lays more emphasis on logic t~an does the original edi• 
t1on, &Jld stresses mo;oe the element o.f identity t}lan the ele-
ment of cA&nge~ The author is also more careful with respect 
to the connotation of hie word~h "Common notion" (MET, .77), 
for example; becomes "Current noti~n" (MET2, 44)• "Change as 
the most promi~ent fact of experience" (:MET, 77) simply be~ 
comes "Change as the most prominent feature of experie.noe" 
2 (:MET , 44). !Phe. very concept of iclentitJ is explained in the 
revised edition (DT2 ) ~n te~ of three distinctions: logical; 
phenomenal, metaphysical (MET2;. 45)• This precaution was not 
taken in MET. In the first edition of Mete:phys:icca the cllapte:r 
on "Change ana. Becoming" is finished in an atmosphere of happy 
' 
soluti.on to the p.roblem. The Revised Edition simply a.dds a 
paragraph and refers tb.e further treatment of the issue to the 
chapter on "Time•" A benign attitude is observed towards 
Heracl.i tus ip the Revised Edition, as over against the ~favor-
-----++----- ------ il 
-f 
II 
I 
I 
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able previous treatment that was given him in the first edition 
of Bowne's Metapgsics. 
E. BOWNE'S THBEE KINDS OF IDENTITY 
Bowne calls attention to the fact that tb.e problem of 
change and identi'f;y 01~ grievously complicated b;y the failure 
to 41etinguieh the several meanings of ea.meneet or 1de~t1 ty • 
and by oversight of th~ distinction between phenomenal ancl 
ontological reality."34 He adds, 
We may ~ve logt.oal 1Q.~ntity• phenom&nal 
identity~ and metap~ysi.ca1 ~dentity; 
and unless we are on our guard it is very 
easy to confound them. Logical id~nt1 t:y 
is ~imply the sameness of definition. 
Phenomenal identity is often the equiV$• 
leno e of appearano e; and J:Sometime s it .. 
means the continuity of equivalent ap .... 
pearan.Qe. Metaphysical identity ie 
quite another thing, It t1PP11es to the. 
reality behind the appearance• Without 
it we lose oil,reelves in a groundless 
becoming 1~ which phenomena, whtoll are _ 
phenomena of nothing, oomg and go with• 
out. any reason whatever.3 
Already :J;n hira The.ory of ThoUght and Knowledie, Bowne had an..i. 
ticipated these distinctions, when alluding to the three fun~ 
I 
II 
t. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
I 
i 
I 
damental conditions of the judgment. that is, of though~ itsel1+j 
he referred to the unity and iclentity of the thinking Sf)lf. the l\ 
law of identity and contradiction, and the fact of connection 
-----
II 
I' 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
1·----15 1 
I 
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among the ob j&Qts of thought~ He sa..ys • 
The first is the opndition of an, 
rational consciousness whatever• The 
second is the condition of our thQUghts 
having any constant and coneis·tent 
meaning. The third refers to that 
objective connection whicn thaug~t 
aims to reproduce; and without whioh 
thought lo~e~ all reference to truth. 
As the first relates to the oonatitu-
tion of the s~jeot, it might be c~lled 
the subjective condition; the second 
might be called the formal condition; 
and the third, as relating to the con~ 
stitution of the object, might be called 
the objective condition. Or without too 
great 1n$0curaoy, they might be called 
respectively, the psychological, the 
logical, and the ontological condition 
of thought• The name, however, is of 
no mo~nt, provided we understand the 
th1ng.36 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
In this respect, Bowne adopts fundamentally the customary dis" 11 
tinotions establ:l.shed by standard dictionaries and encyclQw 
pedias. Eisler's doctionary, for example, defines the term as i 
I 
I 
follows: 
36 TTK, 20. 
Identitlt (identitas, Tautotns): 
Dieselbigkeit, Einerleiheit. I. ist 
1~ phenomenologisoh und logisoh: 
Einheit der Bedeutung des Gedachten; 
"Gemeinten" gegenber der Mann.igfal-
tigkeit der Denk • und Vortellungsa.Itte• 
die sich auf denselben (realen o4er 
idealen) GEtgenstand bez·iehen; 2. psy-
chologisch: das sich GleichwBleiben 
des Bewusstseins ale einheitliohes 
Ganzes in seiner Stetigkeit; auf 
Grundlage der Erinnerung ergibt sioh 
I 
II 
II 
~--___ J~=----
I 
:___-----=-- --------------·====== 
lj 
•in I.e ""' Bewusstse.in; 3. real: dae 
eioh selbat_ Gleichbl,ei_·ben e;Lnes Dinges. 
oder Wessens im Wechsel seiner zustttnde 
und 1m Verla~fe seiner Entwioklung . 
Identisch ist, waa:J eioh in ke1nerH1n-
siollt v()n einem andern unterscheidet 
oder wenigstens niobt in e~ner "rele• 
vanten" Rinsioht' Absolute r. hat nur 
d~e Geda~hte ale eolohes (der Begriffs• 
gehal~) un4 das Pormalo, Gesetzlioh• . 
des reinen ("tra.nszenc!lentalen") -Bewusst• 
seine (baw • . die reine "Iohheit" das 
logi.ebhe Sub 3 ekt ) • Zwe . Dingen kinnen 
einander ·me)lr oder weniger gleioll sein, 
aber nie in eines zusammenfallen~ daher 
nioht (absol~t, eigenlitoh) identiech 
(d. h., "diesel ben Dinge") -sein, a:uoh 
wenn lie identieohe .Wesensmerkmale 
aufweisen. Identische -Bewffe sind 
Begriffe von _ gleiofie'~3F t und Umfang (abc:abo; •• ,) • . 
16 
It is to be seen therefore. that the distinctions which 
Bowne establishes in hie Theory of Thought and Knowledge oor• 
respond to those establi~hed by Eisler• Bowne's "unity and 
/I ,. 
id~ntity of the t~inking self" corresponds to Eislor's "PsY• 
chological identity•" Bowne'e "law of identity and contradic-
tion" eorresponda to Eisler*~ "iogical and phenomenQlogioal I 
identi1iy"; and Bowne •s "fact of connection among the objects o:rl 
t-hought" . oorl!'espon4.s .to Eisl~r's "real (or metap)lysical) iden• 1
1 tity."38 In this connection it is interesting to notioe that 
1 
3'1 Eisler, WPB, Erst Band, p. 700 s.v• "Identi,ftt•" 38 For other passages on Bowne •s definitic>n of Identity "f• 
MET, 520 ... 521.; PER, 115, 102; PER, 118 ... 119; TTIC, 21~35 • 
I 
I' 
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the Spanieh and the Italian authoritiee; identifying themselves [[ 
with Reid derive the general notion of Identity from the belie~~ 
in personal identity. Ranzoli tells us that: I 
La nozione ge·nerale d'identita deriva. 
dalls credenza nella nostra iclentita 
personale •• • .La credenza nell'iden~ 
ti ta delle · &1 t re pe rsone non 'e o-he una 
conge.ttura; la eredenz:a nella noet;ra 
identita e una oertezza invincibile.39 
The Enoiolopedia Espaaa, adds that: 
Identidad Perso~al es la Identidad que 
oonstituy la base de nuestra personalidad, 
y puede definirse como la consciencia de 
nuestro yo. • • .Es el sentimiento mas 
intimo y prof1Uldo que sorprende la exis-
tenoia. Como representaoion sirve de 
heoho fundamental a toda inferencia de 
lo real. • ~ ,Reid ha demonst;rado que la 
nocion general de identidad deriva de la 
oreenoia en nuestra identi4ad personal; 
aoeteniendo ademas; que mientras la 
oreencia en nuestra propia identidad es 
de naturaleza invenoible, la oreencia en 
la identidad de las demas personas 1 en 
la de los objet8s sensible& ea una eim~ 
ple conjetura. 
Neither the Spanish nor the Italian authorities are far 
from Bowne in deriving the general notion of Identity from 
belief in personal identity, if we ;oemembei' j: that at least eo I 
far as epistemo,logy is concerned, for Bowne as w·ell as for any ~~ 
39 Ranzoli, DSF, 507. 
40 ESPASA, Vol. 28, P• 873. Of. also PP• 874•875. 
il 
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representative personali$t, the self is the datum.41 I 
41 F'or more material on · definition of Identity Cf. Baldwin, 
DPP, Vol• I, 504•507; and Vol. II, 283·284; Thomson, DPWP, 
1V9w..l83; Ranzoli, DSP, 506·511; .Eno. Brit. Vol. XII, 70; 
New Int. Eno.t' Vol. XI; 747; Lalan4e, VP, Vol. I, 333-.335; 
Creighton, IL, 54-56. 
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CHAPTER I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
PRmCIPLES OF PE RMANENCE 
A. Oriental Philosophies 
The problem of change and identity is no new theme in 
philosophy. It is one of the oldest and most persistent prob-
lems of thought. It has appeared with different names and 
under different forms in the march of time, but the fundamental 
difficulty to which . the problem refers remains unchanged. The 
1. Indian Philosophy Rg Veda, (1500-100 B. C • ) , which is 
a. The Rg Veda • 
• the most anc.ient monument O·f civil-
ization that we poase·es, 1 develops a cosmic pantheism according 
to which a persistent unitary being manifests itself in the 
changing phenomena of the world. The crtldity of this primitive 
b. Brahmanas and 
Upanishads 
pantheism is attenuated in the sub-
sequent phil.osophical wri tinge of 
the Brahmanas and Upanishads (1000~500 B. C.).2 The concepts 
o·f Brahma. as unknowable- universal reality and Atman as the in-
dividua1ized universal,. mark during this second period a car ... 
tain progress in the evolution and d.efinition of the problem o 
_______ --_-_-----~~---=-=--
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change and ide.ntity. In later Hindu and Sanskrit literatures. 
( 500 B. C.----) , the philO·S ophical o • Later Hindu and 
Sanskn t lit-
1 eratures. interest abandonw the objective 
/ world, and turns its attention to the intemal world of the in-
' dividual. 3 Intelligence is spoken of in terms o,f two essential 
I faculties, the Manas Inferior and the Manas Superior of the Yoga 
I philosophy. According to this type of thought, The Manas is 
j intelligence itself which witnesses the changes of the world, 
I because it does not change as rapidly as the world doe-s. But 
there is something in intelligence which changes. This i .e the 
I 
1 Manas Inferior which consists of elaborated sense impressions. 
1 There is an inner faculty~ however, which witnesses the changes 
of the Manas Inferior, and which does not change; for it is the 
psychical ultimate. Its function is to affirm or deny, not by 
reason but by intuition. This is the Manas Superior, identifi~ 
able with the "soul" of Western Thought.4 Various schools of 
contemporary Indian philosophy subscribe to this view of in" 
" " telligence, among them, the Vedanta, Mtmansa, Sankya, Nyaya, 
Vaiseshika, Yoga. 
The prob.lem of change and identity finds expressio-n also 
in the Chinese Phil.os.ophy, especially in the writings of Lao-Tze 
Ibid., 29-445. I 
J. c. Chattergi, Esoteric Indian Philosophy. (tr.) Jose Plana 
y Dora. Second Edition. Barcelona: Bibl.ioteca Oriental-
ista, R. Maynade, 1900. 22-33~ 
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IYang-Tzu, and Lei-Tzu. In the Tao-Teh-King of Lao-Tze (604~ 
Ill 2. Chinese Philosophy 524 B. c.) Reason ie presented as 
a. Lao-Tze 
the p.ersistent element of Nature 
and as "the world order which shapes all things." Reason is 
1 
"the arch-father of the ten thousand things," "the source of all 
j phenomena." According to Lao~Tze, there is change because it is 
/ the purpose of the !!!?. (Reason) that there be variety. 5 The Tao 
I 
is a unified whole. "It is a. oneness•"6 Its nature is that of 
Anaximander's apeiron. 7 It is indeterminate, undefinable. 
1 
bou.ndless.8 Yet, it gives rise to the world of variety, by a 
I principle of separation of "opposites" similar to that of Anaxi-
mander himself. 9 Yang-Tzu (300.,. 
b. Yang-Tzu 
250 B. C •) followed in the foot-
steps. of La.o-Tze but maintained that although the ~ (Reaeon or 
/ Nature) was the metaphysical ultimate, the only Tao known to man 
!1 is his own individual nature. From this point o~eparture he 
I developed a philosophical position similar to that of Epiourus 
I 
II 
in Greek philosophy and of the eighteenlh century Europena. 
romanticists~lO Lei-Tzu (200-150. B. c.) represents a. reaction 
~ Lao-tze, CRV, 15, 75. 
7 Lao~tze, CRV, lOOf. 
8 Infra., , La.o-tze~ CRV, 81. 
9 Lao-tze, CRV, Chaps. XI and 40. 
compare also the note on Philo. 
10 Yang,.;,tzu, GOP·. 
In this connection please 
Infra, note 15. 
·,.--:-:--_-__ ·_--__ ==----_ ----=----=--
====!:l====--=-=--=--==-=-=-=·-=-=-=====------·-·-··----------------
I! 
22 
c. Lei-Tzu 
against the extreme indi~id~lism 
that resulted from Yang--T~u's 
position. His formula is very much like that of Jf.eremiah Ben-
tham in recent English utilitarian ethics: "The greatest good 
for the largest number.nll 
B. Greek Philosophy. 
With Greek philosophy, the first important chapter opens in 
the. history of the problem of Change and Identity. For the 
first time man attempts now to answer the fundamental questions 
of his mind in terms of the facts of Nature herself. It is his 
faith that if the world presents him with problems, the world 
I itself will provide with their proper solutions. This is the 
I, battle humn of science. It is the faith of the laboratory, the· 
II incentive of an cultural enterprisE>. It is realizing this 
. I 
!I 
\' II 
fact, that M. E. Tay1or remarks, 
There are some episodes in hu.msn life which 
possess a significance out of. proportion to 
the small fraction of the tot.ality of space 
and time to which they are confined. The 
Gre,eks were a small nation, and the really 
important period of their history is very 
short. Yet, because the short period of time 
and the small stretch of space to whic-h the 
greatness of Greece was limited were orowd:ed 
with thought and b-eauty and adventurous liv-
ing, they matter far mare t .han the vastest 
11 Ibid., Introduction • 
---------
periods and spaces in which nothing happens 
and nothing moves."l2 
23 
Greece is immortal in the greatne.se o:f her men, but her men are 
great especially in their undying love :for beauty and truth and 
goodnes~. Perhaps their doctrines are all mutually contradic-
tory. Perhaps there is a fallacy in each one o:f their philoso-
phies, for they were not gods, they were men~ and error is 
II human. But the importance of Greek Philosop-hy is not the phil ... 
I) osophical doctrines of the individual philosophers; but rather 
! the nature of the problems behind those philosophies; for in 
I life it is not always the answer that counts. The importance 
lies in the nature of the questions that we raise; and the 
Greeks ~ertainly have raised the ~uestions that humanity has 
never :fully answered with satisfaction. 
Thales. whose name stands at the head of the succession o:f 
1. The Presocratics 
a. The Milesians 
early thinkers, was a citizen of 
the Greek colony of Miletus in Asia 
Minor, and lived in the early part of the sixth century B. c. 
I As Taylor remarks, 
1
1 
It seems at first sight surprising that it 
should be possible to assign any definite 
I
' beginning to speculative thought; and the 
only justification can be that we find in 
I Thales a new point Of departure, the emer.,. 
12 Taylor, GP, 12-13. 
=======f~-=---=--=--------_ -------
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genae of a new character in the activity of 
the human mind.l3 
24 
He was the first to seek for a principle of coherence and unity 
in the world. What he achieved seems little. vVe know scarcely 
Jl anything of him beyond the one crude guess he made that ''All 
I 
I 
things are water." The guess itself has little valuet but it 
was an attempt to answer a great question. The que~tion to 
which Thalea attempted to give an •newer set human thought 
travelling upon the road it has followed ever ainoe. He wanted 
to know what this world of ours really is; and as Taylor points 
out. 
The.re was much more implicit in that question 
than was realized by Thalea and the others 
who first asked it. It implied the assumption 
tha.t things can. be understood• that the world 
is rational. And eo Thaleat though little he 
knew it was the first to drive the thin end 
of the wedge of mind into the stubborn and 
intractable mass of matter. He really wanted 
to discover the stuff of which the world is 
made, something that is always !resent, per-
manent in the midst of change•" 4 
Anaximander of Miletue: is said to have been a. disciple of 
Thales. Re asked the same que-stion that Thales had asked, but 
gave it a different answer; an anawer which showed that he saw 
a little farther into the original problem than Thales had seen. 
Anaximander must have asked himself. "If water is the one real 
I 
\I 
·I 13 
I 14 Ibid. 
I Taylor, 
I 
--+= 
II 
II 
I 
1 thing, why do all the other things exist, and what i s t l_!eir re ... 
\ ration to the one real thing?" Furthermore, nmy should water I I 
I I be more real than any other thing? If all things are water, whyl 
I is there not always and e-verywhere nothing but water?" I It was / 
probably some such difficulty as this which led Anaximander to 
the. conclusion that if all things were re-ally one thing, as he 
felt the y mus·t be, the one thing that is real must be something 
different from all the other things tlla.t we know·~ He called it 
a "boundless something", (apeiron), and said that the 1 oppoe-
ai tea 1 , hot and cold or dry and moist, are •separated out 1 :from 
it• The "boundless" ia in perpetual motion, · and out of this 
motion, the separation of the opposites takes place, I 
15 
Ana:ximenes names Air the first principle. This air, like 
the. "Boundless Stuff" of Anaximander, stretches illimitablY 
through space. Air is constantly in motion and has the power of 
motion inherent in it, and this motion brought about the devel- I 
I 
opment of the universe from air. As operating processes of this 1 
development Anaximenes names the two opposite prooeE$s.es of 
26 
rarefaotion and oondenaation. These two opposite prooesses in 
Anaxime,nes represent a step forward from the point of Anaximan .... 
der, for it explains how Anaximander's formless matter evolved, 
I by rarefaction and condensation.. Anaximander never went that 
16 far. 
Summarizing the different positions of the Ionians or 
Milesians, we co~d say that two conclusions were achieved, 
namely, that Reality is One~ and that all that is• is Alive. 
I The oneness of reality, is ita permamenoe, its identity. The 
llvingneas of reality is its movement, ita change, its variety. 
Three ourrents of thought developed from Milesian think~ 
ing: The Eleatios, Heraclitus and the Atomists, and the Pyth-
1 agoreans. Of these tnree, the first two follow direotly from 
the main two issues of Milesian philosophy. The third il3 a 
movement astray. 
J The Eleatics, Xenophanes, Parmenides and Zeno, discovered 
I 
I assumptions in the philosophies of the Milesiane, which if oar .... 
ried to their logical conclusions, would mean the denial of 
J m.otion, ohange and nux, and further denial of the reality of 
the concrete exe.mplifications of· change~ 
These philosophers were cal-
b. The Eleatics 
led Eleatic, after the Greek col-
ony of Elea, in Italy in which they were resident. Aristotle 
summarizes their teachings in the words, "They expressed the 
I 
I 
i 16 w. T. Stace, CHGP , 1-30. 1
1 
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opinion about the univ·erse that it is one in ita essential 
nature. "17 Xenophanes approaches the problem of the universe 
I 
as "one" from a theological point of view and in the language o:e 
the religious leader~ "God is One, supreme among gods and men 
and not like mortals in body or in mind• ••• The whole (of God) 
sees~ the whole perceives, the whole hears. ~ ."18 Parmenides 
pursues the problem metaphysically and proceeds to the estab ... 
lishment of his conclusions by dialectical method: 
The one way assuming that Being is; and that 
it is impoa~ible for it not to be, is the 
trustworthy path, fo-r truth attends it •••• 
Though and Being a.re the same thing. • • • 
It is necessary both t o say and to think that 
Being ist for it is possible that being is, 
and it is imp,ossible that non ... being is; this 
is what I bid thee ponder. • • .Being is 
without beginning and indestructible; is un-
iversal, existing alone, immovable and withw 
out end •••• Nor is it subject to division, 
for it is all alike; npr is anything more in 
itt so as to prevent its cohesion, nor any ... 
thing less, but all is full of being; there-
fore, the .all is continuous, for being is 
contiguous to being ••• nl9 
Zeno attempts the defense of the principle by the negative 
method of demonstrating the impossibility of supporting the 
I 
opposing point of view. In passing we should also add that in I 
the attempt to prove the oneness of being, the Eleatics were 
the first to dra'' a clear' distinction between appearance and 
17 Aristotle; Eleatic, Intro. 
18 Nahmt SGP, 109"113. 
19 Parmenides, Concerning Truth, Nahm, Op. Cit~, 114..,.121• 
i 
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I reality, and the first to lay down the three anxioma of thought 
· · which could be resumed to one, namely the law of Identity~ A 
is A. But as Bowne points out the Eleatics we.re fallaciou~ in 
their dialectic• for they confused the concept of Being, meaning 
existence. with being; meaning something resting on something 
20 
else. 
Now let us consider Heracli tu.s together with the atomists • 
So far we have noticed that the Milesians emphasized two funda~ 
I mental issues: Reality is One.· All that is is alive. The 
I 
former gave rise to the Eleatic school• which we have disouBeed. 
The- latter. however, gives rise to Heraclitus and the Atomists • i 
1 
who hold that Change i~ the final reality. .,.,_Everything ohanges i 
I 
I 
.... -.Everything ie in :nux ...... These are word~ of Heraclitus. 1'Fire; : 
·I an infinite 1!16BB of B>+bstanoe, unereated and eternal, is iden~ I 
1 tical with the universe~n2.l Fire in its combination of moveeo I 
ment in flickering and its apparent identity and permanence., in I 
it.e consumption of fuel and its giving off o·f ash and smoke• I 
I 
1 would ap·pear to be an adequate manifestation of the principle or 
substance maintaining its identity despite transformation~ 
1 
"Reality~ it is cle-ar, is like the stream or the fire, in con-
I 
1 stant motion and flux." "All things are flowing" including the 
20 Bowne, MET, 81~82. 
' 21 Heracli tua, Fr. 20. 
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the percipient being. 22 Impl.ioit in Heraelitus' theory is what 
later philosophy d~veloped into "natural law". for it is clear 
that if all is in change and flux, the one exception to the 
generali~ation will be the law of change itself~ Heraali tus 
interprets his system in this wa1, for the law ia apart from 
perceptual things and is ident.ified with Logos or wisdom. 23 
24 Dials has called the attention to the tact that too fre .... 
quent contrasts o:f Heraclitus with the Eleatics may contribute 
to misunderstanding, :for di:fferene.es are bo,u.nd to be taken for 
fundamental contradictions. He affirms that Plato himself con-
sidered that the doctrine of change was not an exhaustive in-
terpretation of Heraci.itus 1 conception of the real; and it must 
be so if the following quotation from Plato is well understood: 
Anyone who pays the least attention to the 
sub jact will also perceive that in mu.aic 
there is the same recona iliation o:f oppo.;;. 
si tea; and I suppose that this must ha.ve 
been the meaning o:f Heraclitus~ although his 
worits are not accurate, for he says that the 
one is united by disunion~ like the harmony 
of the bow and lyre•25 I 
Emil Weerts26 believes that Heraclitus' outstanding oontributioJ 
. . ! 
to thought was the explanation he gave of the world when ac ... 
, counting for unity amidst multiplicity. Change is undeniably 
22 Heraclitus~ Fr. 81. 23 . 
24 Heraclitus, Frs. 4, 16, Diels in Hasting's ERE, 
25 Plato, Symposium, 187d. 
26 Helsel. CNGP, 68-69. 
18, 19. 
vol. VI, 591-594. 
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I 
I present and actual in the- philosophy of Heraclitus, but mere 
I change was not the most fundamental thing. "If the universal 
! motion~" says de Laguna, "is what Heraclitus has declared it to 
! 
be, the first principle must be such that its_ very nature, its 
very exis-tence, ·is a balanced change.n27 Professor Helsel, 
I' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
that'll elaborating on this. principle of <le Laguna, goes on to say 
Change thus conceived as occurring in a 
scheem of unity, transcends the cause and 
effect series of meohanistic conception. 
and refers to a kind of unity grounded in 
thought; in the case of Heraclitus believed 
to be discoverable primarily in the inner 
life. • • .The apprehension of this kind of 
unity is what He.racl.itus means by having 
unders-tanding. (-vous}. But one may ask, how 
is such apprehension possible? It cannot 
be acquired by knowledge derived from the 
senses. In the opinion of Heraclitus, exter~ 
nal nature failed at every point to impart 
the meaning of the real~ The world one sees 
and hears is unreliable. ttNot only eyes an<l 
ears are bad witnesses for men who have bar-
barian souls" (quoted from Sextus Empiricus, 
Adv. Math.) but eyesight is a lying sense. 
All sensible things are in state of flux and 
the-re is no knowledge about them. • • uindeed 
death is the only thing we see while awake." 
What then is the source of reliable knowledge 
according to Heraclitus? Hitherto the answer 
to this question had employed the means of 
nature and mathematics, proceeding from with-
out. In Heraclitus 1 opinion, howe-ver, the 
outside world was in ceaseless change, and he, 
similar to the Eleatics, rejected change as 
conditioning knowledge of reality. He then 
resorted to the other alternative~ the world 
within. Heraclitus said, "I sought the mean ... 
ing o1 ·myself." "To all men it is given to 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Theodore de Laguna, "The Importance of Heraclitus." The I 
:Phil. Rev. XXX, no. 3, March/21~ ___ -----------+ 
I 
know themselves.n The comprehension of reality 
according to Heraclitus, therefore is bound up. 
with self~knowledge, and is acqu i red by means 
of (vous), understanding. Rationality is some-
thing of human predication, and truth is more 
than thought. Heraclitus was the first to 
grasp the idea that life primarily was not aim.,. 
ple but complex; that oneness consisted not of 
a quantitative. unit but of a qualitative unity 
among opposites. He discovered within a focus 
of meaning, a nexus of understanding, a source 
of wisdom. The inner and united world of "self" 
was for Heraclitus the clue to otherwise elusive 
flux as applied both to the changing self and 
the changing world. But change was not final 
and exhaustive in the system of Heraclitus, it 
was but external and did not constitute ultimate 
reality.28 
31 
The ultimacy of reality was to be found in the Logos, as exper-
ienced by the inner self. 
As Schwegler points out, 
The practical philosophy of Heracli tue requires 
tha t we should not follow the deceitful delu~ 
siena of sense which fetter us to the changing 
and the perishable, but that we reason; it 
teaches us to know the true, the abidin~ in the 
mutable, and especially leads us tranqu1lly to 
acquiesce in the necessary order of the uni~ 
verse, and to perceive~ even in that whicv· seems 
to us evil, an element that cooperates to the 
harmony of the whole.29 
Now, before entering into a consideration of the pluralists 
that will occupy our attention next, by way of transition let us 
notice that in a certain sense the Eleatio and the Heraolitic 
principles which we have been discussing thus far, constitute 
I 
I 
!I 
I 
I 
' I 
I 
I 28 Helsel, Op. Cit., 68~83. 
29 Schwegler, HP, 22. 
I 
,, 
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the antithesis to each other. If Heraclitus resolves all per-
manent existence into an absolutely fluent becoming• Parmenides 
J resolves all becoming into an absolutely permanent being, and 
Ieven the senses. eye and ear, to which the former imputes the 
!error of transmuting the fleeting becoming into a settled being. 
I 
I 1are charged by the latter with the false opinion which drags 
/ immovable being into the process of becoming.30 We may say ac-
1 cordingly that being and becoming are the equally justified 
I 
antithesis which demand for themselves mutual equalization and 
conciliation. Heraclitus conceives the phenomenal world as 
plained by being simply maintained by Heraclitus. The q-q.estion 
must have ever recurred again and again, Why is all being a 
130 
I 
Notwithstanding the differences which we point out here, Dr. 
Dials maintains that "The Eleatic and Heraclitic thought are 
similar in that each system has a 'husk' and a 'kernel'. In 
the husk Heraclitus condescends to depict the world, as men 
are wont to fashion it for themselves from their ephemeral 
experiences; he portrays the mutable, inconsistent, uncon-
scious and childish world of change •••• The invisible 
represents the kernel of his philosophy. In the empirical 
region of sense perception, everything is inconsistent and 
relative; on the contrary in the realm of pure thought, the I 
absolute is enthroned •••• Thus, Heraclitus comprehends as 
exactly as his opponent Parmenides, who indeed only partially! 
understood him, noumena. and phenomena, truth and illusion , 
in his system." Herman Diels in "Heraclitus", ERE. vol. VI, I 
I 
I 
I 
592-593. :1 
/! 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
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becoming? Why is the one perpetually sundered into the many? 
The answer to this question, the explanation of the becoming 
from the preconceived principle o~ the Being, is the position 
and the problem of the philosophy of Empedocles and of the 
atomists. 
Empedocles' philosophical system may be briefly oharacter-
ized as an attempt at a combination between Eleatic Being and 
c. Empedocles 
Heraclitan Becoming. Proceeding 
from the Eleatio thought, that 
neither what had previously not been could become, nor what was 
could perish, he assumed as imperishable being, four eternal* 
self subsistent, mutually inderi vati ve, but divisible primal 
matter, fire, air, water~ earth. But, at the same time, com~ 
bining herewith the Heracl.itan principle of process in nature, 
Empedocles conceives his four elements to 'be mingled and moulde 1 
by two moving forces~ the uniting one of love, and the disu.ni- I 
ting one of hate. At first the four elements existed together, ! 
absolutely one with each other, and immovable in the Sphairoa, I 
that is, in the :pure and perfect globe ... shaped primitive world, 
where ~ maintained them in unity, till gradually ~' pene-
trating from the periphery into the inner of the Sphairos. that 
is, attaining to a desintegrating pow·er, broke up the unity, 
whereby the world of contrarieties in which we live began to 
form itself. For Empedocles, all that is called origination 
-----
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and decease, all mutation, simply rests on the mingling and un .... I 
mingling of these eternal primitive elements, and all tlle inex .... 
haustible multiplicity of being depends on their various ~ela-
1 
tiona of intermixture. All becoming is thus now thought only as II 
change of place. (Mechanical as opposed to a dynamical explana~ 
31 tion of nature.) 
Fools, !or they have no far-reaching studious 
thought~ who think that what was not before· 
comes into being, or that anything dies and 
perishes utterly •• , .For from wlla.t does 
not exist at all it is impossible that any-
thing comes into being or that ~nything that 
is should perish. And a second thing I will 
tell thee: There is no origination of anything 
that is mortal, nor yet any end in baneful 
death; but only mixture and separation - of 
what is mixed; but men call this, origination. 
~ • .And these elements never cease changing 
place ·continually, now being all united by 
love into one, now each borne apart by the 
hatred engendered of strife, until they are 
brought together in the u~~ty of the all, and 
become subject to it ••• 
Like Empedocles, the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus, en- IJ 
eavoured to effect a combination of the Eleatic and Heraclitie II 
e. Leucippus and 
Democritus 
principles, but in a different way. , 
Instead of assuming, like Empe- I 
ocles, an ag~y-egate of qualitatively determinate and distinct 
primitive elements as o·rigina.l sources, the atomists derived all \l 
I! 31 ThillYt H:P, 20-30;. Zeller, PSP, 117-144. 
32 Na.hm, SGP, 129-144. I 
I 
~--
1 
35 
,: 
phenomenal specific quality from a primeval infinitude of orig ... i 
inal constituents, which alike in quality were unlike in quan• 
tity. Their atoms are immutable material particles, extended 
but indivisible, and differing from each other only in size, 
shape and weight. As existent, but without quality, they are 
absolutely incapable of any metamorphosis or qualitative altera~ ~ 
tion, so that, as with Empedocles* all becoming is but local al~ 
teration; plurality in the phenomenal world is only to be ex ... 
plained by the various figures, order and positions of the atoms . 
which present themselves, toot united in various. comp-lexions. I 
The atoms to be atoms, that is, simple and. impenetrable units, 
must be reciprocally bounded off and sepa.rated. There must ex.., I 
ist something of an opposite nature to themselves, that receives 
the:m as atoms, and renders possible their separation and mutual 
independence. This is empty space~ or more particularly, the 
spaces existent between the atoms~ and by which they are kept 
asunder. Atoms are substances. Empty space is the voia. Ob• 
jective reality accru.es thus. to empty space as a fo.rm of being, 
the same as the atoms themselves. For this reason Demooritus 
expressly maintained as against the Elea.t:tcs, "Being ia by 
nothing more real than nothing. 1' With Democritus as well as 
with Empedoclea, there occurs the question as to the whenoe of 
mutation and movement. What is the reason for the atoms taking 11 
I 
on these multiform 
====l:J::=-=---- -------
inorganic and organic worlds? Democ ri tus finds this in the 
36 I 
I' 
nature of the atoms themselves, to which the vacuum affords 
room f9'r their alternate conjunction and disjunction. The atoms : 
variously heavy, and afloat in empty space, impinge on e·ach 
other. There arises thus a wider and wider expanding movement 
of the general mass; and in consequence of this movement, there 
take place the ~arious complexions, like-shaped atoms grouping 
themselves with like-shaped. These complexions, however,• by 
very nature~ always resolve themselves again; and hence the 
transito·rinesa of wo·rldly things. But this explanation of the 
formation of the world explains in effect nothing: it exhibits 
only the quite abstract idea of an infinite causal aeries, but 
no sufficient ground of all the phenomena of becoming and muta-
tion. As such last ground there remained the-refore O·nl.Y abao ... 
lute predestination or necessity (~1iY~~), which as in contrast 
to the final causes of Anaxagoras~ Democritus is said to have 
I 33 
name.d, TUX.YJ, chance. 
We have seen thus far,, that at least in comparison to 
Empedocles, Democritus was able to work out a more coneistent 
account of a pluralistic universe. We might even say that he 
worked a complete mechanistic explanation of nature. His are 
33 Cf. Zellar, PP, Vol. II, 207-250; and also Burnet, GP, Vol. 
I, 95·101~ 
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th.e ideas that constitute the main principles of every atomistic 
theory even to th.e present day. 
In his mathematical philosophy~ Pythagoras adopted number 
as the principle essential to an explanation of the universe. 
Perceiving niany qualities of num-
f. Pythagoras 
bars in bodies perceived by sense, 
the founder and his disciples developed their observations into 
a philosophy. The beginil.ings of their explanations are to be 
found, as Aristotle suggests34 in Pythagoras' discovery of the 
relationship of concord in music to number~ In the Pythagorean 
applicat:ton of the theory of concord in ml+Sic • Harmonia, which 
originally signified the octave or a musical scale, comes to me 
a system of relations and eventuallY the plan, scheem or eystem 
~ ~hich things compose. The soul is considered to be a harmony or 
atunement of the body. God is asserted as a monad. and exa.min-
ing the nature of number with special care, he said that the 
35 
universe produ.ces melody and is put together with harmony. 
Pythagoras also, according to Professor Helse136 , developed a 
I 
princ-iple of perma.ne-nc e, so,ul, 'fVP\, which in Pythagoras r phil-
as ophy stands :for a sel:f .... existing entity, · imprisoned for a. time 
in tha body, 37 and ita activities manifesting themselves 
I 
34 Aristotle~ MET, XIII. 
35 Nahm, Op. Cit., 78a. 
accord-
36 Helsel, Op. Cit., 58-60. 
I 37 Ibid. 
I 
j 
I 
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ing to distinguishable· qualities. Helsel puts the case in the 
following words: 
Neither the. Orphic "soul", nor the ttsoul" 
of Ionian science, was a self any more than 
the homeric. So far as we can judge, it was 
Pythagoras who first regarded the soul. in 
this way (i.e. as a self) •••• He must have 
regarded the soul which is the seat o.:f know-
ledge :for the Pythagoreans, as somet}?.ing with 
a permanent individualitz of its own.38 
According to Dr. Helsel, Pythagoras anticipates this way, 
Plato's three divisions of the sour, and sete up the beginnings 
of rational paycho,logy. 39 
As for the a·ystem of Anaxagoras, it rests wholly on the 
presuppositions o:f his predecessors, and is simply another at-
te-mpt to solve the :probl&~ of 
g~ Anaxagoras 
change and identity which they had 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
set up. Like Empedocles and the Atomists, Anaxagoras, too, 11 
denies Becoming in the proper sense. "The Greeks," runs one of 
his phrases~ 
erroneously assume origination and destruc-
tion, for nothing originates and nothing is 
destroyed; all is only mixed or unmixed out 
of pre-existing things;. and it were more cor-
rect to name the o.ne process "composition," 
and the other "decomposition. tr 
From this view, separation of matter and of moving force 
II 
follows ll 
for him as well as for his predecessors. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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But it is here t~at I 
39 
Anaxe.goraa strikes off in the direction peculiar to himself. 
Hitherto the moving force plainly had been imperfectly conceived 
The mythical powers o-f love and hate, the blind necessity of 
the mechanical theory, explained nothing; or at least, whatever 
they explained, they certainly explained not the existence of 
design in the process of nature. It was consequently seen to 
be necessary that this notion of design should be identified 
with that of the moving powert. This Anaxagoras accompliehed by 
his idea of a world ... forming intelligence (tVov~) that was abso~ I 
I 
lutely separated and free from matter, and that acted on design. 
I 
I 
Anaxagoraa describes this intelligence as spontaneously 
operative~ unmixed with anything, the ground of all motion• but 
itself unmoved, everywhere actively present, and of ail things 
the finest and purest. If these predicates~ in part, rest still I 
on physical analogies, and disclose not yet the notion of im- II 
materiality in its purity, the attribute, on the other hand~ of 11 
thought and conscious action on design; which Anaxagoras as-
cribed to theN' ous, leaves no doubt of the distinctly idealistic 
character of his principle otherwise. He remained standing by 
the mere statement of his main thought• nevertheless. and pro-
cured not for it any fulness of completion. The explanation of I 
this lies in the origin and genetic presuppositions of his prine ' 
ciple. It was only the necessity of a moving cause, possessed 
at the same time of designing activity, that had brought him to 
I 
I 
I 
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t~e idea of an imma..terial principle. HisNous is in strictness !1 
pnly a mover of matter: in this function its entire virtue is II II 
almost quite exhausted. Hence the unanimous complaints of both 
Plato and Aristotle, in relation to the Mechanical character of 
Anaxagoras' doctrine. Socrates relates in Plato's Phaedo that 
in the hope of being bronght beyond merely occasional or secon .... 
dary causes and "U.P to final causes, he had applied himself to 
the work of Anaxagoras, but instead of any truly tele :o~ogical 
explanation of ex~stence, he had found everywhere only a mechanm 
ical description. Like Plato, Aristotle also complains that 
Anaxagoras named indeed Mind. as the ultimate prineipl. e of things l 
but, in explanation of existent phenomena; sought its aid only 1 
as deus ex machina. Anaxagoras, thus, has postulated rather I 
t 
than demonstrated Mind as the power in nature, as the truth and 
reality of material existence. 
Side by side with thetVoGs, and equally original with it, 
there stands according to Anaxagoras, the mass of the primitive 
I 
I constituents of things: 
I 
40 Fr. 1. 
All things wer_e together infinit~ll numerous• 
infinitely little; shen came thefVous, and 
set them in order~4 And since these things 
are so, it is necessary to ~bink that in all 
the objects, .that. ?orB compound: ·there existed 
many things of all sorts, and germs of all 
objects, having all soriia of forma and colours 
---- ====== -- --------------- --
41 
and tastes. In all things there is a 
portion of everything, except mind; and 
there are things in which there is mind 
als o.42 · 
41 
These primitive constituents are not general elements, like 
those of Empedocles, fire, air; water; earth (which to Anaxa-
gcras are already compounds and not simple materials); but they 
are the identical, infinitely complex materials, constitutive 
of the individual existent things, (stone, gold; bonestuff) 
"the germs of all things," preexistent there, infinitely small, 
infinitely simple, and in perfectly chaotic intermixture. The 
f/ousbrought movement into this inert mass in the form of a 
vortex that perpetuates itself forever. This vortex separates 
the like parts and brings them together; not however, to the 
complete exclusion of all intermixture of like with unlike; 
rather, "in all there is something of all," or each thing con-
sists for the moat part of its own likes so to speak; but con ... 
taina within it representatives of all the other primitive con ... 
stituents as well. In the case of organized beings, more ea- \' 
pecially, we have the presence of the matter-moving , which I 
as animating soul, is immanent in all livins beings (plants, 1 
animals, men) but in different degrees of amount and power. In 
this way we see that it is the business of the Nous to dispose 
41 
42 Fr. 3. Fr. 5. Cf. also Nahm, Op. Cit., 149·155. 
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42 
all things, each in accordance with its own nature, into a 
universe that shall comprehend within it the most manifold 
forms of existence, and to enter into• and identify itself with 
this universe as the power of individual vitality~43 I 
With the theory of the immaterial principle~ the 1\1 oGs of I 
Anaxagoras, the realistic period of Presocratic Greek Philoso~ I 
phy concludes. Anaxagoras has brought all preceding principles ! 
into unity and totality. His chaos of primitively intermingled !I 
things represents the infinite matter _ of the Hylozoista; the 1 
pure being of the Eleatics is to be found in his/Vous; as both 
the "becoming" of Heraclitus and the "moving forces" of Empe .... 
docles in his shaping and regulating power of an eternal mind. 
In his ~ parts or homoeomeries, we have the atoms. Anaxa-
goras is the last of an old and the first of a new series of 
development; tne one, by the proposition, the other by the in-
completeness and persistently physical nature, of his ideal 
principle. 
As the purpose of this paper is mainly to trace the devel-
opment of the problem of change and identity in Greek Philoso .... 
phy~ we have tried to avoid all irrelevant material. Now we 
are about to enter into a consideration of Plato's and Aris-
totle's views on the matter. One oan readily see, that any 
43 Zeller, PP, Vol. II, 325-394. Also Helsel, Op. Cit.; 
Windelband, HP, 31, 31, 52; and Thilly, HP, 33-.40. 1 
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43 
discussion on the Sophists, the Stoics and the Epicureans~ I 
would be perhaps irrele,vant, for their problem is ethical, and I 
ours is metaphysical. Perhaps something should be said about 
the later Pythagoreans~ specially the Megarians; but it will 
suffice if taking Euclid of Megara. as their rep.resentative we 
simply mention the fact that he 
h. Euclid of Megara 
endeavoured to harmonize his Par-
menidean tradition of the oneness of being, with Socrate·sr em...; 
phasis on the validity of Reason; developing thereby an unsys-
tematized conception of Reality as a harmonious oneness of the 
2. Socrates, Plato, 
Aristotle 
a. Socrates' Concept 
nature of mind. But as for Soc~ 
rates himself who did not bother 
much with Metaphysics. but contri-
buted "The Concept" to dialectics and Ethics, which in turn 
II II I 
I 
I influenced Plato by way of method and attitude. 
Plato distinguished between two worlds, the world of sense I 
and the world of reality. The world of sense is the world of 
appearances in which we live, which 
b. Plato's Universals 
surrounds us, which imposes itself ~~ 
The world of reality is the world of thought; it is [II 
the world of universals; and only universals are real. Our 
upon us. 
world of appearances is but a mere copy, a vain imitation of 
the world of universals. What is the nature of these univere 
sale? Plato himself tells, that they are "valid, always and 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
j . 
44 
44 
everywhere." • "They are ever the same, self ... identical and 
self-existent, absolute, separate, simple, and without begin ... 
ning or end~ n45 "They are not rua·ted or worn away by the pro-
ceases of change which wreck such havoc in particular concrete 
obje·ots."~6 In another dialogue, he presents them as "free 
from any taint of sense or imagery~n47 and again, "Invisible i 
to the eye, apprehended only by the mind,"48 and finally, "They 
are complete, perfect, existent in every respect~n49 In shortt 
$o quote Fuller, 
In contrast to the shifting impermanent, 
multiple world of sensible objects, they 
bear all the ear marks of true being ••• 
They are the real esse noes of things, the 
only genuine existences, the things that 
really are •••• Moreover, taken altogether, 
they fit into one another and form one in-
terconnected whole• so that their different 
I 
aplendoura seem to radiate from a single 
principle~ a common denominator, present. in 
them all, the essence of all the meanings and 
values present in the world~ And this essence 
Plato seems to elevate into a separate and 
supreme Idea, a form of which all other forms 50 are particular instances and partial aspects~ 
Now, as Fuller very well has implied, it is not merely the 
existence of ideas, what Plato has been defending. In the 
4
4
4
5 
Re~ublic X, 296a; and also Aristotle, MET I, 9, 990b, 6ff. 
Phaedo, 78d-79c. 
46 Ibid. and also Fuller, HGP, Vol. II, 305ff. :~ Phaedrus~ 247c; Phaedo, 79a. 
Ibid. 
49 Republic VI, 493e; 507b; X, 597d; Phaedo, 65d; 78d; lOOc. 
50 Fuller, HP, Vol. II, 306. 
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Republic Plato puts the coping stone upon his ideal theory by 
asserting not merely the existence of separate, independent 
1 
I 
II 
ideas, but what is more important, the systematic unity of all \I 
II ideas under one s.upreme principle, a principle at once of all 
reality and of all thought. But with this conception of the 
ultimate unity of all things with each other and with the mind; 
Plato's philosophy seems to enter upon a second stage of devel~ 
opment, which carries him still farther away from the abstract II 
idealism commonly attributed to him. As we pointed already in II 
the introduction to this paper, it is noticeable that in the ~~~ 
dialogues which follow the Republic, Plato begins to change llis I 
point of view, and to speak of it a.s the business of philosophy 1
1 not only to rise from difference to unity, but also to trace 
the way downward from unity to difference and multiplioity. He ll 
characte:z;-izes the philosopher as one "who thinks things to... \I 
gather," but requires him that as soon as he reached the highes~ 
Idea, he should de·velop all other ideas from it. For Plato, 
1
1 
only he who is able to perform analysis and synthesis is worthy 
of the name of philosopher. Plato declares, 
He must be able to take a comprehensive view 
of the multiple of scattered particulars and 
to bring them under one form or idea for the 
purpose of defining the nature of th~1spec1al subject which he wishes to discover. 
51 E. Caird, ETGP, chap. 7. 
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Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) represents perhaps the climax of 
Greek philosophy. The method of proceeding by observation, 
initiated by Socrates and timidly applied by Plato, was eatab ... 
liahed on scientific basis by him. After having gathered an 
immense amount of mate rials which 
c. Aristotle 
(1) Logical Identity made him the first scholar of an-
(a) Fundamental principle 
of logic tiquity, he constructed eo vast a 
I 
synoptic philosophy of the whole of ! 
reality, that he earned for himee·lf the right to be considered I 
the prince of ancient philosophy. In real being, aocording to 
Aristotle, there is an element which is stable; and also an 
element of becoming. The element which is stable has both a 
logical and a metaphysical manifestation. "It is impossible~" 
Aristotle says; "that the same predicate can both belong and 
not belong to the same subject at the same time and. in the same 
sense. n 52 This is what is commonly called in logic the law of 
Non-Contradiction or "A is not not-A. " It calla attention to 
the fixity and permanence which judgments have and which pre-
vent them from changing into different meanings • This perman ... 
ence constitutes what in logic we call the ttniversality of 
judgment. The principle, of course; may be expressed in three 
I 
I 
52 Aristotle~ Metaphysics. Bk. III, Chap. 4• In the remaining !\ 
chapters of this book Aristotle shows that all thinking II 
~ presupposes the principle of logical identity. - ... _ II ------
1\ 
II 
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ways: The law of Identity (A is A), The law of Non~contradic~ 
tion (A is not not.A), and the law of the Excluded Middle (A 
is either B or no.t ... B}. But the principle is always the same, 
53 
that of consistency. 
Aristotle conceives the "real" of Plato; tha.t is, Plato's 
"ideas" or "Universals" not as existing apart~ but as immanent 
(b) Status of the 
Universal 
in individual sense objects. That 
is to say, universals do not exist 
by thEunselves. They a~e merely 
multiplied in the individual representatives of a class. In 
this respect, of course, Aristotle differs from hie teacher 
Plato• Aristotle classifies beings in ten categories~ of which 
the two fundamental are substance and accident. Socrates is a 
substance; but his virtue is an accident. An accident may be 1 
classified in different categories: quality, quantity, :relation j 
place, time, posture, possession resulting from change, aotiv- l1 
ity and passivity implied in change. In order to understand 1 
(2} Metaphysical Identity 
(b) Relation of Aristo-
tle's Forms to the 
problem of identity 
the Peripatetic metaphysics, it is 
necessary to se.t side by side with 
this division whicb is of the sta ... 
tic order, the classification of 
actuality and potentiality based on the becoming o:f being. Ever~~ 
II 
53 For ample discussion of logical identity consult any logic 
text-book. We suggest Creighton, IL, Chap. XXII, 397-409. 
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change, according to Aristotle, implies the passage from one 
state to another state. Suppose the case of a being X passing 
I 
from the state Y to the state z. The analysis of' this passage I I 
requires that X alre·ady possesses in Y the real princiEle of 
its change to z. Before its being Z it was capable of' becoming 
Z. Actuality or "-.ot"' is its present perfection, the degree of tj 
I ~ I \ )/ 
being ( f.VT{ /-.(X(Id To EV TE >-.E:<; EXt /V ) • Potentiality, potency or 
power, is the aptitude to receive perfection ( bUIIO...;<-ts). The 
actualization or passage from a potential state to an actual 
state is called motion or movement. Aristotle's theory of ~­
ter and form belongs to phyeics, but it takes a metaphysical. 
sense inasmuch as it is an explanation of change and identity. 
According to him, movement or change requires an amorphous or 
undetermined substrate (matter) which receives some determina- ~~ 
tio·n (form). The first of these elements is the principle of 1 
all that is potential; the second, of all the actual perfect-
ions in a being and especially of its unity. As he repeatf:J in 
his Physics, since terrestrial substances owe their generation 
and disappearance to their transformation into one another, it 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I is neeess.ary that there should be in them the permanent sub-
r ' i 
stratum of matter, that is, first or primary matter ("'f\ li?WTY\ I 
I 
I 
f/ UXY\)~ identical throughout the various states of the process, 
and another principle peculiar to each one of these stages~ 
I 
namely substantial for.m (eidos). The becoming of forma in I 
t-
·---------------------~ - c:f:l---=---. -_-
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matter is regulated by an inevitable purpose, which nature al- If 
ways tends to realize. Ace:ording to Ari~totle, the soul ap- 1'1 
pears as the first actuality (entelechy) of a natural body 
I potentially possess·ed of life. It is the substantial form o:f 
the living being. as the body is the first matter of the latter l 
( 
( I ) f I' I f ~~ ) 54 Y\. 'Pll'?Y\ Edll E.v•E)...E¥-Eia n lT'PWTY) owh1..ncs <\ludii(Uo. Though 
radically one, the soul finds its expression through various 
(3) Identity as object 
of the intellect 
faculties. These various kinds of 
faculties are the principles of all 
specific vital phenomena. Sen~e 
knowledge .,._ whatever be its form, whether through the extermal 
senses, the common sense. the memory or the imagination -- pre-
sents to us the particular and contingent properties of things. 
It is only Intelligence that perceives by a process of abstrac-
tion their reality apart from their individual Characteristics 
and limits imposed by time and space upon them. Me-taphysical 
identity is therefore the object of active intelligence. 
c. European Philosophw since Aristotle. 
I 
I 
i 
After the death of Aristotle the question of the Universals ! 
and Particulars continued to be the fundamental philosophical ~~ 
theme of the Middle Ages~5 The early Scholastics did not elearl~ : 
54 Aristotlet De Anima, II~ i. 55 Guilson, PMA,' 27-95. 
I 
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see the many aspects that this question involved, :for the prob ..... 
lem did not spring up spontaneously during this time. It was 
:forced upon the attention of the 
I 
I 
I 
L 
1 .. The Scholastics 11 
philosophers by an obscure text of 1! 
the raagoj~e of Porphyry commented by Boethiua. The question ~~ 
Porphyry asked was: Do genera and species exist as substances j 
in the world of reality • or are they mere products of the mind li 
II (sive subsistant, sive in nudis intellectibus posita stnt )? In JI 
other words, Do the objects of our concepts, that is to say, I 
species and genus; exist in nature (subsistentia), or are they ! 
merely abstractions of the mind (nuda intellecta)? Are they or 
are they not things in themselves. Those who replied in the 
affirmative (universalia aunt realia) received the name of 
realists. The other party answered: Universalia aunt nomina. I 
These were called anti-realists or nominalists. These histori-
1
1 
cal debates naturally bear on the problem of our dissertation, 
:for the universals were the only realities :for Plato, identica~ 
unchanging, eternal. Gilbert de la Porree (1076 ... 1154} caused 
an i~portant advance in the problem of universals by maintain-
ing that there is in things an objective 'fundamentum' :for the 
universality o:f our concepts. According to him~ the mind com--
pares and gathers together the essential determinations rea~ 
lized in a number of individual beings and it makes a mental 
union of the realities in them that are alike, and it is this 
=========fr=~----==---
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element of likeness, of identity, of mutu~l conformity and of 
continuity, which we call genus or species. In other words his 
distinct contribution towards the solution of the problem is 
the. teaching that it is the similarity of 'the essences which 
f'Q.rnishes the ground for the universalizing abstraction on the 
part of the mind, but also that such likeness and such identity 
is solely an object of the intellect. This, of ceurse~ is but 
another way of saying what Aristotle had already maintained. 56 
Identity is object of the mind, but its basis is to be found 
in the objective substance of things, for substance is the con-
tinuum and consequently the fundamental ultimate. 
In the philosophy of the British empiricists, Looke, 
Berkeley and Hume, this fundamental ultimate which is the basis 
of all knowledge, undergoes a radi-
2. The British Em.-
piriciats 
a. Locke (1732-1704) 
cal change. Locke does away with 
the concept of traditional aubstanc 
and brings in turn the concept of primary and secondary quali-
ties to take its place. He says that whatever the mind per ... 
56 Supra. C:f. also Guilson~ PMA., 58-60. 
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rest, number. 
The secondary qualities are in truth nothing 
in the objects themselves but powers to produce 
various sensations in us by their primary qual ... 
ities, i.e, by the bulk; figure, texture, and 
motion of their insen$ible parts, as colours, 
sounds, tastes; etc~~57 
52 
To Locke, the primary qualities exist independently of the mind,! 
they remain no matter what alteration the object un<l.ergoes; 11 
II For example~ 
Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, 
each part has still solidity, extension, figure 
and motion; divide it again, and it still re-
tains the same qualities; and so divide it on 
till the parts become insensible; they mu~t re-
tain still each of them all these qualities.58 
The secondary qualities, on the other hand, have no independent 
existence; they are nothing but sensations produced in us by 
the primary qualities; these sensations do not resemble the 
qualities existing in the objects. 
Let not the eyes see light or colours; nor the 
ears hear sounds; l .et the palate not taste~ nor 
the nose smell; and all colours, tastes, odours, 
and sounds ••• vanish and cease, and are re-
duced to their causes, i.e. bulk, figure and 
motion of parta.59 
I 
II I! 
1\ 
I 
We have seen on the other hand, however, that the primary qual-
ities never disappear, even if one divides the object into the 
most insensible parts. Identity for Locke consists in the con- 1 
57 Locke, Essay Cone. Human Understanding, Bk. II, Chap, VIII, 
58 sec. 10. 
59 Ibid., sec. 9. Ibid., sec. 17. 
II 
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60 tinuity of these primary qualities, But Locke also tackles 
the pTOblem of personal identity, and makes it depend absolute-
ly on conscioueness. With consciousness the self is also i- I 
I 
i 
dentified.61 As we have seen Locke's distinction between pri- I 
mary and secondary qualities conati tutE5 the first blow against I 
the traditional concept of Substance. i 
The final blow is Bishop Berkeley's finishing touch. 
Berkeley directs his polemic against Locke•s division between 
b. Berkeley (16~5-1753) 
primary and secondary qualities. 
Berkeley is in full accord with 
I 
Locke when he admits that secondary qualities, such as colour, I 
I 
sound, taste, smell and the like have no independent existence, ! 
This, of course~ re- I 
solves itself into the theory that such experiences are ideas, 
1
1 
perceptions by us as perceiving subjects. Locke, however, in-
for they are a result of our own senses. 
I 
sists that primary qualities do exist independently of us, for I 
I 
they are not a result of our senses. Berkeley does not accept I 
this theory. He shows logically that even the primary qualitie~ 
I differ with different individuals, which proves conclusively ~ 
II 
1
1 
that the primary are just as relative as the secondary quali- II 
I ties; hence nothing exists independently of being perceived by I 
I the mind. Esse est percipi. The Mind is the metaphysical 
11 
II 
/I 
~~ Ibid., Bk. II, Chap. XXVII, sees. 1 and 2. 
Ibid., Sees. 9, 10, and 17. 
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u1timate. It is the unchanging basis, the only principle of Ji 
pe rmane nc e. The human mind, however, in the Philosophy of II 
Berkeley is not the only Mind there is. !, As we have seen, the 11 
old concept of substance of the scholastics, has given way to 
a spiritual ultimate, the only ontological continuum, basis of 
all that really is. 
II 
1
11 
I 
I 
I 
Identity, for Hume, is one of the seven different kinds of \i 
I 
I philosophical relation. It cannot be the object of certainty, I 
nor the object of any kind of knowledge because it does not 
i 
c. Hume (1711~1766) 
· depend solely on any impression or ·I 
any ides. 62 His views on personal 11 
identity are very contradictory, but as a whole it may be said 
that he finally decides for the reality of a necessary unifying 
self. To be more explicit, Hume's first attitude is _that of 
ine:xhorable attack agains.t the philosophers of self. 63 "We 
have no idea of self," says liume. By this, of course, he means 
II 
I 
that there is no original impression to which the idea of iden- ~ 
tity could be traced, for every genuine idea must have 
correspondent impress ion. 
We have a distinct idea of an object that re-
mains invariable and uninterrupted through a 
supposed variation of time; and this we call 
that of identity or sameness. Vie have also a 
distinct idea of several different objects ex-
its I I 
II 
ll 
II ~~ Hume, THN, Vol. I, part III, sec. 1, 73-74. ll 
Ibid., part IV, sec. 6, paragraphs 1.-5_,__, _2_3_8_-_2_4_0_ . ______ ·_ __ _ ___ - --
jl 
II tl 
I 
I 
I 
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- -----~--. ·-· -·---isting in sucaession, and connected together 
by a clos.e relation; and this to an accurate 
view affords as perfect a notion of diversity 
a.s if there Was no manner of relation among 
the objects.64 
55 
It is the relation that exists among objects themselves, that 
facilitates the transition of tbe mind from 
one object to another, and renders its passage 
as smooth as if it contemplated one continued 
object. This resemblance is the cause of the 
confusion and mistake, and makes us substitute 
the notion of s%entity~ instead of that of re-
lated objects. 
For Hume, thus, objeats are ontologically connected by 
themselves. 
But we often feign some new and unintelligible 
principle that conne.cts the objects together 
and prevents their interruption or variation 
• , • and run into the notion of a soul, and 
self, and substance, to disguise th"6Variation.66 
One wonders, however, what meaning does Hume attach to the· idea 
ot objects being connected by themselves. ffuat is the nature 
of that connection? Where does that connectiop. come from? 
What is it that does the connecting? It is not memory; al-
though in a way, memory is the faculty that accounts for iden-
tity. But identity is not connectedness. The function of 
memory is recognition, 
and in this particular, memory not only dis-
covers the identity, but also contributes to 
its production by producing the relation of 
64 Ibid., sec. 6, paragraph 6, 240. 
~~ Ibid. 
Ibid., 241. 
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resemblance among the pereeptions. 6? . ~ 68 (It) is the source of personal identity. I I 
I 
Had Hume followed into the farthest implication of his concept I 
of objective connection, he would.. have arrived at the notion of 
a Supreme Mind, for connection is unintelligible except in 
terms of mind; and if there is objective connection valid for 
external reality, there must be an objective Supreme Mind doing 
the connecting. The way Hu.me concludes the treatment of the 
problem of identit.y in his Treatise is certainly most unsatia...;. 
factory. He says, 
The whole of this doctrine leads to a conclu-
sion ••• viz. that all the questions concern-
ing personal identity are to be regarded rather 
as grammatical than as philosophical diffioul-
ties.69 
But apparently, Hume himself was not satisfied with his con-
clusion. He continued struggling with the problem, and even 
though finally he did not offer any more definite solution, 
courageously he confessed, 
Upon a more strict review of the section con-
cerning personal identity, I find myself in-
volved in such a labyrinth, that, I must con-
fess, I neither know how to correct my former 
opinions, nor how to render them consistent.70 
While the concept of Substance as fundamental ultimate is 
undergoing the revisions we have already pointed out at the 
67 
68 Ibid.~ paragraph 18, 246-247. 247. 
248~ 
I 
Ibid., paragraph 20, 
69 Ibid., paragraph 21, 
70 Hume, EHU, appendix, par, 1, 260. 
------~ 
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hands of the British empiricists, the continental rationalists, 
Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, are also questioning the tena-
bility of the concept in the traditional sense. Descartes, as 
Dean Knudson puts it, "breaks the 
3. Continental Ration. 
alists 
a. Descartes (1596-1650) spell which the Aristotelian dis-
tinction between matter and form 
had exercised over the human mind for almost two thousand 
years.n 71 He establishes a distinction between thought and ex-
tension, that is to say, mind and body, making mind or soul in-
dependent from the body. Mind's function is soiely that of 
thinking. As Dean Knudson calls attention again, the definitio 
of soul as a think.ing substance 
establishes a sharper distinction between mind 
and matter and between soul and body than had 
heretofore been made. Thought was now regarded 
as constituting the essence of mind or soul, 
and so constituted, the mind stood distinctly 
opposed to extended matter and the soul to the 
divisible and perishable body. As thought the 
soul was the moat certain object of knowledge. 
It was also a 'pure substance' maintaining ita 
identity through chan~e as the body could not 
do, and hence was to e considered as 'in ita 
own nature immortal.•72 
It is clearly to be seen, therefore, that although starting 
from different premises and even by way of different reasonings 
the English empiricists and the continental rationalists, ar-
rive at the same fundamental conclusion, namely, the primacy of 
~~ Knudson, POP, 430f. 
Ibid., 323. 
58 
the self as point of departure. An exception to this last 
statement is the pantheistic monism of Spinoza, whom we shall 
discuss parenthetically, for even though he does not add any 
worthwhile contribution to the philosophy of self, in a way the 
p~oblem of change and identity finds treatment in his system. 
In contrast to the distinction that Descartes had established 
b. Spinoza (1632-1677) between matter and mind, Spinoza 
reduces both to phenomena of an 
underlying reality, or an ultimate Substance that transcends 
both matter and mind. This Substance, Spinoza identifies with 
Nature and with God. He conceives it as possessing an infinite 
number of attributes, of which only two are known to us, namely 
thought and extension. To the totality of reality he applies 
the aame of Substance intending by it, we suppose, a coherent 
explanation of phenomenal variety in terms of a unitary trans-
cendent concept. In this respect, the system of Spinoza fails 
to achieve its aim, because nowhere does he give us an insight 
into the way in which his Substance differentiates itself into 
its infinite attributes. The concept of infinite attribute, 
furthermore, carries with it an internal contradiction, for in 
this case overlapping of jurisdiction among the attributes 
would be unavoidable. Besides, a concept that is so large that 
by its nature erpands itself to be so inclusive that nothing 
escapes it, finally bursts and becomes empty. This is the 
59 
difficulty with Spinoza'e Substance. But there is a positive 
element in hie philosophy that serves well our investigation, 
namely, the function that Intuition has in hie epistemology. 
Imagination, Reason and Intuition are the three kinde of know-
ledge man is able to have. The first gathers its data from 
the senses~ multilated and confUsed. The second is rational, 
and refers to things in relation to their proper setting in 
nature. The third, is the only knowledge by which man grasps 
the meaning of the whole, and the identity of God with His 
world. In Spinoza, therefore, Aristotle comes back to us, with 
hie fundamental position: Identity, an object of the intellect 
Descartes, we have seen, was an avowed dualist. Spinoza, on 
the other hand, was a vigorous monist. The philosophy of Leib-
niz, influenced by Spinoza and Descartes, shows traces of both. 
At the same time, however, that it was influenced by these 
philosophers, it corrected the difficulties raised by them. In 
the first place Leibniz revises the concepts of Descartes' mind 
and matter. Thought for Leibniz includes more than it does for 
Descartes. It does not include merely conscious ~erceptiona, 
but the unconscious states. Both enter into the wider category1 
I 
of the thought concept. Then again, Descartes calls matter 
extension. But such a description of the physical represents 
it as static; inactive, inert. Experience and reason itself 
---'-'==----
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picture the physical world quite differently. Everywhere there 
is action, motion, power, Will, resistance, desire, struggle. 
c. Leibniz (1646-1716) 
As a matter of fact, behind exten-
sion there is a force that extends 
itself. It may be that the changing world of phenomena is but 
the external manifestation or appearance of the force within. 
This force must therefore be inextended. The whole universe is 
force; this in turn, in the sense of resistance, exhibits it-
self as extended matter, but at the same time; it also has the 
mental aspect of perception~ beginning with the vaguest kind of 
perception in the lowest realm of inanimate body, and ascendi~ 
to the highest sphere of conscious reasoning. Leibniz is there4 
fore monistic in that he reduces the whole universe to force. I 
- I 
He also introduces a theory of monads according to which nature 
consists of as many centers of force as there are things in the 
world. A monad is an original forqe, a formal atom, a sub-
stantial form. Each constitutes an individual, independent of 
all other monads, depending only on itself for form, character, 
mode of life. No external cause can modify it. It is endowed 
with spontaneous activity. It eternally remains what it is. 
"It has no windows by which anything can enter or pass out." 
I Each monad is a mirror of the universe, reflecting within itsel~ 
r 
all that nature contains. There iS no outside source whence it 
I 
- - -- --- ------:---------=o=.=c==~=~~- 6~-l~ -~~~= 
may derive knowledge. The lowest monad too, contains such /! 
mirrored knowledge, but its perceptions are the most minute and .\ 
vague. As one ascends in the scale of importance of the monads 
the higher they are the more clear and intelligent do their 
perceptions become. V'lhen one reache!i3 so-called soul-monads, 
one finds the most conscious, 
of the world. This universe 
is the Monad of monads. The 
I 
clear, comprehensive reflections I 
of monads is governed by God who , 1 
I 
will of God is the ultimate reason l 
! of the self-contained and entirely self-determined development I 
I, of each monad and of its power of reflecting within itself ever71 I. 
other monad in its conscious or unconscious cognition. This 
principle Leibniz calls the Pre-established Harmony~ which in 
the oase of hie system explains not only causality in general, I 
I but the interaction between body and soul~ In essence, then, 11 
I in the philosophy of Leibniz, there are no bodies. Matter eon- I 
sists of a group of lower monads. Space and time are merely II 
II 
!I 
phenomena of consciousness. Each monad is an independent force ~ 
and in this respect it is a substance. Substance and cause are // 
I 
correlatives. Organisms are groups of monads. They are dis- i 
tinguished from inanimate matter in that they have a central I 
! 
i 
monad, which dominates the lower monads. Considering the far- \ 
I 
I 
reaching implications of the points stated above, and especi-
,, 
j/ 
-'~ . 
ally realizing that nLeibniz was the first to develop the 
I 
I 
I II II [, 
/i 
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principle of individuality in a thorough-going way, • having "it li 
consist not in an 'idea 1 or 'form' or a passively conceived II 
substance. but in a power of aotion;n and also considering that j 
"Leibniz found the true exemplification of this individuality il II 
I in the soul or in soul-like beings," Dean Knudson says that "in 'I 
this respect Leibniz might be called the first personalist.n73 
The monad as the fundamental principle of permanence and iden~ 
tity in the philosophy of Leibniz is one of the great achieve-
menta of philosophy. 
The great task of subjecting experience and knowledge to 
a through-going radical investigation, however, was reserved to 
Immanuel Kant. He showed that the sensibility as the mere pas-
sive recipient of external sense 
4. Kant (1724-1804} 
data could produce nothing beyond 
fleeting and unconnected impressions. Without the impact of 
creative thought sensations in and of themselves have neither 
unity nor identity. They are merely "phantasmagoria without 
intelligible content." Sensations are but the materials of 
I 
I 
I 
thought. By themselves they lack all articulate character~ The ! 
I 
! 
i categories are the a-priori ground of experience, and without 
them experience is impossible. In contrast to the traditional I 
li 
li 
rl 
view of earlier philosophers that thought merely analyzes the 
II .-c~~~~~ 
il 
73 Knudson~ POP, 185, 186, 188. 
I 
I 
material of the senses, Kant emphasizes the synthetic activity 
in all our mental operations. He distinguishes three original 
sources or :faculties: 
1. The synopsis o:f the manifold a-priori 
through the sens&s~ 
2. The synthesis of this manifold through 
the imagination. 
3. The unity of that synt~~sis by means of 
original apperception~ 
According to Kant every representation contains· something 11 
manifold which is presented to the mind under the :form of time. 
1
1 
Impressions appear and disappear. In and by themselves they I 
have no relation. One impress.ion can not judge another impres- 1 
sion; nor the consciousness of a single impression can distin-
guish that impression from the consciousness of succeeding im-
pressions. If impre.ssions are to have any meaning, they must 
be gathered up in the unity of a single consciousness of all 
I 
the impressions united into a single object. This is what Kant ~~ 
calls "The synthesis of apprehension in intuition." This syn-
thesis, however~ is a function of identity in itself. Explain-
ing the second faculty mentioned abovet which Kant calls the 
synthesis of reproduction in imagination, he applies to indivi.;. 
dual separate thoughts what he already had said about separate 
impressions~ 
74 F. Max IMler (tr.) KC:PR, 78~ 
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We must admit a pure transcendental synthesis 
of imagination which forme even the foundation 
of the possibility of all experience, such ex-
perience being impossible without the repro-
ductib.ility of phenomena. Nowt when I draw a 
line in thought or if I think the time from 
one noon to another, or if I only represent to 
myself a certain number~ it is clear that I 
must first necessarily apprehend one of these 
manifold representations after another. • • • 
And if, while I proceed to what follows, I were 
unable to reproduce what came before, there 
would never be a complete representation, and 
none of the before-mentioned thoughts~ not even 
the first and pure~t representations of space 
and time, could ever arise within ua.75 
64 
• 
I 
I 
I 
One can readily notice; therefore, the importance that Kan1:!1 
lays on the function of synthesis in all mental operations. II 
II 
Kant has made a searching analysis of logical identity, and ea- II 
tabliahed it as the fundemental prerogative of all intelligible 11 I, 
experience. To the third synthesis Kant gi vee the name of the Jl 
synthesis of recagni tion in concepts, and calls attention to il 
the fact that: 
Without our being conscious that what we are 
thinking now, is the same as what we thought 
a moment before, all reproduction in the ser• 
ies of representations would be v~in. Each 
representation would, in its present state, 
be a new one~ and in no wise belonging to ~he 
act by which it was to be produced by degrees, 
and the manifold in it would never form a 
whole, because deprived of that unit~ which 
consciousness alone can impart to it. If in 
counting I forget that the "U!.lities which now 
present themselves to my mind have been added 
gradually one to the other, I should nat know 
the production of the quantity by the suecee-
75 •• . Muller, Ib~d., 84. 
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sive addition of one to one, nor should I know 
ooneequently the number produced by the count-
ing, this number being a concept, a consisting 
entirely in the consciousness of that unity of 
synthesis. 76 
65 
In other words, deny the unity of consciousness, self-con-
sciousness itself, and experience will become inarticulate and 
knowledge impossible, Kant's emphasis on this principle and 
his carrying of it to its furthest implications, is the greates 
contribution that has been made to the problem that occupies 
our investigation. Indeed he puts it more final when calling 
this same principle by the name of transcendental apperception 
he tells us that it 
must be a condition which precedes all exper. 
ience, and in fact renders it possible, for 
••• No knowledge can take place in us, no 
conjunction or unity of one kind of knowledge 
with another, without that unity of consciousness 
which precedes all data of intuition, and with-
out reference to which no representation of 
objects is posaible.77 
I 
The importance of Kant's position, of course, is not merely I 
It carries wiJ~ epistemological or logical, as we have gathered. 
I' it far-reaching implications extremely valuable in the field of :1 
I 
metaphysics, for above all, it affinns the ontological reality 
of the self• 
The influence of Kant upon subsequent philosophy can 
76 Ibid"; 85. 
77 Ibid., 88. 
=--=-----++--_----:_--:~~--=-~-~--=- =-=-=-=----_-::-_-_ -_-_=----~--------=- .---,----__ --=-=-----==--.::::. 
II 
I 
I 
II II 
-----
--i-t---- -===--
66 II 
scarcely be exaggerated• It has given birth to several origin- l1 
al systems, which have treated the problem of identity from a ! 
point of view radically different to that emphasized by Kant. 
Fichte elaborated an original philosophy to which he gave 
I 
I 
I 
the name of Wissenschaftlehre. According to his system the I 
Absolute is an Ego, It is a tendency to aat, It is infinite, II 
unbroken activity, acting for it- II 
·' 5. Problem of Identity 
since Kant 
a. Fichte (1762-1814) 
li 
self and through itself. In acting I' 
it converts its own states into ob- I 
jects of knowledge and by reflection becomes eelf~consciousness. 
I 
The process of becoming self-conscious covers three stages: I 
1. (thesis} The Ego posits itself, that is to say, it knows it-
self as existing and as identical with itself; 2. (antithesis} 
It posits within itself the Non-Ego, that is to say, it creates 
the world as an object of representation; 3. (synthesis) The Egq 
or universal self-consciousness becomes aware that it is limite~ 
by the Non-Ego, and that the Non-Ego is limited and determined 
by the Ego. According to Fichte, the reflection of the essen-
tial activity of the Ego is by its very definition a turning 
back upon something anterior to itself, and it follows that to 
explain its possibility, there must be at the beginning an 
absolute and immutable principle, This principle, however, is 
not a mere fonn of reflection but God himself. Apparently, 
Fichte 's phil.osophy does not bear much on the problem of iden-
I 
,,, 
'I I, I. 
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tity; but it does in several ways. In the first place the 
i 
whole of its structure rests on the validity of the Ego posit~ 11 
ing itself as identical with itself. In the second place, his !I jl 
notion of the absolute, as a conscious cosmic totality bar-
monizing the opposing extremes of theses, antitheses and syn-
~ 
,I 
II 
I 
theses, is itself one of the problems of ultimate identity; and j 
in the third place, even his theory of State as an organic I 
living whole, a living structure itself~ is itself an aspect of \ 
I 
our problem applied to social theory. I II 
The philosophic work of Schelling is marred by its want of ij 
:j 
I Between the years 1797 and 1799 he developed a system unity. 
I 
I of Physical Idealism, according to b. Schelling (1775~1854) 
which nature is spirit, as it is a I! 
psychical product of mind representation. His system at this I' 
!I period is an account of unconscious spirit passing according to ' 
i a rhythm of purposive evolution, through the various stages 
which constitute the different kingdoms of nature. In his 
I 
I 
I 
I 
transcendental or aesthetic idealism (1800-1801) he presents. thel 
I' 
aesthetic production of the Absolute Ego as the principle of a1~ 
I 
' I 
its activities. Such aesthetic production is itself a basic I 
I, 
function which reduces to unity the operations of both the ~~ 
theoretic and practical Ego. Hence, the work of art is the Ego 1\ I' 
producing itself most perfectly. Schelling's "physical ideal- 1
1
1 
I 
·I ~ 
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ism" which we discussed in connection with his writings during I 
1797-1799, gives an account of the Non~Ego. The transcendental ~~~ 
idealism w}lich we have just discussed, however, gives us an ac- j l I. 
count of the conscious Ego. Later, he united both in a third !I 
I 
This I 
Ac-. I 
system, Absolute Idealism or the Philosophy of Identity. 
period covers the works which he wrote between 1801 ... 1804. 
cording to Schelling, now, nature }las a real value independent 
of consciousness or spirit; but there is a common ground or 
principle anterior to both nature and consciousness. This he 
calls The Absolute, and from it he deri ve~a both nature and the 
spirit. The Absolute he defines as the identity of the ideal 
and the real. There is a simila~ity between Schelling and the 
neo....Spinozist at this period, at least in respect to Spinoza's 
I 
I 
I 
psychophysical parallelism. 
II 
According to Schelling, the Abso- lj 
II lute develops itself in a twofol~ seriation, the real and the 
ideal; matter and thought. At the end of his writings, Schelw 
ling's philosophy of identity assumes a slight new form, be-
cause instead of being regarded as indifferent, it is endowed 
wi.th Intelligence and Ideas, This identification of being and 
thought in the system of Schelling represents another step for-
ward in the evolution of the problem of identity, for the prin-
il 
I 
l1 
ciple of permanence that it sets forth in 
synthesize the two most radical extremes, 
the Absolute seeks to 
1 that of the ideal and 
1
, 
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that of the real, not in terms of Spinoza 's senseless, impas-
sible and mechanical Substance, but in terms of a spiritual Ab-
solute whose basic function is its free becoming and manifesta-
tion into finite reality. 
Commencing with the unity of consciousness as point of 
departure; Hegel attempts to gather into a higher synthesis, 
the opposites of mind and matter, spirit and nature, neumenal 
c. Hegel (1770-1831) 
and phenomenal world, which Fichte ~ I 
Schelling and other of his immediatd 
predecessors had recognized, and of which others had suppressed 
one of the correlatives. He holds that all existences have 
i 
their reality only as ideas in the univers~l reason. The ulti-
i 
mate source of all things is a spiritual principle, the essence i 
It 
of which is thought. Hegel 'a philosophy comprises three parts~ 'I 
I logic, the philosophy of nature, and the philosophy of mind. I 
I 
I The abstract conditions of consciousness, and the evolution of 1 
the categories which we utilize in conceiving the . universe unde~ 
the progressive heads of pure being, essence and concept, is thJ 
! 
fundamental theme of his logic. All reality is a system of 
I 
I 
I logical concepts which evolve from one another in dialectical 
I 
I 
necessity. Hegel's controlling assumption in his theory of 
dialectical evolution is the law of the identity of thought ana l 
I 
being. Fichte and Schelling influenced him in this respect~ / 
-----
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11 but Hegel transcends both of them, The dialectical evolution 
of his logic terminates, or rather, culminates in the concept 
of the Absolute Idea, which contains in its totality all the 
thought elements evolved from the primal Idea of Being. His 
i 
! 
.!
1 
philosophy of nature which he divided · into mechanics, physics 
ana. organics , is the statement of the :forms of the ob;! e eti ve I i
world in ana. through which Thought becomes concrete, His phil- l1 
osophy of Mind deals with the stages through which Thought 
I 
passes from the simplest forms of physical activity to complete 11 
self-consciousness. As in the case of Hegel's philosophy of 
nature, Thought loses its inwardness and is disclosed in its 
objectivity under the forms of space and time; in the case of i 
his philosophy of Mind, thought returns from the outwardness of !. 
II 
nature into itself. His philosophy of Mind Hegel divides into 'I 
II 
I 
, the Subjective Spirit, the Objective Spirit and the Absolute 
--1 
I 
Spirit. Of Hegel's system, this is the part most rich in pro- I 
found implications, especially in the field which at present 
attracts our attention, namely, that of the metaphysics of 
change and identity. His principle of identity, we have seen 
in Reason itself~ "All being is reason, and the rational alone 
is real;" he says. Consciousness of our personal identity with i 
. ·I 
the universal or Absolute Spirit, is the ideal which underlines I 
his philosophy. To Hegel's philosophy several objections may / 
I 
'I 
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II be raised, especially within the limits marked by the object of ,. 
our dissertation; but to avoid repetition; we shall take these ,1 
up when we discuss Lotze who pointed some of them, and also 
when we discuss the Hege:t,.ia.n eleme.nts in the logic of Bowne • 78 
Schopenha.uer, like Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, was dis- 11 
satisfied with Kant's analysis of the reality behind the phe-
nomena.. The Ka.ntian Ding an sich seemed so useless and un-
necessary, in view of reason's inability to comp.rehend it, that 
for the post-Kantians the most 
d. Schopenhauer (1788-1860) 
logical thing was to identify it 
with some element whose nature might be known to us. This 
thing in itself in the systems of the post-Kantian idealists 
tur.ns to be their principle of permanence~ their metaphysical 
ultimate, and their continuum~ Hegel calls it Reason; Schopen-
hauer, Will~ Kant himself had attached a great deal of imp or-
tance to Will. He made it even superior to pure reason in its 
successful attempt to postulate the existence of freedom, im-
I 
i 
I 
li 
II 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
mortality and God. Fichte went one step farther, making Will I 
the instrument by which the Non-Ego is imposed by the self for !I 
its moral development. Schelling finally called his Absolute, 
Will, also. These theories, however, we-re only the starting 
point of Schopenhauer 1s conception. To them, Will is intelli-
78 Infra, Chapter III,' caption h. 
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this Will, accol"ding to Schopenhauer, we can know nothing ex-
cept by opposition to phenomena. Therefore it must be aaid, 
that since the world of' representation is dependent on time and 
space, the Will is independent of these forms - o~ space and time. · 
I It is not subject to multi plication or variety, It is one. It I 
is free, for contrary to the world it is unhampered by the laws 
1 
of efficient causality. It is blind. It is infinite. Phenom-
ena are not the effect of will. They are its objectivation. 
As for consciousness~ its primordial fact is representation; I 
I 
space, and causality~ which belong to the structure of' the 
II 
I 
I 
I 
but representation depends upon the aepriori forms of time~ 
~acuities. Consciousness, therefore, is not o~ the nature of 
I 
the ultimate. It is no finality, and consequently~ not a valid I 
principle of permanence. I I 
II 
!I 
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So ;far we have tried to give a brief history of the prob- 1 
lem of change and identity by singling out the principles of 
permanence which the different systems of philosophy have em-
phasized. Our purpose in doing this has been to understand the 
philosophical background of the man whose thought we propose to 
study in our investigation. As a result of our brief survey we 
have observed the tenacity with which the problem of change and 
identity has persisted throughout the history of thought. One 
particular fact has not escaped our attention~ namely, the im-
permanence of all principles of permanence. No sooner a meta-
physical ultimate is offered as solution to the problem; than a 
new formula appears. It is not venturesome, however, to remark• 
that the different principles of permanence have been marching 
in the same direction until the time of Kant. The common di-
rection seems to be that of personality as the metaphyE!ical u1..:. 
timate, but with the post-Kantians up to Schopenhauer, the 
principle of permanence little by little has depersonalized it. 
self until it has simply become an abstraction; whether the ab-
straction is the Reason of Hegel, or the Will of Fichte, Schel-
ling, or Schopenhauer. Consciousness has come to be either an 
effect or a mere objectivation of the Will as in the case of the 
I 
I 
[I 
German pessimist, and so far as these philosophers are concerned 
one wonders if after all there are even grounds to keep believ-
!I 
lo 
74 
/i 
I 
I 
ing in the reality of the self. Philosophy calls for a daring 
representative who transcending Fichte; Schelling, Schopenhauer I 
and Hegel, may be able to redeem the soul. This is the place 
I· that Hermann Lot~e occupies in the history of thought. 
.Knudson observes: 
As Dean 11 
Re combined the idea of reality with that of 
consciousness, or, rather, interpreted reality 
in terms of s·elf-consciousness. For him there 
was no consciousness without a subject, no 
thought without a thinker, no activity without 
an agent. The very consciousness of unity and 
of self-identity put upon the soul the stamp 
of reality. No further evidence of its truly 
substantial character was needea.79 He found 
the mark of reality in conscious self ... existence, 
and directed attention to the fact that in self~ 
experience we have an actual instance of the 
co-existence of uni~O and identity with multi-
plicity and change• 
It was Lotze, therefore; who made personality the funda-
mental u1 timate and the essential datum. He e.ays, 
Among all the errors of 
e. Lotze (1817-1881) the human mind, it has 
always. seemed to me the 
strangest that it could 
come to doubt its own existence, of whioh a-
lone it has direct experience, ·or to take it 
at second hand as the product of an external 
nature which we know only indirectly~ only by 
means of the knowledge of the very mind to 
which we would fain deny existenoe.81 
Referring to the abstraction of the Hegelian Reason, which we 
79 Knudson, POP~ 74. 
ao Ibid., 84. 
81 Quoted by Knudson, POP, 393f~ 
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mentioned before, according to Dean Knudson: 
Lotze corrected the Hegelian tendency toward 
an abstract and universalistic type of meta-
physics by successfully maintaining that real~ 
ity is concrete and individual~ that it is 
infinitely richer than thought~ and that in 
the form of personality it offers an adaman~ 
tine resistance to every dissolvent that 
thought is able to apply, for without a thinker 
there can be no thought. The self is a pre-
supposition of thought. True existence must, 
therefore, be something more than thought; it 
must be existence for self.82 
/' 
I 
I 
I 
II 
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! 
Lotze spoke of reality as concrete and individual; but the prin , 
ciple of individuality carries with it the correlative of 
plurality. For Lotze the universe was a community of individ-
ual beings in interaction. Being is relatedness. The sub-
stance of things consists in their interconnection. The world. 
must be thought by analogy in terms of our own beings• The 
plurality of individuals that form the universe can only be 
understood in terms of an Infinite Being, a fundamental person~ 
al Substance, a co-ordinating One. The personalistic philoso-
phy of Lotze covers wider fields than the ones we have under .... 
lined in our surveyt and undoubtedly he must have influenced 
his student and friend; Borden Parker Bowne in more ways than 
we have suggested here. Our interest, however, bears on 
Lotze's position in respect to the problem of change and iden-
82 Knudson, POP, 432-433. 
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tity. His treatment is similar to that o:f Bowne, but as we 
shall see, the student honored his teacher in this case, not 
only by carrying on, but by transcending the work o:f the mas-
ter. 
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CHAPTER II 
BOVinE'S T REATTilF.NT OF TIIE PROBLEM FROM THE 
POINT OF VIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY 
A. Reality of the Self as Primary Condttion 
of the Mental Life. 
nchange and identi tyn is for Bowne one of the deepest 
problems of philosophy. If philosophy, therefore, is to deal 
with it methodically and fruitfully, it must be treated in the 
usual philosophical way, namely, by positing first a point of 
departure. This point is to be the datum, and th~ datum is the 
self. For Bowne, the reality of the self is the fundamental 
condition and basis of the mental life. 
There is strictly nothing in experience, to 
suggest that mental states can exist by them-
selves like things; on the contrary, experience 
declares that there must always be something 
which has them. • • .Allowing that they may ex-
ist apart from a subject, there is no way of 
accounting for the mental life ••• (for) each 
is a particular and isolated unit, and must remain 
so until a common subject is given, in the unity 
of whose consciousness these elements may be 
united.l 
In other words, the very legitimacy of the problem of change 
and identity, as well as of any other problem, any other idea, 
l IPT 12-13. 
' 
77 
any other experience, or any other mental state, is question-
able unless from the very beginning we take for granted the 
reality of a sub je·ct, for "a ra ti onaJ.. life by its very nature 
demands a unitary consciousness and a unitary subject."2 
To think is to compare~ to distinguish~ to 
unite. But in order to any of these opera-
tions, one and the same conscious subject must 
grasp in the unity of a single act the things 
compared, distinguished, united. • • .All 
reasoning ·has the implication. Unless the 
same subject grasps both premises in a single 
conscious act, there can be no conclusion~ 
The same is true of the consciousness of plu-
rality. The knowledge of the many is possible 
only through the unity of the one. Hence not 
merely the consciousness of self as one reveals 
the unity of self~ but much more does conscious ... 
ness of the many compel the same assumption.3 
The very faculty of memory. without which there would be no 
knowledge, would also be impossible apart from the reality of 
78 
the self, for "memory involves a consciousness of temporal re-
lations between certain elements of experience; and this oon-
sciousness falls asunder without the unity and identity of the 
subject.".4 Bowne admits that many questions may be asked 
respecting the self which we are not able to answer, but 
The sel~ itself as the subject of the mental 
life and knowing and experiencing itself as 
living, and as one and the s ame throughout 
its changing experiences, is the surest item 
of knowledge we possess. 
~ IPT, 27. 
4 IPT, 28. IPT, 29. Bowne e::cpressed himself about memory this way in 
1886. In 1897 however, he wrote of memory as the essence 
of self. Cf. ThreT2, 64; TTK, 40-41. 
79 
Nothing else, then, is so c erta._.in as the reality of this self. 5 
Everything e.ls.e is inference, probability, conjecture. "We 
have then, n he tells us, "a center of knowledge, a border of 
6 faith, and poured around all, the great ocean of the unknown." 
By way of criticism to his own positio.n Bowne brings into 
the discussion Herbert Spencer's theory of the self. According 
to Bowne, nspencer sets aside the self as nothing but a complex 
1. Spencer•s Opposi-
tion to this Theory 
of states of consciousness, which 
states have the ground of their 
connection in the brain."7 But a 
self whose nature is simply that of a complex of states of con-
sciousness, is so passive and so subjective, that it is not able 
to do much in the knowing line. nMere states of consciousness," 
Bowne tells us, "are neither permanent nor changeless nor ex-
ternal."B To find some proof of objective reality and thus meet 
the difficulty of his own view, in later writings Mr. Spencer 
suggests the theory of the self as an energy producing agent. 
The self in this case, as Bowne remarks, 
is no longer a mere set of mental states, but 
a source of active energy producing effects and 
being ·res:li.sted, and this sense of energy and 
experience of resistance are made the essential 
material of which the conception of the outer 
world is built.9 
5 
6 :PER, 88f. 
7 
SIT, 106. 
9 KS 429 Also :KS, 365 ·, MET. 386 • 
"- , . ~ 
KS, 427. 
8 Ibid., 428. 
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i 
Bowne attacks Spencer 1s theory on the ground of its internal in1 
consistency with previous views of Spencer himself, and of its II 
.I incompatibility with the premises of Hume's empirical psycholo~ 
in the realm of which it is suppossed to belong. 
B. Senses do not give us Reality. 
Should we try to rid ourselves of the reality of the mind 
would say, that if the proper stimulus were given, sensations 
1
1
. would certai1uy be produced, even if there were no 
12 
correspond in~ 
II facts in the ob je cti ve world. 
lO SIT 78. 
11 TTK' 10. 
12 TTK' 319-320. 
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C. Sens.ations Require an Organizing Agent. 
Sensations, therefore, in and by themselves are abstrac-
\I 
tiona, unless made intelligible by an interpreting mind. Experl 
ience is a complex rational activity which transcends seneation.!
1 
Sensation as such is a mere affection lacking unity or identity, l\i 
unless the mind fixes the dissolving impression 1\ 
into a single and abiding meaning. O~ly thus \ 
can sensation become an object of thought. • • • · 
The impression apart from (the mind's) act of !1 
fixation, involves an indefinite multiplicity 
1 
in itself, just as the motion of the body from 
A to B is no simple and single thing, but an 
indefinite number of movements through all the 
intervening points. And as this motion becomes 
a single one only as the mind constitutes it 
such, so the i1mefinite manifold involved in a 
sense impression becomes a single and simple 
sensation only as the mind constitutes it such. 
Hence the experience of a single sensation as 
anything articulate implies, as its absolute 
condition, .that the mind constitutes it one and 
identical.l3 
Bowne's line of argument with respect to the organizing agent 
that all sensation presupposes, is that sensations and impres-
sions are mere abstractions with no content whatsoever unless 
there be a universalizing intellect, a registering mind, for 
which the simple experiences are not merely vanishing mental 
states, but also bearers of an abiding meaning which is common 
14 
to all and identical in all. So far we have studied the mind 
I 
I 
I 
I 
j l3 ~TK 
'I 14 TTK, I , 
38-39. 
41, 43. 44. 45, 48, 56, 57. 
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in the respect in which we have approached it, in the first !I 
place, because Mind itself is the datum with which Bowne com- I: 
I 
mences his treatment of the problem of change and identity, and I 
in the second place, because 1lind. itself is the principle of [ 
permanence and becoming that Bowne offers ultimately~ 
D. Consciousness is the Agent. 
Mind, then, is the agent required, for as Bowne holds, 
The world of experience shows itself upon re-
flection to be nothing existing apart from all 
intelligence and antithetical to consciousness, 
but rather as being somethin~ which exists for 
and through consciousness an is me.aningless 
otherwise .15 
I 
I 
The very data of science is destro yed and all knowledge 
if consciousness is repudiated.l6 
vanishes! 
I. 
I 
I 
Conceive a musical symphony. At first sight we 
might say the symphony exists in s pace and time. 
It is inclosed within the walls of the room and 
lies between certain temp oral limits, and there-
fore has temporal and spatial existence. This, 
however, is superficial; for the s{mphont, apart 
from the synthetic and unifying ac ion o in-
telligence, really cannot exist in aU! a.ssignable 
sense. It exists, as anything artie ate and 
intelligible, only for the composer and performer 
on the one hand, and for the audience on the 
other. As something in space and time it would 
consist of air waves mutually external and with-
out unity or connection. The corresponding 
sounds are also mutually external as spatial or 
temporal events. If, then, one were bent on 
15 :KB, 423-424. 
16 SIT, 191. 
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finding the symphony within the walls of the 
room, and should proceed to chase the mutually 
external waves in space and the successive waves 
in time back and forth throughout the hall and 
the time of the playing, he would soon become 
aware that the symphony; apart from the unify-
ing action of consciousness which unites the 
many and the successive into one would be some-
thing strictlt non-existent for intelligence. 
However real he waves or the co-existent and 
successive sounds may be in themselves,. it is 
not until they are united in a consciousness 
which grasps and unifies them all in one co~lex 
musical apprehension that the symphony exis s 
or can exist.17 
1 
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At this point it is convenient to observe that Bowne does I 
not always apply the same connotation to his concept of intel- i1 
E. Experience and Consciousness. 
ligence or consciousness. At least, there are times when he 
distinguishes between consciousness and experience,18 and times 
when he identifies experience and consciousness.l9 
F. Verbal Distinction Between Self-Experience 
and Self-Consciousness. 
i' 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
l 
He also makes a confusing distinction between self-experi- 1 
i 
ence and self-coneciousness. 20 This distinction rests on . the 1
1
1 
difference he establishes between consciousness and expe r1.enc e, I 
I 
II 17 PER, 113 -114. 
I 18 KB 369-370. I 19 PER, lol; TTK" 
20 IPT, 245, 248. 
I 
345. I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I, 
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Better discussed in SIT, 274, 275. 
I' II 
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which we have already discussed. II 'When he s peaks of self-con- ;: 
sciousness, apparently Bowne means self-knowledge, for he says, 
nself-con.sciousness may be called a reflection of consciousness 
upon itself."21 To avoid all this confusion, personally we 
prefer the distinction as established by Professor Edgar Shef-
field Brightman, instead of the one that Bowne offers us. 
Professor Brightman says, 
Self-experience is not to be confused with re-
flective self-consciousness. Self-experience 
is always present wherever there is conscious-
ness; it is the experience of the whole exper-
ience as belonging to gether and thus as being 
'mine'. But reflective self-consciousness~ or 
self-knowledge is what occurs when we stop to 
think about self-experience •••• Reflective 
self-consciousness happens only occasionally 
in our introspective ~omenta. Self-experience 
is al\v.ays present.22 
G. The Reality and Nature of the Soul. 
II 
I ~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
F rom the point of view of psychology, Bowne's treatment of I 
the problem of change and identity still presents another dif- ,I 
ficulty, namely, his position with res pect to the soul. He himi l 
I 
self admits that "the chief debate about it concerns its realit~ l 
I whether it be substantial or non-substantial, a true thing or a 1 
j function of material activities.n23 But when discussing it, he ~ 
II 
1\ I, 
'I 
!I 
21 IPT, 246. 
22 Brightman, ITP, 191. 
23 MET, 352. 
t 
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I 
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states that, 
The soul is the central point of psychology. 
It is indeed, the central point of all phil-
osophy and science. For knowledge in general 
assumes the trustworthiness of the knowing 
power. Vfuatever throws d~~credit on this dis-
credits knowledge itself. 
Yet, to affirm its reality does not help much in knowing what 
the nature of that reality is. In fact Bowne 1 s theories of 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 soul are somewhat inconsistent. A statement like the following II 
certainly reveals a substantialia- ! 
1. Bowne's Contradicting 
Theories of Soul 
a. Substantialistic Soul 
tic trend of thought in Bowne's 
philosophy of soul: 
We have neither an abstract consciousness of 
self, nor only a consciousness of mental stat~g, 
but a consciousness of self as having states. 
Consider also the following passage: 
There is strictly nothing in experience to sug-
gest that mental states can exist by themselves 
like things; on the contrary, experience de-
clares that there must always be something 
which has them.26 
I 
I 
I 
'I 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
But this "something•' is not consciousness. It has consciousnes~ 
I 
for it "has mental states," but it is not consciousness itself. 
-
vVhat can it be then, if not the old Scholastic substantialistic 
soul? 
Affections of consciousness also are largely 
spoken of, AND CONSCIOUSNESS ITSEJ.JF IS PROPOSED 
~~ MET, 351. 
26 IPT, 247. IPT, 12. 
I II 
AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE SOUL. THUS CONSCIOUS-
NESS IS HYPOSTATIZED into something above its 
alleged elements, and playa essentially the 
part of an active and rational subject. HOW 
THERE CAN BE STATES WHICH ARE STATES OF NOTH-
ING, AND HOVf CONSCIOUSNESS, V'THICH IS ITSELF A 
MENTAL STATE, CAN ALSO HAVE STATES , ARE QJJES-
TIONS PASSED OVER IN PROFOUND SILENCE.27 
Bowne even calls materialists those who dare deny the 
reality of a "substantial soul~tt28 
Yet, at times, there is no severer critic of the substan-
tialistic theories of soul than Bowne himself. In fact the 
/I I 
I 
I 
I, 
I 
I 
I 
b. Non-substantialistic 
Soul 
i' first two chapters of his Meta h si~ 
I 
on the "notion of being"29 and "the I 
nature of things"30 are final death 
blows to the scholastic "Substance." Attacking the scholastic 
conception of the changeless substance as the metaphysical ul-
timate, Bowne says that: 
2 7 IPT 
' 28 I PT 
29 MET' 
30 IvlET: 
31 SIT , 
A definite form of action must correspond to 
a definite state of being; and a change of 
activity is impossible without a corresponding 
change of being. If the raw of causation is 
worth anything it is worth this. Hence we 
say, that the very essence of a thing is im-
plica ted in its activity; that the notion of 
a changeless substratum must be abandoned, 
and the very substances of the physical uni- 31 
verse must be brought into the circle of change. 
13. 
15-16 . 
27-.58. 
59-76. 
2.45. 
I: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I' 
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Again he tells us that: 
Substance is often conceived as substratum 
and various formal distinctions are made b~­
tween it and being. It is easy to account 
for this notion, but it cannot be allowed. 
1.1:etaphysically, substance and being are iden-
tical; and both denote these real subjects 
from which change and activity proceed.32 
Substance is individualized force or power. 33 
The Soul, as substance, forever changes; and, 
unlike to what we assume of the physical ele-
ments, its series of changes can be reve.rsed 
only to a slight extent. The soul develops 
but it never undevelops into its former state. 
Each new e~perience leaves the soul other than 
it was; but, as it advances from stage to stage 
it is able to gather up its past and carry it 
with it, so that at any point it possesses all 
that it has been. It is this fact only which 
constitutes the permanence and identity of self. 34 
Thus Bowne's theories of soul are in themselves inconsistent, 
87 
I 
I 
!I 
.I 
!I 
I' 
I 
I 
for at times, as we have seen, he leans toward the old scholas- 1 
tic conception of substance, and at times, he himself attacks 
the concept of substance most rigorously. In the last state-
ment, a step of advance ie to be noticed in Bowne's philosophy 
of soul, however. He identifies the soul with the self. But 
i 
il 
I 
I 
' I 
I 
I 
' ! 
how do we know this self or this soul? one would inquire. Bownei 
tells us that 
The soul is not known by the way it looks, 
for it does not look at all. It is rather 
the invisible personality living, experi-
32 SIT, 227. 
33 SIT 235. 
34 MET~ 63. , 
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88 I 
encing itself in various ways, and putting 
forth various activities and in and through 
these the soul is. known. ~5 
II 
! The soul, then, we have seen, is for Bowne in these last I 
statements the same as self, and the same as personality. Pro- 1 
I 
feasor Brightman has put the case more concretely, and more 
satisfactorily from the point of view of psychology and meta-
physics when he tells us that: 
Self is not a separate and distinct element in 
consciousness to be distinguished from all other 
perceptions and thought. It is not a special 
phenomenon or a sort of atom around which the 
other atoms cluster. In other words, self-psy-
chology approaches consciousness synoptically 
and functionally rather than analytically. A 
self, then, is any conscious experience or pro-
cess · taken as a whole and as experiencing it-
self~ The 'soul' was the hypostatization of 
this 'wholeness'; but since the self is a con• 
crete .conscious reality, why push the soul off 
into the realm of the unknowable? The self, 
then is not a mere unity (as the soul-theory held~, nor mere multiplicity (as associational-
ists and behaviorists believe), but it is a 
synthesizer of unity and multiplicity.36 
I 
I 
I 
,. 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
'Whether Bowne would have subscribed entirely to Professor Brig}lt I 
man's view of the self is questionable; but he did at least i-
dentify the soul with personality and with the self. The prob-
lem of the self still remains obscure both in philosophy and 
psychology. The younger group o.f personalistic philosophers, 
however, are either accepting Professor Brightman's theory of 
35 KS, 255. 
36 Brightman, ITP, 255. 
1/ 
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the self» or else leaning towards its acceptance.37 
H. The Self as :Principle of Value. I 
I! As we indicated be~ore, the reason for our study of Bowne~ 1 
position with respect to the mind is twofold. In the· first 
place, mind itself is the datum with which Bowne commences his 
treatment of the problem of change and identity. In the second 
place, mind itself is the principle of permanence and becoming 
that Bowne offers ultimately. As a principle it is so inclu-
sive that nothing escapes its jurisdiction. Bowne carries its 
validity even into the field of practical ethics and aesthetics, 
when basing all achievement and value experience on the dignity 
of the mental subject as a principle of permanence, he tells us 
that: 
It iB the relation (of feelings) to the self 
which chiefly determines the value of an ex-
perience in the developed mental life. Plea-
sures and pains, except purely physical ones, 
depend to a great extent on being connected 
with self as their subject •••• Few of our 
experiences have value in themselves, as pas-
sive gratifications of our sensibility; their 
value lies rather in the element of personality 
I 
37 Cf. Allport, :PER, one of the most important books on Psycho1~ ~ 
ogy published since the times of James. BD3LIOGRAPHY, Infra.! 
Cf. also Earl Marlatt, iJVhat is a Person; BIBLIOGRAPHY, Infra.! I 
Jose A. Franquiz, La Naturaleza de la Mente Humana, San Juan, 
Puerto Rico: Cantero Ferndndez y Compania, 
1935. 
---------------- "La Introspeccion como Metodo," New York: 
La Nueva Democracia, 8(1937), 16-22. 
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38 il 
which we have put into them. !i 
I· Sta rting from the same basis, the mind as ~atum, and personalitY!! 
II as the metaphysical ultimate, Professor Brightman has carried 
Bowne•s se~f as principle of value to its farthest implication 
when he says that: 
Value is, in any given situation, the highest 
which contributes most to the coherent fUnc-
tionin§ and organization of exper~ence as a 
whole. 9 
I. Essence of Self, Memory. 
There are t wo passages in Bowne's writings which have to 
with the essence of selfhood. The sensitive states, he says, 
become something for thought only through the constitutive ac-
tivity of intelligence. For anyone who thinks differently he 
proposes the problem: 
Given a flow of states each of which perishes 
as fast as it is born~ to deduce or in any way 
reach, any articulate conception whatever •••• 
If care be exercised, it will appear that the 
temporal as such; eludes all knowledge until 
it is brought under the control of a timeless 
idea.40 
The purpose of this problem, one can readily see, is to imply 
II 
II 
I 
I 
dol 
I 
that the essence of self is memory. In his Revised Metaphysics j 
I! Bowne even says it more categorically: 
38 IPT, 194. For a more literary 
this principle Cf. SIT, 65-73~ 
39 Brightman, ITP , 144. 
40 TTK, 40-41. 
and elaborate discussion of 
1/ 
II 
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We are not conscious of a permanent substance, 
but of a permanent self; and this permanence 
is not revealed, but constituted by memory.41 
1· J. Essence of Memory, Recognition. 
91 
I 
I 
li 
The essence of memory, however, is recognition. Combattin~ 
Spencer 1s theory of memory as psychological recurrence, Bowne 
sa.ys, 
Supposing all these extraordinary things that 
are told us about the nerve vesicles and nerve 
fibres and nerve currents were true, we should 
be no nearer to the solution of the problem 
of memory than before, and no amount of such 
reproduction would ever bring us to recognition; 
for recognition is possible only as the mental 
subject relates its present experience to it-
self and the members of that experience to one 
another under the temporal form and then iden-
tifies some element of the present expe rienoe 
as similar to one of the past. Without thie ao" 
tivity, memory is demonstrably impos~ible.42 
Again he tells us that: 
I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
The logical work of getting (notions) consists 1 
in recognizing the one in the many, and in fix- 1
1
1 
ing it as a unit of thought.43 
I 
Thus, recognition is the function of memory. Memory is the; 
essence of sel:f, for it is the faculty by which the mind finds I 
fixity for itself throughout the flow of becoming. The self, oJ 1 
the othe r hand, is the metaphysical ultimate and the fundamenta~ l 
datum in whose reality and nature we are able to find the key ! 
41 lviET2 , 64. 
42 KS, 383. 
43 TTK 126 127. t t 
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to the problem of change and identity. 
'I I· 
II 
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CHAPTER III 
BOWNE'S TREATMENT OF THE PROBLF.J\1: FROM THE 
POINT OF VIEW OF LOGIC 
A. Identity, the Fundamental Function of all Faculties. 
the imagination; and 3. The unity of that synthesis by means 
of the ori ginal apperception. The first has to do with the 
sense impressions; the second, with concepts; and the third, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l, II 
I 
with the totality of experience. Impressions by themselves are 
1 
uno onnected and inarticulate unless intuit ion gathers the mani- 1 
fold of them into synoptic wholes. Concepts by themselves are I II 
impossible unless the separate perceptions and impressions on !1 
which they rest, are properly synthesized by the faculty of I 
imagination; and once having the concepts, that is to say , once 
having given an account of how ideas are made, by the separate 
functions of identity of the first two faculties, experience 
and knowledge. are still impossible unless there is a unified 
consciousness which precedes all data of intuition, and without 
93 
I 
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reference to which, as Kant says, no representation of objects I 
is p ossible. In elaborating this Kantian position, whioh Bowne I 
himself accepts, Bowne shows the importance of identity as a I 
function realized by each and all of the faculties, without 
1 
1 I 
which neither knowledge nor experience is possible~ i 
I 
I 
II 
'I 
B. Unity of the Mental Subject. 
!I 
The Unity of the mental subject is a necessary condition 
of all consciousness. "VIhe:rever there is thought there is a 
thinker." This thinker as such is a unified self, synthesizer ·1 
of experience. Without his reality all knowledge vanishes. 2 I' 
In fact, this principle constitutes for Bowne the first of the 
1. Mental Subject 
Necessary Hypothesis 
indicates. He says, 
subject must be admitted at least 
as a necessary hypothesis, Bowne 
If the mental subject be given as real and 
abiding, and as an integral element of con-
sciousness, an element without which a 
rational consciousness is demonstrably im-
1 KS, 68-75. Cf. also Chapter I of this dissertation, caption 
c, sub-heading 4. 
2 S IT , 38 7-3 9 5. 
3 TTK, 20-35. 
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possible, then that subject is to be admitted 
1
11 
as a fact until some other facts are discovered 
which make such admission impossible.4 
:'., These words of Bowne with respect to the sub je.ct, the self, re-
veal one of Bowne's qualities overlooked by his biographers and 
interpreters: the non-dogmatic aspect of his philosophy. He 
admits that the self as such is a hypothesis, but a fundamental 
one. His attitude towards this hypothesis, however, is the at- ! 
I, 
titude of scie.nce towards all hypothesis. After all, why shoulali 
not h& assume this attitude towards hypothetical thinking? rn 11 
fact, all thinking involves a hypothetical element. I! 
j! This fact may be called metaphysical, or 
supersensible, or metempirical, or whatever 
else we may think disagreeable; nevertheless 
we are bound in good faith to recognize it 
as a fact;5 I 
for inference, memory and knowledge are impossible a1?art from 
a unitary self. 
Suppose A is a sensation 
2 • Inf e remc e , l!emo ry 
and Knowledge 
of color, B one of sound, 
c is a pain, D is an odor, 
etc. Each is an isolated 
existence, and is unable to 
advance beyond itself. A 
a. Impossible Apart from 
Unitary Self 
consciousness composed of 
such elements would be no consciousness at all. 
These states of consciousness must in some way 
be turned into a consciousness of states •••• 
But this is not provided for by the coexistence 
and sequence of the states, but only by some 
unitary subject, which, standing over against 
~ IPT, 15. 
Ibid. 
li 
I 
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the states~ grasps them all in the unity of 
a single a pprehension. Before A, B, c, and 
D, etc. can become elements of a rational life, 
a subject must be given.6 
I 
II 
li 
I Quantitative. and qualitative comparisons are not functions of 1 
the sensibility, but a function of the unitary self, 7 and these It 
I 
I 
comparisons are condi tiona of inference and knowledge. Memory 1 
8 
we have already discussed, as the very essence of self. 
The basic unit of knowledge is the concept, which Bowne 
defines as tta timeless idea of the intellect," but the concept 
b. The Notion and the 
Judgment 
or the notion is timeless in the 
sense of subsistence. It unifies 
I 
I 
I 
il 
I (ll The Nition as Unifyer 
of Particular and 
Universal 
the particular and the universal, 
1
1 
for, as Bowne says, "The universal 
element is present in every individual by the time it is any-
thing for intelligence.n9 "A conception (a notion) is plainly 
a universal with reference to a plurality of experiences.nlO 
In other words, the concept itself is the means by Which the 
, self unifies the manifold. Yet the concept thus produced is a 
function of the identical-changing self. Bowne says, 
Let us take a heat sensation. As occurring, 
this sensation has no unity and no identity 
of any kind. In order to become anything 
6 IPT, 27-28; 119; Cf. also KS, 424; PER; 114f; SIT, 191. 
7 IPT, 127, 153f. 
8 Cf. TTK, 40; MET2 , 64. Supra, Chap. I of this dissertation, 
9 captions I and J. TTK , 120. 
10 TTK, 121. 
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I 
I 
whatever articulate,. the heat sensation must be 
transformed into a sensation of heatj which is 
something very different.ll ••• In doing this, 
we have gone beyond the mere affection of the 
sensibility to the plane of a universalizing 
intelligence, and that even in this simplest 
possible experi~nce.l2 
97 
It is in this way that the fixed ideas of the ru1derstandin 
! 
arise, and 
(2} The Notion as a I 
Result of Change 
and Identity 
It is through these fixed 
ideas o:;f the understanding 
that the mind is able to 
bring any order whatever 
into the flux of impress-
ions themselves. Thua we 
see an element beyond sense experience entering 
into it for its jorganization, and this appears 
all the more when we come to the higher ideas 
of the reason.l~ 
I 
Thus~ the very process of ideating and idealizing are essential 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
ly functions of a self that establishes i ·dentity of meaning to 1 
I 
I 
the cha nging flux of events. 
The general notion~ thus, expresses in one thought the 
contents of many exPeriences. The 
(3) Notion, Shorthand i 
Expression for 
the Many 
concept MAN, for example• stands 
for all men. As such, "the concept i 
I 
becomes a shorthand exuression for all the individuals com-
"' ! 
prised under it • "14 
when he said that: 
ll KS 11. 
12 ' KS , 12. 
13 KS, 13. 
14 TTK, 128. 
We !suppose this is what Kant had in mind II 
lj 
I! 
II 
All judgments are 
(4) All Judgment, Func-
tion of Unity 
several others, so 
are collected into 
functions of unity among 
our representations, the 
knowledge of an object 
being bromght about, not 
by an immediate repre-
sentation,. but by a higher 
one comprehending this and 
that many possible cognitions 
one.l5 · 
98 
But the logical judgment which is a function of unity and 
order, as we have seen, by its very nature implies an objective 
(5) Logical Judgment unity. vVhen we judge, our judgment 
does not merely tells us that a 
certain psychological process is going on in our consciousness. 
Our judgment tells us much more than that. We are especially 
conscious of its reference to an objective world. Bowne sup-
poses, as an instance, the case of a geometrical judgment like. 
for example, that of the sum of the angles of a triangle being 
equal to two right angles. Bowne says, 
No one would admit that by this judgment he 
meant only that in his own consciousness the 
subject and predicate come together. Possibly, 
Ul1der polemical stress, a sensational philoso-
pher might momentarily take such a position; 
and then the sufficient answer would be, 
Well, what of it? The judgment being by 
hypothesis an accident of the individual, no 
one else need concern himself about it. But 
the bare :fact of living together and of being 
mutually intelligible makes such a position 
impossible except a.s a verbal pretence. ~ 
geometrical judgment, then, carries with it a 
15 }1. Max Muller (tr.), KCPR, 57. 
II 
I 
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reference to a fixed order of reason which is 
common to all, and assumes to set forth some 
truth concerning that order.I6 
Bowne carries t he implication of this reasoning to differ- I 
ent fields of intellectual enterprise, and applies it in the I 
same way. Thus when discussing its application in the realm of I 
physics, he tells us that I I 
The physical judgment contains a necessart 
reference to an order of fact which is no 
an accident of the individual, but is common 
to all.I7 
I 
II 
I 
Professor Brightman has applied this reasoning to the prob i 
lem of value, and has based on it an important argument for I 
axielogical objectivity.18 Three main points are emphasized by ~~ 
Bowne's above argument, namely, epistemological dualism~ ob-
jectivity of thought, and transcendence of self. Our interest, 
of course, in this dissertation~ iS the problem of change and 
identity. In the present chapter, however, we are studying 
Bowne's treatment of this problem from the point of view of 
logic. But logic studies the mind as an agent that pretends to 
give us knowledge of something beyond itself, and in this sense 
it is absolutely proper that in dealing with the mind as the 
ultimate in whose nature is to be found a key to the problem of 
change and identity, Bowne should also raise the question of 
1 6 TTK, 15. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Brightman, ITP, 157. 
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the implication in the logical judgment regarding the existence 
of an objective fixed order of reason. 
c. Mind, the Active Subject. 
Thus, mind, we have seen, never stops in sensations, but 
organizes them, and then transcends to the objective world. In 
fact so much is this true o~ the mind, that Francisco Romero, 
Latin American philosopher, has 
1. Unifyer of Sensations 
gone to the extreme of identifying 
19 the mind with its function of transcendence. Bowne says, 
The human mind never rests in impressions of 
the sensibility, but works them ever into forme 
inherent in its own nature. In so doing it 
transcends the sense fact entirely, and it does 
this on its own warrant. Thus, suppose that I 
am struck by a stone. The sense fact is simply 
certain visual, tactual, and painful sensation~. 
If I say the stone hit me, I have transcended 
the sense experience, and attributed objective 
existence and causal efficiency to the stone. 
Substract these ideas, and there is nothing left 
but a succession of sensations in my own con-
sciousness.20 
Considering the validity of the facts stated, we may 
gather therefore, that mind as a datum and as an ultimate, is 
the fundamental presupposition of all logic. The solidity of 
I 
Francisco Romero, Filosofia de la Persona. Buenos Aires: 19 
Edicion Radio Revista, 1938. p. 30. Cf. Jose A. Franquiz, 
"El Estruoturalismo Personalists de Francisco Romero.n 
Luminar (Sumpossium of Personalism), Spring number, 1940. 
20 TTK, 10. 
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this position is so unshakable and finn, that even in th~ field 
of symbolic logic, its validity is recognized. In fact, the 
very president of the Symbolic Logic 
2. Presupposition of 
all Logic Association of America. Dr. c. J. 
Ducasse, admitting this circumstance, I 
I 
spoke to his Association last June in the following terms~ I 
which at length we quote because of their importance coming I 
I 
from such quarters: I 
The relation called symbolizing is not a dyadic, 
but rather a tetradic relation. That is, in 
order for something A to be a symbol of something 
B, there must be in addition c, a mind trained 
in a special way, and D, a certain manner in 
which that mind is occupied at the time. For 
although we do say, for instance, that a mark 
consisting of a little cross is the symbol of 
addition~ the fact is of course that at times, 
when that mark is not present to a mind, it does 
not symbolize addition or anything else. More-
over, even when it is present to a mind, it does 
not symbolize addition unless that mind has been 
trained in a certain manner, for obviously such 
a mark does not symbolize addition to the mind 
of a Hottentot or other wholly illiterate person. 
And further, even when the mind to which that 
mark is present, is one trained as our minds have 
been, the mark does not symbolize addition unless 
the mental content in that mind at the time is of 
a certain kind: viz., mathematical; in a reli-
gious context, for instance, that mark symbolizes 
for us something very different from addition. 
Thus, to describe with some degree of precision 
the fact only roughly expressed by the statement 
that a little cross is the symbol of addition, 
what we must say is that when minds have been 
trained as ~ have been, and are thinkin~ about 
mathematics, and perceive or think of a ii tle 
mark consisting of a little cross, then and then 
only for these minds that mark symbolized addi-
tion. Nothing less than this adequately states 
the fact ••• (This} makes clear at least that 
the relation we call symbolizing is a four-
term-relation, and that it is not a physical 
but a psychological relation.21 
D. Objections to Unity Considered. 
The conception of a unifying mind as the fundamental pxe-
supposition of logic has been challenged, however. It is not 
I 
wholly admitted that judgment necessarily involves the mental I 
activity of comparing, distinguishing, uniting. It is urged, J\ 
that in the same manner that a conception of all the parts of a I 
watch in separation is not a conception 
of how much one compares, distinguishes 
of the watch, regardleSS i 
and unites those parts, \ 
in like manner the judgment is not made 
II 
up of particular states. !! 
and needs nothing beyond the one judging act itself. 
claim," Bowne answers, nis subtle rather than profound." 
he adds, 
Thexe is a clear conception of the impossibility 
of building complex conceptions out of simple 
ones by mere juxtaposition; but along with this 
there is a confusion of logical simplicity with 
psychological simplicity. Psychologically, no 
doubt, the conception of plurality is as. truly 
a single act as the conception of unity. The 
conception of a watch is as truly one as the 
conception of a single wheel. But logically 
the one conception has a plurality of elements; 
I 
I 
i In it, 11 
II II 
1\ 
II 
I 
21 Presidential address to the Association for Symbolic Logic 
read before the association in joint session with the Ameri- \ 
can Philosophical Association, at Middletown, Conn., Decemberi' 
28, 1938. Journal of Symbolic Logic, IV, 2 (June 1939},41-52
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and there can be no true thought until the 
unity of the conception is distinguished into 
the plurality of its implications. Over a-
gainst the plurality we must affirm a unit{; 
and equally, over against the unity we mus 
affirm plurality. Analysis is as necessary 
as synthesis. The judgment, may be psycho-
logically one~ but logically it involves the 
distinction OI (its parts) and their union.z2 
lj 
E. Substitutes for Mental Unity. 
I 
I 
Bowne ironically refers to the pseudo-scientists who, mind~ 
ful of the fad more than of the truth, prefer to substitute 
other concepts, for that of self. Consciousness, Thought, 
Energy, are among these suggested new terms. Bowne inquires 
into t .heir meanings and finds them to be mere abstractions. 23 
F. Meaning of Logical Identity. 
In regard to Bowne's logic we have already mentioned his 
three fundamental conditions of judgment: a. The unity and 
identity of the thinking self; b. The law of identity and con-
I 
I 
tradiction; and c. The fact of connection among the objects of 
thought. So far we have been discussing the first. The second I 
general condition of thought, Bowne states, is the law of iden- 11 
I 
tity and contradiction; that is, our conceptions must have fixe~ 
I 
22 TTK, 2:1-22. 23 TTK, 25-27. 
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meanings and must be used consistently therewith. This we ex-
press symbolically, A is A. Negatively we express it by A is 
not not-A. In its positive form it is called the law of iden- I I 
tity; in its negative form, the law of non-contradiction. 24 
The law of logical identity is so valid that even if one 
were to deny it, one must first presuppose it. John Stuart 
Mill attacked the validity of this 
1. Mill's Acceptance of 
Logical Identity law by suggesting that 2 and 2 may 
says, 
male 5 in some other world. Bowne 
Mr. Mill simply presented a truism expressed 
in a most extraordinary form. He was not quite 
prepared to deny the law of identity, or A ia 
A. Hence, he could not deny that 4 is 4, and 
5 is 5. But 4 does not equal 5. Yet, 2 and 
2 do equal 4, and 4, we have said, is not 5. 
It follows, therefore, that the 5 which "in 
some other world• 2 plus 2 equal, is not 5 as 
we understand it, but is really what we mean 
by 4.25 
Mill, Bowne observes, seems to have meant by 5 what we all 
commonly mean by 5, for 
He quotes approvingly the hint of a barrister 
who suggested a way of conceiving that 2 and 2 
should really make 5. The barrister said that 
if there should be some law of association 
whereby, whenever we add 2 and 2, an additional 
unit should be suggested to the mind, then the 
sum of 2 and 2 would always seem to equal 5 . 
Both Uill and the barrister failed to see that 
24 TTK 30. Supra, Introduction, Heading E. 
25 SIT: 35. 
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II 
I in that case not 2 and 2 make 5, but 2 and 2 plus the new unit.26 
I 
But identity is a category of mind, It is a fo :on of know- I 
ing . In fact, it may be that fundamentally, identity is the 
only real category, for as Kant 
II 
II 2. Possibility of Iden-
tity being the only 
Category 
showed, all the other categories can j 
be derived from it; and in formal 
logic, the three main principles of thought, identity, non-con-
tradiction, and excluded middle, are but different ways of 
stating the same fact.27 
A distinction must be establis~ed between the two identi-
ties mentioned above, for logical identity is one thing and 
metaphysical identity is another. 
3. Difficulty in the 
Law of Logical 
Identity 
Failure to do so, as Bowne points 
out, "is at the bottom of some con-
fusion in the history of thought. The Eleatics made it affir.m 
the impossibility of any change, and Hegel denied that it is a 
law of thought at all. tt28 According to Bowne, 
the real dif f iculty in the case is this: 
If our thought absolutely created it objects, 
it could fix and define them on its own war-
rant; or if our thoughts were concerned only 
with a system of changeless ideas, the law 
of identity would present no di f ficulty. But 
this is the case with us to a very slight de-
II 
I 26 sIT t 35-36. 
I 27 Creighton, IL, 397-409; PE R, 98-108. 28 TTK, 31. 
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gree. For the most p.art, our thought is en-
gaged in grasping an existence which it does 
not make and which is constantly changing. In 
order to do this the mind must of course im-
pose its own laws upon the independent exis-
tence. And here the fact appears of a certain 
antithesis between the laws of our thought and 
the nature of many of its objects.29 
106 
In pointing at this difficulty , however, it seems to us, Bowne 
raises more serious difficulties than the one he tries to 
I 
li I 
point out. Once an antithesis and a gap are established be-
tween the ways of nature and the ways of thought, knowledge 
collapses automatically. There is no connection between the 
difficulty Bowne mentions and the solution he offers, but the 
I 
I 
I 
following plan, however, is the formula. presented: 
In thought itself there must be no flow. The 
contents of ideas must be constant quantities~ 
If there be change in reality, the mind must 
stiffen even the change into fixity.30 
II 
I 
I 
A thoroughgoing Eleatic ism of this type, in the first place/ 
is uncalled for because it has nothing to do with the difficult~ 
that is being discussed, and in the second place, it reduces the 
problem of identity and change which Bowne is supposed to be I II 
treating, to the mere problem of identity. Indeed, Bowne him... II 
self tells us that "the law o:E id.entity is but the negative con~ 
dition of thought, for if it were the only law, thought would I 
31 
come to a standstill." He adds, 
29 TTK, 30 
31 TTK, TTK, 
31-.32. 
32. 
33. 
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Identity is more often f orma l than real. ifve 
find very few real identities in experience, 
where certainly most things are in perpetual 
change and flow. Inall such cases the iden-
tity is formal, imposed by the mind for its 
own cggvenience and expressing no ontological 
fact~ 
This falls in line with what psychology says on the matter. 
Allport asserts, 
It took centuries for men to observe the 
nidentical element" in the behavior of the 
falling apple and the tides. Usually it takes 
years for students of psychology to see the 
manifestly common features between diverse 
schools of thought. One is seldom affected 
spontaneously by the so called •identities." 
The scientist must search for identities in 
the midst of diversities. There is nothing 
compulsive about identities. They do not 
automatically cause transfer from one object 
to like object.33 
107 
These statements of Bowne and Allport have validity only when 
identity is considered abstractly and alone, but not when con-
sidered in the light of experience rationally interpreted. But 
if the law of identity is the negative principle of thought, 
as Bowne has called it, "the objective connection which thought 
1 
aims to reproduce, and without which thought loses all referenc l / 
to truth,n34 constitutes the positive principle. It is equiva-
lent to the Leibniz' law of suffi- I 
4. Positive Principle 
of Thought 
;~ PER, 98-99. 
Allport, PER, 270-273. 
34 TTK, 20. 
cient reason, although Leibniz' 
i 
il 
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formulation of his principle is not adequate 
1081 
anii satis:facto ry. ~~ 
Bowne explains it a~ 
the assumption of rational and systematic 
connection among the elements of that inde-
pendent order which thought must assume, if 
it is to be more than a meaningless mental 
event; that is, the objects of thought must 
not be isolated and unrelated but must be 
variously connected in rational relations. 
The mind is impelled by its own nature to 
seek such connection, and without assuming 
it, thought can not begin at all.35 
This is what Bowne must have had in mind when frequently he 
G. Coherence as Criterion of Knowledge. 
In his material logic or criteriology, as well as in his 
formal logic, Bowne is synoptic in his method. But synopsis 
as method, and coherence as criterion, are correlative char-
acteristics of organicistic philosophers, for whom all exper-
I 
I 
I 
I ience matters and all facts count. Borden Parker Bowne was one J 
of these. Experience, hoVJever, that is, conscious experience, 
is an affair of persons only. It is no mere coincidence, 
therefore, that personality, experience, synopsis, coherence, 
as a general rule should go together. ViJherever personality as 
35 TTK 34. t 
II 
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a philosophical concept be present in all its dignity and 
wealth of implications, we shall find deep regard for exper-
ience and synoptic outlook coherently functioning. Wherever 
coherence be the criterion and synopsis the method, persons 
will be ends, goals and ultimates, instead of means, instru-
109 
ments and numbers. Bowne was a representative philosopher of 
personality. Coherence, therefore, was his criterion. 36 In 
fact, Coherence is itself a type of the "logical togetherness," 
the "belong ing together," and the "harmonious whole, rr which so 
frequently he mentions and elaborates in his philosoph~. 
H. Apparent Contradictions in Bowne's Regard for Logic. 
In our investigation of Bowne's treatment of the problem 
of change and identity from the point of view of logic, cer-
tain inconsistences in Bowne's attitude toward logic have 
attracted our attention. Our interest in this aspect of 
Bowne's thought, however, is not a mere matter of philosophical 
curiosity. It is a part of our problem under investigation. 
In essence the case for consideration before us at this time 
ia as follows: Bowne is a logical thinker,. master of his dia-
lectic. One of the most important points of view from which 
he approaches the problem of change and identity is that of 
36 TI~R 82· TTK 21· 61· l~T 520 525 529. 
J:.l.!J t ' ' t t t ' ' 
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logic. To this field Bowne himself brings worthwhile contri-
butions, as for example his three principles of judgmont37 as 
contrasted with the traditional three axioms of thought: 
Identity, non contradiction and excluded middle; 38 and his so-
called fallacy of the universa1. 39 With this background in 
mind, one wonders how Bowne could assume such cinical attitudes 
toward logic, 40 and at the same time be so much of a Hegelian 
logician as he was. 41 
There are two apparent extreme positions implied in Bo\vne' 
attitude toward logic. On the one hand we are told that there 
are certain limits to logic, for life is deeper than formal 
thought, 42 understanding gives us only the form, 43 and reality 
cannot be comprehended under logical forms. 44 But logic must 
be absolute, on the other hand, for Bowne also tells us exactly 
the op· osite in other passages, when he says that logic rules 
in the realm of thought and reality, 45 reality is logically de-
ducible,46 and nature is concrete reason. 47 A separate study 
37 TTK, 19-35. 
38 Creighton. Loc. Cit. 
~~ TTK, 251:259. . 
I~T, 529, TTK, 307, THE, 15-22. 
41 MET, 103-104; 239; ThffiT, 274; SIT, 
SIT~ 135, 119~ . 
42 IviET, 529f. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 MET, 103-104. 
46 MET, 239. 
47 SIT, 119. 
119-120, 136-140; TTK, 127 
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of the individual contexts in wh ich the different conflicting 
passages occur leads us to fo?mulate the following explanato~ 
hypothesis. In the first place Bowne distinguishes, as he 
should distinguish, between traditional formal logic, that is, 
the Aristotelian syllogistic logic; and the Hegelian logic of 
Truth. The former is abstract. The latter is conc~ete,. for it 
refers to the whole of reality. It is synoptic, organic, 
vital. The former is argumentative, syllogistic, intellectual-
istic. It seems to us, that when he criticised logic as sub-
jectivistic and abstract,. he was referring to Syllogistic logic 
but when he talked of "logical togetherness," "nature as con-
crete reason," "reality logically deducible" and "logic ruling 
in the realm of thought and reality, n he was approving Hegel's 
logic. As for the references of the shallowness of logic and 
the deepness of life, these assertions were directed against 
those 11 representatives of intellectualism" whose tendency was 
ttto regard the individual as having no significance beyond 
48 
serving as a specimen of a categ ory." 
It seems as though the purpose of Bowne's criticism of one 
type of logic and his a pproval of the other, was to emphasize 
the ultimate worth of the human individual and the necessity 
· of a cosmic vision of organic reality in terms of Hegel's 
das 1Jahr ist das Ganze. 
4 8 :MET, 529. 
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CHAPTER IV 
BOWNE'S TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM FROM THE 
POINT OF VIEW OF EPIS TJ.i,"'1WLOGY 
A. How Does Mind Get Objects? 
Without the constitutive activity of the mind the world of 
sensations could not become a world of objects with meaning . 
1. Mind Active and 
Constitutive in 
Sensation 
This we ha ve a lready discussed in 
connection with the categories of 
Kant. for: 
A sensation in itself or apart from thought~ is 
simply a peculiar affect ion of the sensioility. 
But the sensation as occurring has no unity and 
no identity. As temporal, its successive phases 
are mutually external and mutually other or 
different. Like an explodil~ catherine-wheel, 
the occurring impression sputters all around the 
circle; and when we attempt to gr as p it only a 
mental blur results, unless the mind fixes the 
dissolving impression into a single and abiding 
meaning. Only thus can a sensation become an 
object of thought.! 
Mind fixes these dissolving impressions into abiding meami:ngs 
by means of its categories, whose function is primarily that of 
intuition. This, of course, is equivalent to resting all know-
ledge on intuition. In fact Bowne himself tells us that 
1 TTK, 38. 
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"unless we ad.mi t the existence o:f the mind with an outfit of 
rational principles, and for which principles it needs no proof 
beyond its own power of insight, there is no rational science 
possible."2 There has been considerable debate in regard to 
the mind as a relational principle, without which as we have 
stated above there is no possibility of science. The objection 
to the principle has come especially from the quarters of 
traditional empiricism. Empiricism, however, has accepted the 
a. On the Acceptance 
of Mind as :Principle 
principle in part, for Spe ncer sug-
gests nthat there may well be some 
ultimate mental unit, which is the 
original thing in mental combination." On analysis of Spencer' 
mental unit, however, the same resolves in a conception of mind 
as mere adjustment of the internal to the external~ According 
to the interpretation of Bowne, S·pencer thinks that mind would 
be best understood when we assimilate it to that stage of evo-
lution which lies nearest to it. This he finds in life. There 
fore, by studying organic life, which is the most recent phase 
of evolution, we shall get light into the obscure problem of 
mind. J~cordingly, Spencer reproduces hie definition of life 
and extends it to include mind. 
~ KS, 372. 
KS , 352,353. 
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Life is the definite combination of hetero-
geneous changes, both simultaneous and succes-
sive, in correspondence with external coexis-
tences and seq_uences.4 
li 
ll 
For sake of convenience, this definition is afte~lard cut down , 
to the form that "life is the continuous adjustment of internal ! 
I 
relations to external relations."5 This formula, Spencer shows ~ 
applies equally to the process of mental evolution, which also \ 
is an adjustment of internal relations to external relations. 6 I 
This presentation of mind as "the unsubstantial produce of 
organization" which results from adjusting the internal to the 
1
j 
external, is, in spite of its apparent idealism, materialism ,I 
disguised, for the internal in this case is the psychic, and I 
the external is the physical, and materialism, as Bowne poi~ts 
out, "is to be discovered not in its doctrine of matter but in 
7 its doctrine of mind." 
As over against the empiricism of Hume upon which Spencer 
materialism is based, Kant proved that "there ~re forms of 
b. Kantts Great Contri-
bution=~ to -· phi'losophy 
thought, (that is, principles, 
categories) which are regulative 
I 
! 
I 
I 
[, 
I• 
lj 
I 
I 
II 
I, 
in the mental life."8 The mind is I i 
not passive in understanding. 
~ KS, 353. 
Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 MET 352. 
8 ' SIT, 37. 
It is active and creative in I I I 
II 
II 
I 
II ,, 
knowing. Bowne points out, 
This activity of the mind in knowing is ~ 
principle which rational philosophy will 
never consent to give up, It was gained 
only after centuries of criticism; and the 
failure to grasp it is at the bottom of the 
chief errors both of ancient· and modern 
philosophy. The doctrine contains the im-
plicit refutation of empiricism, because it 
shows that experience itself, on which the 
empiricist relies, is impossi~le without a 
constructive mental activity. 
This activity we have already discussed in Chapter II when 
115 
I 
I 
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I 
dealing with the reality of the self as the primary condition II 
of the mental life, and in Chapter III, when dealing with Iden- 1 
10 1 tity as the fundamental function of all the faculties. To 
avoid repetition, it will suffice to point out the fundamental 
principles involved in Kant's main contribution to philosophy 
as discussed by Bowne and already mentioned in this disserta-
tion. Attention has been given especially to the creativity 
of mina, 11 in the sense that mind works sensations into ration-
al forms, 12 mind unfolds in knowledge,13 all unity is based on 
14 . 15 
nature of self, and thought demands total1ty. The reader 
may o~ject that so frequent references to Kantian philosophy 
are in the first place unnecessary repetitions, and in the 
g S IT, 120ff. 
10 Supra, Caption A of both Chapter II and Chapter III. 
11 TTK , 36; KS, 45, 47; SIT, 120-128. 
12 TTK , 11; SIT, 226; IPT, 257. 
13 IPT, 254. 
14 KS, 416• 
15 TTK, 105. 
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I 
second place, unjustif ied digressions. We answer with antici- 1 
I' 
pation, however, and call attention to the following facts~ I 
The discussion of the problem of change and identity, as well \ 
as the discussion of any fundamental problem of philosophy oans!i 
II for the knowledge of a~ least one fact upon which to build all 1 
I 
I theory. This fact, this irreducible datum, is the mind, the 1 
1 self, for Borden Parker Bowne. The mind also is the principle 
of permanence in whose nature, according to Bowne, is to be 
found an ultimate key to the problem o-:f change and identity. 
J!1 or these reasons, constant reference is made to the nature of 
mind in the philosophy of Bowne. As for the repetitions that 
our reader may notice, attention is called to the fact that in 
treating the problem of change and identity from the points of 
view of psychology, logic, epistemology, metaphysics, social and 1 
religious implications, and theology, Bowne himself makes these 
repetitions for the simple reason that a means may serve differ- 1 
I 
ent ends. Thus, the knowing self is the primal reality in the 
1
1 
II 
!I 2. YW1owing Self only 
Primal Reality 
philosophy of Borden Parker Bowne. 
And because the self is, the world 
is, for 
'Ye have seen that experience apart from the 
constitutive action of the mind, is an il-
lusive phantasmagoria without intelligible 
contents, and that articulate experience is 
possible only as the mind imposes its own 
rational forms on the sense matter.l6 
16 TTK, 345f. 
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B. Mind as Principle of Permanence. 
Mind, then, is the principle of permanence, for Bowne 
again points out that "the sense world is flitting, fleeting, 
discontinuous." Epistemology shows that it is all an inarticu- ; 
late, phantasmagoric flux or dissolving view until thought \' 
i brings into it its rational principles and fixes and interprets l 
it.17 The temporal impression itself is nothing for intellect I 
until it is fixed into an abiding meaning,18 and "without this 
synthetic and interpretative action of the mind there could be 
19 
no world whatever for us." It is the mind that recognizes 
20 
the one. among the many, and unifies in this way our sensa-
I 
tiona. 21 Senses, we have already said, do not give us 
22 
reality, I 
while mind does. 
c. Recurrence of Experience Possible only to a 
Universalizing Intelligence~ 
Recognition of a sensation presupposes previous experience 
of that sensation, thus, the concept of recognition carries 
with it the implication of recurrence. Recurrence of experi-
ence, however, is possible only to a universalizing intelli-
17 PER, 6 8, 6 9. 
1 8 PER 70. 19 t 
20 PER, 71. 
I 
TTK, 126, 127; KS, 21-22, 383. 
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gence, 23 for sensations can only recur in mind, 24 In fact, as 
Bowne points out, the recurring manifold is impossible without 
a co~ordinating and unifying one. 25 There is experience of 
succession according to Bowne, because this principle is 
26 
valid. , 
And even the concepts of number and time find their basis in !, II 
the validity of this principle. I 
I Quantitative likenesses and unlikenesses when two or more cases of a common quality are com-
pared. Here the mind comparing two or more 
cases perceives a peculiar identity or change 
in its inner states as it passes from one to 
another, which change, moreover, is reversed 
when the order of mental movement is reversed. 
This fact is the basis of all ideas of quan-
titative equ~yalence, or of greater and less 
in quantity. 7 
I 
D. Categories of Thought in General. 
I 
In captions A and F of our previous chapter, the general / 
,j question of the categories of thought was discussed. One of / 
these categories is Identity~ 28 To what has been already said I 
it will suffice to state that for Bowne, Identity as well as 
the other categories, is not created by mind, but recognized by l 
29 it. In this recognition, the establishment of the categories / 
I 
~~ TTK, 41 t 120. 56, 57. TTK, 44, 45, 48, 55, 
25 SIT 226. 
26 TTK: 66, 67. 
27 IPT 127, 153f; TTK, 70; PER, 261-262. t 
28 TTK, 87-89. 
29 SIT' 47. 
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consist~ But they are established by intuition.30 As such, 
the categories are the framework of intelligenoe;31 but apart 
from the content of experience, they are vacuous and meaning-
less.32 
E. Identity as a Category. 
Bowne hsa defined the oategores as "the normas by which 
the mind proceeds, implicitly or explicitly, in fixing, defin-
ing, and relating its objects.n33 
be logical, or may be metaphysical. 
The categories, however~ may 
Still, some may be both; 
that is~. some may be valid both for thought and for reality. 
Identity is both a metaphysical and a logical category. That 
I 
I 
In both senses, II 
II 
is to say~ it is both formal and ontological.34 
it is a presupposition of knowledge~ 35 
I· 
I 
I F. A-priorism and Empiricism. II 
The nature and validity of the categories is the fundamen- \I 
The de- II 
bate itself, according to Bowne, must be carried one way or the 1 
tal issue in the debate of a-priorism vs. empiricism. 
other only on the assumption of the reality of the soul. 36 
30 SIT 31 TTK: 32 TTK . 
33 TTK' 
34 TTK, 
35 PER' 
36 :MET' 
' 
48..;.61. 
112. 
346; KS, 
59. 
87, 112. 
78. 
499. 
141-144. 
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Bowne calls attention to the fact that the opponents of a-
priorism 
fancy that the doctrine is that all men are 
born with a certain stock of full-blown ideas, 
or intuitions. which appear in every conscious-
ness, so that whatever else one may be ignorant 
OI, one knows that space must be infinite, time 
eternal, that there can be no accidents without 
a substance, and no event without a cause ••• 
But no such a view is held by intuitionists.37 
120 
Bowne comes in the defense of intuitionists or a-priorists, and 
states that 
"All that intuitionists in general have held, 
is that the mind is such that, when roused to 
activity by contact with the outer world, it 
will necessarily develop certain forms of ac-
tivity from which certain principles or mental 
formulas may be abstracted. These principles 
will not be imported into the mind, but will 
be expressions of the mind 1 s own nature. As 
such they will be innate, not something acquired 
from without but something developed from with-
in.38 
G. Thought and Thing. 
These categories, then, is all we have. With them and 
through them we judge. Indeed, rea son itself is but the or-
ganic functioning of these categories, and reason is all we 
have. 39 Reason, Bowne would say, influenced by Hegel, is one 
and universal. 
37 MET, 494-495. 38 MET, 495. 39 SIT 106. t 
Human reason, however, is only discursive. 
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He says: 
Our thought contains two elements: a certa in 
rational content or insight, and a variety of 
processes by which this insight is reached. 
The former is the objective and universal ele-
ment of thought; the latter is formal only, 
and it may be related to us. On this account 
our reason is said to be discursive, and has 
been opposed to the supreme reason, which, be-
cause it 9ossesses truth in inwediate vision, 
is said to be intuitive.40 
Thought, however, al ways refer to something not itself. When 
! 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I' 
there is consciousness, it is always consciousness of something~ 
41 ·
1 "Vifhen consciousness is empty of objects there is nothing left." 
It is clear that for Bowne, epistemological dualism was ines- I 
42 I capable in view of the fact that there are thought series and 
1 
thinO' series 43 But the knowledge of things assumes their con- 1 
• b 44 • I 
stancy, or what is the same , all objective science assumes 
uniformity of nature both in s pace and time;45 ancl this brings I 
us to another aspect of Bowne's philosophy of identity, namely , I 
wha t he himself called nthe fact of connection among the ob-
jects of t h ought," and which constitutes his third fundamental 
condition of judgn1ent.46 The infinite changes of a variety-
world are unified i n a harmonious whole through interaction 
40 TTK 
41 TTK: 
42 IPT 
43 TTK' 
44 SIT' 
45 ' 46 SIT' TTK, 
386-387. 
lS'I. 
238, 241. 
297, 312, 
45. 
87. 
20 t 33. 
Brightman, ITP, 78-93. 
313. 
I' 
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which is a function of identity, and interaction is 
of knowledge.47 
the basis li 
II 
H •. A.me.nability of the World-Ground. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Interaction, however, which is the basis of knowledge, is . 
1 the handiwork and expression of a Cosmic Mind. Hence the world 
is knowable, for it is thoughtlike.48 Nature is concrete rea-
son~49 and mind now Mind. 50 
47 MET, 
48 THE 
49 SIT' 
50 SIT' 
51 PER' 
' 
If the things themselves are really processes 
in space and time, they become anything arti-
culate for us only through the ideas by which 
we fix the processes into meanings. But on 
the hand it is plain that these processes could 
not be grasped through these ideas unless they 
were really the expressions of ideas. It would 
be incredible that we should know things by 
ideas essentially unrelated to them; and as the 
ideas by which the things are constituted are 
independent of us, there must be a supreme in-
telligence behind the things which make them 
the bearer of expressions of the ideas. :ve can-
not understand noises unless they are informed 
with thought, and they can be informed with 
thought only as there is a thinker at the other 
end. In the same way things can be graf!>ped by 
thought only as they are the products of thought. 51 
492. 
130-134; POT, 65; SIT, 155. 
119. 
57. 
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CHA.PrER V 
,, 
BOVifNE 'S TREATME'1TT OF THE PROBLEM: FROM THE 
POINT OF VIEW OF METAPHYSICS 
A. Change and Becoming. 
Even though we have discussed the problem of change and 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
id6ntity from the points of view of psychology 9 logic and Jl 
I 
epistemology, and later we shall discuss it from the points of 1 
view of social and religious implications and of theology~ the 
trea tment of the problem of change and identity properly belong 
in the field of metaphysics. Most of our discussion so far has 
been carried on within the field of identity. The problem of 
change Bowne himself leaves for metaphysics. According to I 
Bowne, the standing objection to the notion of change is that itl 
I 
violates the logical law of identity. In order to consider thi~ 
objection, Bowne sets up to contrast the Heraclitic notion of 
being as perpetual flow, with the Eleatic notion of being as 
changeless and motionless. The Heraclitic and Eleatic world 
conceptions we have already discussed in Chapter I under the 
caption of the Greek Presocratics. The pattern of argument 
that Bowne follows in his treatment of the problem from the 
point of view of metaphysics is that of showing that both 
123 
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change and identity taken abstractly are logical contradictor-
ies. .i! or this reason all the steps taken to reconcile change 
and identity have failed. As in connection with his views on 
the failure of Heraclitus~ Bowne was severely attacked by 
1. Patrick's Criticism 
of Bowne 's View on 
Heraclitus 
and so far as it is of our know-
ledge no other investigator has mentioned the issue between 
Bowne and Patrick, let us consider the case at this point. Pat 
rick expresses his contention in the following manner. 
Mr. Borden Parker Bowne in his Metaphysics (p. 
89) says that the Heraclitic theory of change I 
thus e.xtremely conceived is nintelligible and i 
possible only because i1t is false." Let us I 
look at Mr. Bowne's argument. He has first J 
shown in the same chapter that the Eleatic con- 1 
caption of rigid being without change is im- ; 
possible, since in a world of absolute fixity, r
1
' J 
even the illusion of change would be impossible. 
Furthermore he has shown that the vulgar con~ 
caption of changeless being with changing states 
is untenable, since "the state of a thing ex-
presses what the thing is at the time." Chang- ,. 
ing states would be uncaused and undetermined 
except as the being changes. There can be there- II 
fore no fixed useless core of being. In general 
there is no changeless being. All is change • 
. All is becoming. Is there, then, he asks, any 
permanence or identity whatever, or is the ex-
treme Heraclitic position true? It is false. 
Why? Because as in a world of Eleatic fixity~ 
even the illusion of change would be impossible, 
so in a world of absolute change, even the ap-
pearance of rest would be impossible. There must 
be some abiding factor, that change may be known 
as change. There must be something permanent 
somewhere to make the notion of flow possible. 
'rhis permanent something Mr. Bowne finds in the 
-------- ---=================~~~==========-~=-========~===- ~-=~-
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knowing subject, the conscious self, Having 
proceeded plainly up to this point, here he 
becomes mystical, The permanence of the con-
scious self~ he continues, does not consist in 
any permanent substance of the soul, The soul 
forever changes equally with other beings. The 
permanence consists in memory or self-conscious-
ness. "How this is possible, n he says, "there 
is no telling. The permanence and identity of 
the soul consists, however, only in its ability~r 
to gather up its past and carry it with it. In 
this argument Mr. Bowne's first fallacy is in 
saying that in a world of absolute change there 
must be some permanent factor in order that the 
change itself may be known. This is meaningless. 
Permanence as regards other moving factors is 
simply relative difference of change. Mr. Bowne 
seems to have committed the primitive error of 
supposing that because all things seem to move, 
he alone is fixed - like the earth in the Ptole-
maic Astronomy. According to his argument is he 
were in a moving car and should meet another mov-
ing car, the perception of movement would be im-
possible. His reasoning assumes that by absolute 
change is meant uni f orm change all in one way, 
which would not be change at all, but absolute 
fixity. Difference is the essential element in 
change, and difference is all tha t is necessary 
to the idea of change. The assumption of perman-
ent personality in order to make change itself 
possible is unnecessary. Mr. Bowne says that 
· constitutes permanence in the conscious self is 
its ability to gather up its past and carry it with 
her. But a stratifying rock or growing tree 
gathers up its past and carries it with it. But 
the apparent permanence in the case of the rock 
or the tree is a temporarily abiding form or tem-
porarily abiding relations. The apparent perman-
ence of personality may similarly consist wholly 
in temporarily abiding form or relation, must in 
fact consist in this, since Mr. Bowne rejects any 
abiding soul substance. But temporarily abiding 
relations, the extreme Heracliteans do not deny, 
certainly not Heraclitus~ to whom apparent rest 
was due to the temporary equilibrium of opposite 
balancing forces. We conclude therefore, that Mr. 
Bowne's charge of :falsity against the theory of 
the Heraclitic flux is not well substantiated. 
125 
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Here as ever we see the difference between 
modern and ancient philosophy. The former 
looks within; the latter, without. Mr. Bowne 
seeks the abidL~g within himself. Heraclitus 
looked away from himself to the universal with-
out, which determined all things and himself.l 
Patrick has raised an in~ense amount of dust about one 
single paragraph of Bowne without doing full justice to him. 
126 
Bowne has done more justice 
Bowne. Patrick's arguments 
to Heraclitus than has Patrick to II 
have left Bowne untouched. The ex-
ample of the two cars is of no use because no provision is made 
in it for the ground on which the cars move, and which in rela-
tion to the moving cars is still. As for the charge of Bowne 
pr etending to be the only individual around whom the universe I I 
i 
revolved, Bowne would have never supposed to be the only person ! 
there was. He demolished sollipsism. Bowne would have prob- [
1 
I ably answered Patrick in the f ollowing fashion. How is it I 
possible to know anything whatsoever about those cars, or any I 
car, so far as that goes, apart from the self? And how could 
the self know if in the temporal process of knowing it should I 
break up in different other selves with no identity whatsoever? i 
As the common ground of change and identity, Bowne offers I 
the principle of personality as the metaphysical ultimate, in j 
I 
j 
I 
1 Patrick, F!JllH, 65-68. In the revised edition of his Meta-
physics (1898), Bowne assumes a more benigh attitude towards 
Heraclitus. Whether Patrick's criticism had anything to do I 
with this change of attitude, not even Patrick himself knows, II 
as may be gathered from correspondence of Summer 1939 between 
Patrick (now in Palo Alto, Calif•) and the present writer. 
==-il. 
-======~~--==-=-====~~~-=~==---
127 ij 
2 whose nature the only s elution to the problem is to be found. 
Real change and real identity are only found in consciousness. 3 
In the first edition of his Metaphysics in the year 1882, 
Bowne considered his problem settled by simply harmonizing ·in 
the conscious self at the end of his chapter on Change and Be-
coming, the two extremes, or apparent contradictories of change 
and identity (if taken abstractly). In his revised edition of 
1898, he refers the solution of the problem of change and iden-
tity, to the chapter on the metaphysics of time. 
B. The Metaphysics of Space and Time. 
Both time and space are for Bowne, as they were fo? Lotze, 
functions of identity, tools of consciousness. In the case of 
time, however, Bowne presents us with a tremendous problem~ for 1 
as we stated before, in the revised edition of his :Metaphysics, II 
he does not solve the problem of change and identity in the 
I 
I 
I 
chapter that bears that same name, but postpones it and refers 
the student to his chapter on time for a final treatment. 
I 
Yet ~~ 
his position in regard to the metaphysics of time is so inter-
nally inconsistent with i t ·self, that it is impossible to har-
monize his own views. Time is discussed as a peculiar mental 
2 MET, 77-100; MET 2 , 44 ... 67. 
3 Cf. Flewelling, BPR, 15t 217-222; PPP; Knudson, POP, 
223f, 237f; Brightman POI (Chap. I)~ and conclusions 
ITP; P6IC; P'7IC. 
83f, 
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principle whereby the .mind connects experiences under the for.m 1 
I 
I 
of sequence. 4 It is a subjective ap pearance of change. 5 But 1 
h . t lf d t . t. 6 Ti i i 1 c ange 1 se oes no requ1re 1me. me s pr mari y a law I 
of thought. 7 When relating time to God, Bowne puts us in the I 
I 
most ·difficult of situations, for on the one hand, we are told 1 
I 
that there is no time in God. On the other hand we are told I 
I 
I that there is, and then again we are told that there is not. 
8 God is beyond time, we are reminded. Time in God would lead II 
Creation itself is a non- I 
9 
us to an evolving developing God. 
I 10 11 temporal act. God is eternal. Timelessness of God consist~ 
in his self"sufficiency.12 Therefore, neither time nor change 
must be carried into Intelligence.13 There is changeless know-
14 ledge and changeless life in God. But on the other hand, as 
we have s a id, we are also told that there is time in God, for 
time and change are real fo r metaphysical reality;15 change is 
not phenomenal but a fact of reality itself;16 the divine ac-
tivity is essentially te~pora1, 17 and cosmic process may be 
E I PT, 129, 130, 131-132. 2 
6 IPT~ 129; ]AET~ 225; 1ffiT, 226f; 1mT , 189. MET 237; IviET , 183-184. 7 TTK: 66-68, 70; THE, 186. 
8 THE, 186; SIT, 268; PER, 145, 149. 
9 POT 151, 185; THE; 184. 
lO 1rnT!, 191; SIT, 307; POT, 153. 
11 THE, 182-186; POT~ 153. 
12 THE 224. 
13 1ffiT~ 193 192. 14 , ' 
5 :MET, 240. 
l6 KS~ 49 3•5 241· 1mT2 52, 178, 182. 
17 lviErl', 2 , , t . 53 
I 
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18 I 
coeternal with God, extending throughout the infinite t ime.l9 , 
In the case of God, he tells us, for whome to know is to act,20 
and in whose infinitude and omniscience all knowledge would be 
present, 21 time is but an eternal now. 22 
Three main difficulties we are compelled to :face at this 
I 
moment. One is religious, Another is metaphysical. The other I 
is ep istemological. In the first place, if there is no time i 
II in God, there is no reason for using such religious vital con-
cepts as the patience of God, the forgiveness of God, the op-
1 portunity of God for his children, the hope of man~ the trust 1. 
in a better world , the perfectibility of the world; fo r all il 
I! 
the se concepts presuppose the reality of time. In the second j\ 
I place, if there is no time in God, God c~n not be free; and muc~ 
less can we; f or freedom presupposes the reality of time. In il 
the third place, if there is no freedom, in terms of Bowne him- 1 
self, there is no knowledge . The essence of Bowne 1 s argument 
for freedom in this connection may be stated as follows . Know- !1 
I! ledge is not given. It is i nferred. Inference is valid spec- 1 
I 
ulation. At the roots of valid speculation lies the search for 1 
truth, which 1ogieally means the correspondence of ideas with 
the objects to which they refer. But the function of searehin& 
18 THE, 222. 
19 THE, 223. 
20 THE, 241; TTK~ 313; SIT, 233. 
21 MET, 237; MET , 183, 193. 
22 PER, 145; IvillT , 220; 225; 236. 
I 
I 
II 
!I 
I 
,I II 
-=· --=:.:_-::j:j-1=-=-=--=--=--===:.=·=--=---·-_-_··-::-----------------·-------
-- r---
130 
I 
and als ·O the function of comparing ideas~ asserting, denying, I 
including pertinent experiences, or excluding irrelevant facts, 
1 all these activities presuppose freedom of the self and the 
il I, metaphysical validity of that freedom. In other words, then, 
if there is no freedom, there can be no valid knowledge. But 
freedom necessarily involves the reality of change, and the 
!i 
I' 
,I 
I' 
reality of time. Speculation, and especially valid inference \ 
presuppose a changing self. Identity of the self is, of course,! 
presupposed too; but many a time Bowne leans towards an Ineati- i 
I 
cism which naturally would invalidate his Speculative Argument 
for Freedom. Thus, in our opinion either time and change are 
real for the self and for ontology, or Bowne's speculative 
argument for freedom is fallacious. 
I 
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CHAPT ER VI 
BOWNE'S T :m:ATMENT OF THE PROBLEM FROM THE 
POINT ON VIEW OF RELIGIOUS AND SOCIAL Hfl?LICATIONS 
A. Apparent Extreme Individualism. 
The vigor of Bowne's thought wrestling with the problem 
of change and identity does not exhaust itself in theoretical 
psychology, logic, epistemology and metaphysics. There are 
religious and social implications i n it worthy of serious con-
sideration. The following passage is really interesting be-
cause apparently it upsets the whole of Bowne's organic phil-
osophy. It only stresses the reality of individuals in society 
but not the reality of society itself. 
The real.i ty is the individuals which make up 
society. vVhen, then, we say that the public 
thinks, we mean only that the citizens think; 
and when we say that the public holds this or 
that opinion, we mean that the majority of the 
citizens hold the opinion.l 
But society (or the State which is society itself in its 
legal aspect) is much more than a sum of individuals. Society 
is a living organic whole, even if this whole has no existence 
l MET 363. t 
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and no justification apart from the initividuals of which it is I 
coneti tuted. Bowne's assertion, therefore, is not absolutely !i 
I! 
warranted when he states that: 
We attribute thoughts, feelings, and actions to 
the publ~c, and yet the public is and does 
nothing. Cfor) The realities are the elements, 
and they do whatever is done.3 
•i 
., 
J! II 
il 
I We have m§de it clear, however, that Bowne 1s individualismj 
is merely apparent. The statements quoted above, mainly under- I' 
line Bowne's aversion to what he himself called the fallacy of 
the universal. 4 
B. Bowne's Social Organicism. 
In more representative passages, Bowne does more justice I I 
II 
to the reality of society. "Indeed, human life in general ex- il 
I 
ists only in society, tt he admits. 
Of course there can be no society without the 
individual as its unit; but the individual 
comes to himself only in society. On the one 
hand, we can understand others only by assimi-
lating their life to ours; but, on the other 
hand, our own life is dormant until it ie5cal-led out by the universal social stimulus. 
i 
I 
I 
From the point of view of social philosophy, the problem of · 
the dal.. ly af- 11 change and identity, therefore~ has a bearing on 
fairs of practical life; for the problem of unity and plurality ~, 
I 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 TTK, 251-257. 
5 I PT, 197. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
--==----=+!'-=.c::___ ==== ==-----==_j----=---== 133r 
I' 
that lies at the heart of our tremendous social question today, I 
is fundamentally the same problem, change and,. identity, that jl 
Bowne has been treating psychologically, logically, epistemo- II 
logically and metaphysically, and the roots of which as a per- 11 il 
I sistent problem of thought we have synoptically traced across 
the history of philosophy. 
As the political situation stands today internationally, 
it does seem aa though from a point of view of social philoso-
phy, the fundamental issue of debate were that of Totalitar-
i 
I 
I 
I 
ianism vs. Extreme Individualsim. The Hegelian absolutisms of ~I 
present day European dictatorships are representative of the II 
first. The scientific anarchism proposed by Kropotkin, Bakunin 1
1 and Bertrand Ru.sse11, 6 are representative of the second. 
Bowne takes into consideration the two positions, and 
doing justice to both facts of experience, presents us with a 
formula worked out from the practical implications of the prob-
lem of change and identity: 
Some, forgetting that life must be experienced 
in ourselves before it can be found anywhere 
else, would make society (the State) the suf-
ficient source of all individual experience; 
while others set the individual apart in a false 
self-sufficiency, and forget that without the 
social stimulus the mind of the individual 
would never unfold.7 
6 Bertrand Russell, Proposed Roads to Freedom. New York: 
Blue Ilibbon Books, 1930. Cha~ter II, PP• 32-55. 
7 IPT, 197. 
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But , without the individual's self-consciousness ans self- 1 
dignity, all social idealism cOllapses, Bowne would. add , for he II 
also tells us that 
Apart from this self-consciousness, the pains 
of poverty, of social slights, etc., would be 
a vanishing quantity •••• Failure (to realize 
this) is the world 's great source of grief and 
heart-burning, It is this conception of self-
consciousness wh ich has led to the familiar 
onslaughts upon it as the sum or at least the 
root, of al l evil. Since we can interpret 
others' experience only by our own, a broad and 
intense ego-life is the condition of any full 
and deep social life. It is only in our own 
consciousness that the meaning and value of 
life and its experiences can be revealed; and 
without the knowledge of these there can be 
no SYffipathy for others and no understanding of 
them.8 
C. Social Value of His Philosophy. 
Approaching the end of this investigation, a question re-
garding the s ocial value of Bowne r s treatment of the problem of 
change and identity, would naturally be in place. In part this 
question was anticipated and answered in the discussion of the 
previ ous topic, because indeed, in the social process at the 
I 
I 
I 
II 
present time the problem of change and identity is conspicuousl1 
present , and whatever treatment it may receive from systematic 
intelligence, t his treatment may have far reaching consequences 
1 
8 IPT, 195. It must be admit ted, however, that here Bowne only 
plants the seed of a social philosophy. :B10r a representative 
position of Personalism in regard to Social Philosophy, Cf. 
Brightman, Personality and Religion •. New Y~rk: Abindgon 
Press 1934 • Cha • V. pp. 129-156, Ul partl.cularo 
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for the good or for the bad of human life. Bowne's penetrating 
analysis of the problem,. and his treatment of it in terms of a 
cosmic democratic society of real selves created and directed 
by a Supreme Self, who shares with them the infinite enterprise 
of eternal value achievement, certainly has a profound social 
importance, for as he says: 
l1Iaterialism. atheism, (pessimism), etc., are 
undoubtedly depressing and demo~alizing; but 
belief in God, immortality, and moral govern-
ment, has a great value both for personal and 
social well-being. It is the ~reat source of 
courage, hope, cheerfUlness an steadfastness 
in righteousness.9 
He emphasizes his posit ion even more clearly, when by way 
of summary and Weltanschauung, contrasting the life abundant 
with pure intellectualism, he states that 
The tendency has been to regard the individual, 
the only reality and the seat of all values, 
as having no significance beyond serving as a 
specimen of a category. In this way life and 
personality have been degraded from their true 
significance into abstract forms without either 
life or meaning. But there is always something 
deeper than thought; it is the thinking, living 
persons. And there is something deeper in the 
person than formal thought; it is life and as-
pirations ••• ,Hence the aesthetic, the ethi-
cal, and the religious nature have always 
claimed to bring us nearer to the life of being 
and its true significance than the understanding 
can ever come. In the contemplation of the 
beautiful, in devotion to the good, and in the 
service and worship of the perfect; we enter 
into the .inmost life of reality, and become one 
•ith the universe.lO · 
9 MET, 395. 
10 MET, 529-530. 
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D. Orthodoxy and Liberalism. 
Bowne has given deep meditation to the problem of har-
monious life. For him, the human world of daily enterprise, 
1. Change and Iden-
tity in the Social 
Process 
of aspirations and ho pes, achieve-
menta and frustrations, is an 
evolving world. In such a world• 
he sees both pennanence and progress as alike indispensable. 
nif there were no permanence," he tells us, nwe should have 
simply chaos, and if there were no progress we should be con-
fined to a social monotony which would be destructive,"11 
These two elements he calls the conservative and the progres-
sive. If society developed normallYt according to Bowne, these 
two factors would go side by side, and there would be no fric-
tion. 
Pe rmanence would hold fast all that is good, 
and conserve whatever of value has been 
gained in human experience. The progressive 
element, on the other hand~ would remember 
that the permanent element merely conserves 
whatever has been gained, and would point out 
that in changing human conditions it is neces-
sary to adapt society to those conditions.l2 
Unfortunately, however, this is not the case in actual exper-
ience, for as Bowne observes, 
11 SIC 
t 
12 SIC t 
We have an excess of permanence or we have an 
excess of the critical and progressive element, 
and the result is that hurnan development i s 
359. 
359-360. 
very often accompanied by a great deal of 
friction. Permanence becomes monotony. Pro-
gress becomes lawlessness and anarchy~l3 
137 
But both elements tend to be car-
2. The Conservative and 
the Progressive icatured in every day life, for as 
Bowne again states, 
We find in s ociety vested interests becoming 
indifferent to justice and humanity, unwill-
ing to make any progress and resisting it with 
all their might. On the other hand, we find 
wild reformers without any sense of social 
continuity, and unaware of the complex inter-
ests of society, who suppose that anything 
can be brought about to order by law.l4 
Of course, society is not absolutely divided in these two 
categories as one would gather from Bowne 1 s classification. 
In fact the great majority of hun~n beings occupy a position 
somewhere in between these two ext remes. There is a funda-
mental truth in Bowne's words, however, for a t least within 
the circle of militant thought, Bowne's two divisions, the 
conservative and the progressive, hold valid. 
E. Social Coherence as Organic Unfolding. 
As in the case of social individualism and political ab-
solutism which we discussed in the first two sections of this 
chapter, and in connection with which Bowne's social organicism 
may be considered as a conciliatory formula, in the case of 
13sic, 360. 
14 Ibid.. 
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the two opposing forces, conservatism and progressivism~ Bo~n1e 
proposes a fO:i."mula of social coherence through organic unfold-. 
ing. "It would be very desirable, n Bowne says~ "if these two 
elements, the conservative and the progressive, could be u-
nited in the same persons~ who seek at once to prove all things 
and to hold fast all that is good. 1115 He adds, 
In society they would recognize the things 
of permanent value in our inheritance from 
the past, and would conserve them with all 
energy~ but they would also recognize that 
the world is moving~ that we are entering 
upon new social conditions, and that the 
social order must be adjusted to correspond. 
In the thought world the s ame pers ons would 
recognize that the thoughts of men are widened 
with the process of the suns, and they would 
seek to retain the truth of the old and also 
keep their minds open for ne vv tru.ths from 
every quarter. If this were done we should 
then have a peaceful progress. Instead of 
having society divided into two rather hostile 
c amps ~ we should have the two factors of per-
manence and progress united, and progress 
would be by evolution, and not by revolution. 
Or it would proceed by organic unfolding from 
within, instead of being mechanically imposed 
from without .16 
F. Argument for Change in Discussion and Criticism as 
Instruments of Progress. 
The great instrument of progress in all fields, however~ 
is free discussion and public criticism. This is true alike 
15 '7. 6 SIC, v 2. 
16 S IC, 363. 
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of the physical, the mental, the social and the politic~l life 
of man. ifithout criticism there can be no investigation no 
. , 
new enterprise, no change whatever in life's motives, life's 
ideals, life's values. To this effect, Bowne argues that 
There must be test ing criticism and discus-
sion of the past, i n order to see what is to 
be kept and what is to be improved or set 
aside . The present is preeminently a period 
of this kind. At last we are be ginning to 
take an i nventory of our inheritance, with the 
aim of rationally appraising it. We are be-
ginning to apply intellect to the problems of 
life and society more systematically and com-
prehens ively than eve r before. The laws of 
health are being studied and ap-plied; the prob-
lems of disease are being attacked with unpre-
cedented vigor; social and economic laws are 
being investigated with unexampled precision; 
and the social order itself is subjected to 
thorough scrutiny.l7 
G. Argument for Permanence in the Church as Conserver 
of Value Achieved. 
This progress, howeve:r, will bear no fruit, if there is 
no way of providing for the conservation of its values achieve 
Religion fundamentally deals with the function of experiencing, 
crea ting and conserving values. Bowne gives intense meditation 
to the actual situation of the Church as institutionalized 
religion, and argues for intellectual honesty and love of truth 
17 SIC , 369. 
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18 in a dynamic militant church~ whose authentic nvita.l inter-
est in the kingdom of God will pe rpetua.lly gene rate right 
thinking~"19 The rank and fule of the Chu?ch cannot be ex-
pected to be deeply interested in intellectual pursuits and 
scientific investigation, but the realm of faith calls as much 
for reason as the realm of reason calls for faith. 
The Church, therefore, has need of a body of 
scholarly investigators to do its intellectual 
work. They will have the function of formu-
lating the spiritual life so as best to express 
it and keep it from losing its way in swam1?S 
of ignorance and superstition. They will also 
have to adjust religious thought to the ever-
advancing thought of cultivated intelligence 
so as to remove needless misunderstanding.20 
It is not until a high de gree of intellectual 
and moral development has been reached that 
the Church becomes a factor of progress as well 
as one of permanence.2l 
Smnmarizing , then, the problem of change and identity 
carries with it two £undamental social and religious implies.-
tions. The first one of these has to do with the problem of 
extreme individualism versus dictatorial absolutism of State. 
The formula of Social Organicism offered by Bowne, is con-
ciliatory of the two extremes. Its synthesizing operation is 
a function of identity in change . The second implication has 
to do with the two opposing forces or elements, the progressive 
18 SIC 
1 9 SIC' 
20 SIC' 
21 SIC' t 
369-399. 
374. 
382. 
364. 
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and the conservative, in the social process. A creative in-
telligent Church, doing justice to the t wo elements, mindful 
of constant progress, and conserving the permanently valuable~ 
is Bowne's formula. In this case, the Church would function 
as the factor of identity and continuity through the changing 
flux of human experience. 
CHAPTER VII 
BOWNE 1 S TREATIYTENT OF THw P3.0BL"'M FROH '.rHE 
POINT OF VIE":V OF THEOLOGY 
A. A Mind Back of Nature. 
After discussing briefly in Chapter I the history of the 
problem of change and identity by considering separately each 
of the principles of permanence developed by different philoso-
phers, the rest of this dissertation hSls been devoted to the 
discussion of the principle that Bowne presents: Mind. There 
are certain serious difficulties, however, in Bowne's treatment 
of the mind as psychological datum and metaphysical ultimate, 
which we have considered prudent to mention by way of personal 
reaction in connection with the field investigated. On the 
first hand , in terms of Bowne 1 S treatment of the problem one 
has to reco gnize that a new argument for the existence of God 
has been con tributed, namely, that of Interaction. Only on the 
basis of Interactionism can the physic al and the mental realms 
of being find intelligible explanation . Interactionism, on the 
other hand~. is unintelligible on the irnpe rsonal plane. · We can 
understand it and accept it only on the basis of nature being a 
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rationa l sys tem and of there being a mind back of nature.l 
B. The Supreme Hind, the Yorld- Grouna. 
Thus , according to Bowne, 
We pl ant behind the phenomenal system, sensa-
tional or otherwise, a Supreme Intelligence 
wh ich manifests his thought through it and 
thus founds that objective unity of the sys -
tem of expe rience which is presupposed in all 
our knowing.2 
C. The Co-ordina to r of the One and the Many . 
For we cla im, Bowne adds, that 
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.Apart from the design argument, and a part from the in-
dica tions of phys i cs , i t is strictly i mpossible , 
wi th ou.t insoluble con tradiction, to regard a 
plurality of interacting things as i ndependent 
of mind. An interacting mani fold is i mpossi-
3 ble without a co-ordinating and unifying one. 
D. God Wo rks on Rati onal Principles. 
The co-ordinating and unifying One, however, is the Supreme 
Mind Himself. God as a Mind works on the same principles a s 
any othe r mind; that is, the same categories of the understand-
ing which are valid for the human mind, according to Bowne , 
must be valid for God , for the y are expressions of God himself , 
ana consequently l aws of t he Div ine activity. 
l SI T 
2 ' PER 
3 SIT : 
119 , 155 . 
78; SIT, 398-309 
226. 
Hence we can never get behind the f act that 
the principles of reason and right are the 
laws of the essential divine activity . To 
refer t o the divine nature as s omething more 
ultimate is only to dilude our s elves with a 
figment of the imagination. But i n calling 
these principles the laws of the Divine ac-
tivit y we do not think of them as external 
norn~; but as essential expressions of God 
h ims elf.4 
E . Epistemology Shows us that the World. i s F..nowable 
Because it is Thoughtlike. 
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This being the case, then, nThere is mind. at both ends;tt 
and "If the world. be the product of mind. , there is no reason wh~ 
our minds should not know it as it is.n5 
The sense world , so far as it is articulate, 
or anything we can talk ab out, is alread.v a 
thought world . Its ~ermanences and identi-
ties are products o:r thought. The compl ex 
system of relations, whe reby it is defined 
and art iculated., is a thought product whioh 
can in no way be given to s ens e . The far 
re.aching inferences of scie nces , whereby our 
spontaneous thought of the world is so pro-
foundly transformed, a re something wh ich ex-
ists for neither eye nor ear , but f or thought 
only .6 •••• The world. as we grasp it is a 
world of thought rela tions; for thought can 
grasp nothing else. n ow i f the real world 
were an expression of thought , this wo uld be 
quite intelligib le. The world without exists 
through a mind. analogous to the mind within. 
Thus, the thing world and the thought ·wo rld 
would. be commensurable, both being founded 
in the nature of r ea son.7 
4 SI T, 346. 
5 SIT, 57. 
6 Tlffi, 131. 
7 THE , 132-133. 
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F. Yet, God Does Not Think. 
And now arises our difficulty with Bowne, for after postu-
lating God as a mind, and even telling us that the principles 
of reason and right are God's divine activities, Bowne tells us 
that God does not think: 
For perfect knowledge everything in the system 
of reason would be equally self-evident. We. 
however, not having such insight, have to find 
our way by combining the little we know so as 
to advance into the unknown. Heas oning in 
general would be needless for a perfect mind. 8 
G. And Though Eternal --
The problem of Time and God has been the most serious dif-
ficulty we have encountered in Bowne 's treatment of the problem 
of change and identity, for even though in various occasions 
9 he ascribes time experience to God, in most of his statements 
God is beyond time. 
The world-ground, is indeed, unconditioned by 
anything beyond itself; but it must be con-
ditioned by its own nature in any case, and 
the question arises whether this conditioning 
involves temporal sequence in the infinite 
life itself •••• To maintain the affirmative 
here would involve us in the gravest specu-
lative difficulties. We should have to hold 
that t he world-ground is subject to a law of 
development and comes only gradually to itself, 
or rather, that there is some constitutional 
8 TTK, 184; SIT , 352. · 
9 TF.IE 222 223 POT 153·, MET , 235, 241·, ~mT2 , 52, 178, 182·, 
' t ; ' 
KS , 49. 
necessity in the world-ground which forbids 
it always to be in full possession of itself • 
• • ,To admit real succession into conscious-
ness would make thought impossible. The know-
ledge of the changing must be changeless and 
the knovvledge of time must be timeless.lO 
H. And Eternally Creating --
But God is not merely the Absolute Person, with-
out a past and a future; he is, .a lso, the founder 
and conductor of the world-·process. This fact 
brings God into a new relation to time. This 
process is a developing and changing one, and 
hence is in time. Hence, also, the activity 
of God in t his process is essentially a temporal 
one, and God himself is in time, so far as his 
process is concerned, but here, too, there is a 
certain timeless element. As knowing all the 
possibilities of the process, the divine know-
ledge of the system may be viewed as without 
succession, and hence as non-temporal. But, as 
the chief agent in the process, and as incessant -
ly adjusting his activity to the several stages 
of the process, both his activi ty and his know- 11 ledge of the advancing reality must be in time. 
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It would suffice to ask one of Bowne's own questions if we 
should like to overthrow the validity of the above statements, 
for, "How can an unchanging substance produc e change? How can 
God create a changing world in time and yet be tw1eless and 
non-temporal?" Bo·wne himself must have recognized this cliffi-
12 
culty. 
10 THE , 183; Cf. also Tllli, 186; 2SIT, 268; PER, 145, 149; POT, 151, 185; THE , 224; lvlET, 192, 193, 17'7, 189; 
MET, 240, 225, 220, 226, 227. 
11 MET , 241. 
12 KS , 4 9 ; l,1ET 2 , 52 , 17 8 • 
I. Is Changeless 
Bowne i nsists , however, that, 
A being which is in full possession of itself, 
so that it does not come to itself successive-
ly, would not be in time. Such a being can 
be conceived as having a changeless knowledge 
and a changeless life. As such, it would be 
without memory, and without expectation, but 
would be in the absolute enjoyment of itself.1 3 
J. And Ti meless . 
Finally, Bowne adds that, 
By its position as the source and cause of all 
dependent being, and of all reason and know-
ledge, the infinite can neve r transcend itself 
wit hout contradiction, and can never receive 
anything from without. As inclependent and un- 14 
conditioned, it must al ways b e equal to itsel f . 
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Bowne's co nt radictory statements with respect to God and time 
are so numerous and so confusing that it is ext remely di ff icult 
to reconc ile them. He fears that the re cognition of time in 
God would lead to the idea of an evolving or developing God . 1 5 
But as we have shown, however, i n Chapter V, he recognizes the 
metaphys ic al importance of time in various passages. Profe ssor 
Brightman's criticism of Bowne at this point is opportune when 
he says: 
Bowne failed to see clearly that f or one person 
who made pe rsonality the fundament al principle , 
13 MET 240. 
14 SIT: 268. 
15 POT , 185, 151; THE, 184. 
the ideality of time -- that is, its depen-
dence on persona lity-- is an assertion of 
its metaphysical reality . To be a person 
is to act and to endure, while at the same 
time experiencing changeless truth in the 
changing process of co nsciousness. Tha tem-
poral is just as necessary to the eternal as 
the eternal is to the temporal. Without both 
we have a mere abstraction~ no explanation 
of experience as a whole.l 
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Respectfully we submit the conclusion that Bowne•s treatment of 
the 1n·oblem of change and identity is not absolutely satis-
f acto1·y. His faith malces him lean so much towards El eaticism, 
tha t 'lfor fear of not being led to a n evolving or developing 
God" he has simply dealt thoroughly with the problem of iden-
tity, but has left the problem of change almost untouched. One 
fundamental uestion we would have liked to answer ourselves at 
the end of this investigation: Is the mind or self simply that 
which is permanent and unchanging in the last analysis, or is 
it the experience of change and identity? If the latter, ~ould 
it be true tr~t both change and identity are functions of the 
seli? On the basis of Bowne's treatment of the problem the 
question may be answered affirmatively and negatively. In the 
problem of change and identit y we simply face one of life's im-
ponderab les. But in front of i mp onderables, no better attitude 
than that of Bowne himself: 
16 E . s . Bright man , "ATemporalist View of God." Jour. ::tel . 
12 (1932 ), 545-555. 
We now see through a glass darkly, yet the 
image there discerned must not be distorted. 
As we think of the infinite past and the in-
finite to come, it becomes plain that there 
is much in the Infinite One which we can never 
hope to understand, but upon which we can only 
gaze; yet must not all be wrapped in shadow; 
something must pierce thru to the sunlig~t 
and the clear blue. In contemplating Him we 
shall ever be as men watching in the darkness 
at early dawn, with a deep sense of awe and 
mystery press ing upon us; still there must be 
some glow upon the hill-tops and a flush in 
the open air. ~here must, indeed, be a solemn 
silence that reverence may bow low and worship; 
but there must also be a voice which we can 
trust, bidding us be not afraid. The absence 
of either of these elements would lead, I 
believe, to the decay of all true religion. 
In the God who commands our reverence and our 
loving worship, there must be mystery , and 
there must be manifestation.l7 
17 PHS, 77-78. 
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The problem of this dissertation is that of the relations of change and 
identity with special reference to its treatment in the philosophical writings 
of Borden Parker Bowne. The historical backgrounds of the problem arc 
investigated in order to shed light on Bowne's views. 
I 
The problem of change and identity is one of the most difficult and 
persistent as well as one of the most ancient problems of thought. Traces of it 
may be found in history as far back as early Indian philosophy. The Rg Veda 
(about 1500-1000 B. C.), which is one of' the most ancient monuments of 
civilization that we possess, develops a cosmic pantheism according to which 
a persistent unitary being manifests itself1 through the numberless forms 
of our changing world. In the subsequent' philosophies of the Brahmanas, 
Upanishads, and later Hindu and Sanskrit literatures, the crudity of this 
primitive view is attenuated, but pantheism ,continues to be the characteristic 
note. The concepts of Brahma and Atman, as universal and individual realities 
respectively, are important developments in : the evolution of the problem in 
the second period of Indian philosophy (1000-500 B.C.). In the third period, 
that of the Hindu and Sanskrit literatures 'of Vedanta, Vaiseshika, Nyaya, 
Sankya, Yoga, Mimansa, (from 500 B. C. on), the problem shifts from 
cosmology to psychology, from the objective world to the world of mind. Two 
conc~pts are specially significant during this period, namely, that of Manas 
Inferior, the changing mind; and that of Manas Superior, the unchanging soul. 
The problem of change and identity is dlso treated in the Chinese philos-
ophy, especially in the 'Tao 'T eh King of Lao-Tze, with its theory of Reason 
as a metaphysical ultimate, in which " the ten thousand things" find explanation 
and justification. Lao-Tze also anticipates the theory of "Opposites" that is 
to appear later on in Greek philosophy. Not until the Greek pre-Socratics, 
!J.owever, do we find the problem methodically treated . We may even say that 
the fundamental theme of Greek Pre-Socratic Philosophy, is that of change 
and identity. The Milesians, the Eleatics, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, 
Democritus, Pythagoras all aimed at the same problem through the same 
-lUestion :-What is the one root and trunk of the tree whose branches con-
stitute the many phenomena of the world? 1 
I 
Socrates contributes to the clarification 0f the issue with his view of the 
logical importance of the Concept. Plato enl'iches thought about the problem 
of identity with his Ideas, and Aristotle gi~es it final form for the Greek 
period by distinguishing between logical identity, metaphysical identity, and 
identity as object of the intellect. : 
After Aristotle, the Scholastics spoke of Substance as the only true being, 
the only unchanging reality. Locke and Hume referred to it as the "unknown 
cause" of impressions not originated in the senses. Berkeley identified it with 
Mind. Descartes spoke of matter as extended substance, of mind as un-
extended substance, and of God as the fu11damental underlying substance 
that connects matter and mind. Spinoza identified substance with nature, and 
nature he called God. In him, therefore, the principle of identity is nature 
itself. Leibniz, however, is to be credited with a major contribution. He made 
reality to consist of individual monads, varying in degrees of self-consciousness, 
self-direction, and ability to realize themselves. Identity, therefore, he identi-
fied with Being itself, but Being he identified with activity. Kant's position 
with respect to the problem in question is rather problematic because of his 
so-called Dinge an sich and all the ambiguities of his Categories. But it can 
at least be said that for Kant identity is one of the functions of the mind. 
Mind imposes it upon its world of phenomena. Schelling does away with 
Kant's noumena, and speaks of the Absolute, as the organic whole, in which 
all theses and antitheses find ultimate explanation. Identity, for him, is a 
function of the Absolute. Hegel makes this Absolute an organic dialectical 
whole, objective cosmic spirit. Identity for Schopenhauer is of the nature of 
the universal will-to-be. This is the metaphysical ultimate in which he finds 
all continuity. 
Hermann Lot2;e (1817-1881) goesbeyond previous thinkersinhisanalysis 
of change and identity. For him, the problem finds solution only on the plane 
of personality. Only persons change while remaining identical. Change and 
identity taken abstractly are logical contradictories. In personal experience 
they find exemplification and explanation. 
Borden Parker Bowne, student of Lot2;e, owes much to his teacher in the 
position he occupies with respect to the problem of change and identity, but 
does not depend completely on the line of argument laid out by Lot2;e. 
Bowne (1847- 1910) treats the problem of change and identity from the points 
of view of psychology, logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and religious and social 
thought. The main steps of his argument in psychology run as follows: The 
reality of the self is a primary condition of the mental life. Sensations require 
an organi.4ing agent and consciousness is the agent. The essence of self is 
memory, and the essence of memory is recognition. Recognition is impossible 
if the recognizing agent is not identical with itself. In his argument from the 
point of view of logic, stress is laid on identity as the fundamental function 
of all faculties, on the unity of the mental subject, and on the necessity of 
this unity for all inference, memory, and knowledge. Mind is the coordinator 
of the one and the manifold ; and the notion is its shorthand expression 
for the many. From the point of view of epistemology, attention is called to 
the mind as active and constitutive in sensation, for mind is the relational 
principle. Apart from this principle experience is impossible. R ecurrence ot 
experience itself is possible only to a universalizing intelligence. The problem 
of change and identity belongs especially in the field of metaphysics. Bowne's 
argument in this field begins by way of definitions and penetrating analyse<; 
of the terms of change and identity and their corresponding implications. The 
two terms taken abstractly contradict each other. Identity and change are 
concretely found only in consciousness. Hence, personality, the common 
ground of both, is the only solution to the problem. Unity is ultimate. "The 
heavens are crystalli2;ed' mathematics," and nature is a thought world. Knowl-
edge of nature implies mind at both ends, the knower and the known. The 
universe is a "logical togetherness." 
Bowne applies the metaphysics of change and identity to the daily ex-
periences of the social process. The progressive element in society is the factor 
of change; the conservative, the factor of identity. Bowne's position is that 
of a social organism, where change is stimulated through discussion and criti-
cism as instruments of progress, and permanence is stimulated through the 
spiritual growth of the church as conserver of value achieved. 
The following problems and observations are some of the results of our 
investigation. (1) Like Herbart, Bowne (for pedagogical reasons) starts with 
"concepts" already given to us in experience. He taught his students by 
pointing out the contradictions implied in such concepts. But it is not nec-
essarily true that this method is the most pedagogical. 
(2) Bowne's metaphysics of change and id.entity has undergone numerous 
changes of special interest during his revisions of his works. In 1882 Bowne 
published his Metaphysics. In 1898 it was revise~. The revised Metaphysics 
lays more emphasis on logic than does the original ~dit;ion .of 18_82, and stresses 
more the element of identity than the elel)lent of change. The author is also 
more careful of the connotation of his _ words. A benign attitude is observed 
in the re:vised edition toward Heraclitus, ' as over against the unfavorable 
previous treatment that he received in the first edition. 
( 3) Throughout the treatment of the 
1 
problem of change and identity, 
Bowne is not consistent in naming his principle of permanence. Sometimes 
it is called intelligence, sometimes, soul. At times, it is given the name of sub-
stance. At other times he calls it monad; but he also calls it ego, and self. 
I 
( 4) Up to 1897 Bowne seems to have l~ited the term experience to 
physical sensations as we may infer from hts discussion of apriorism and em-
piricism; but afterwards, experience comes tp mean for Bowne all the data of 
self-consciousness, as we may infer from his discussion of the Kantian categories_ 
( 5) Bowne is not consistent in his the~ry of soul; neither is he consistent 
in his attitude towards logic. He attacks , logic as a discipline, but expects 
from it more than any other philosopher naturally would. In method of 
exposition he himself is a most rigorous logician. 
( 6) In his social theory, there are also apparent contradictions, at least 
between his atomistic individualism and his organic pluralism. 
(7) The most important problem in the metaphysics of_ Bowne, however, 
is his metaphysics of time. For him, "God is timeless and cha1igeless." But 
in several passages, Bowne -tells us that "Change is a fact in reality itself," 
that "the divine activity is temporal," and "Time is eternally coexistent with 
God." It appears impossible to reconcile Bowne's contradictory views on time. 
How can thought reconcile the timelessness of God with the activity of God? 
If personality is the essential metaphysical ultimate, time must be meta-
physically real. 
A serious problem remains unsolved , in this investigation, namely, the 
respect in which the self in Bowne explains the problem of chaqge and 
identity. Is it because the self as such is permanent and unchanging, or 
because it experiences both the changing f-nd the permanent? Of course, if 
the latter be the case, change and identity are fundamental characteristics 
of the self; but in the case of Bowne, w,e can neither affirm the later nor 
the former, in view of the fact that Bowne's theories of the soul are obscure 
and contradictory. I 
I 
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"Herbert Spehcer's Laws of the Knowable," ** New England., 1 l'l 
32 (Jan., 1873), pp. 1-34. Art. (1873) 
I 
1 In the preparation of this bibliography of Bowne ' s writings, I' 
I have consulted the bibliography prepared by Professor 
Carroll D. W. Hildebrand, of DePauw University, as it ap-
pears in the typewritten copy of his Doctor's Dissertation, 
Borden Parker Bowne's Teachin Concernin The Speculative 
Significance o Freedom, Bos on nivers y, , pp. 69-
282, and as printed in Bishop Francis John McConnell's Borden 
Parker Bowne, (New York: Ab ingdon Press, 1929), pp. 282-286. 
I have also consulted and followed closely the bibliography 
prepared by Professor Edward Thomas Ramsdell, as it appears 
in the typewritten copy of his Doctor's Dissertation, Prag-
1 
matic Elements in the E istemoloo of Borden Parker Bowne, 
Boston University, 1932 , pp. 189-19 • Pro • Rams e 1. s j 
chronological order has been preferred to Prof. Hildebrand's 
--1! 
II 
'I 
:, 
II 
!I 
I' 
"Moral Intuition vs. Utilitarianism," * New England., 32- ~1-
(Ap r., 1873), pp. 217•242. Art. (1873) 
1 
"Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psychology, 1' *New England.t 3 32 (Kuly, 1873), pp. 468-506. Art. (1873J 
The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, ** (New York: Phillips 
& Hunt, 1874) PHS 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
"Philosophy in Germany, n * Independ., 26 (Jan. 22, 1874), 1 II pp. 4-5. Art. (1874) 
"The Old Faith and the New," * Meth. Quart. Rev., 56 (Apr., 2 1874), pp. 268-296. Art. (1874) 
t'Faith and Morals,n Independ., 26 (May 14, 1874), p. 3. 3 I Art. (1874) j 
"Ulrici's Logic,"* New England., 33 'July, 1874), 11 
JYP• 458-492. Art. (1874) 4 i, 
nThe Materialistic Gust," * Independ., 26 (July 30, 1874), 5 I 
pp. 2-3. · Art. (1874) I 
"Gott und die Natur," **New England., 33 (Oct., 1874), 6 I pp. 623-254. Art. (1874) I 
Several unsigned editorials in the Independent, 27 (1875) 1 ,, Art. (1875) 
"The Religion of Childhood," Independ., 27 (June 10, 1875), 2 p • 5 • Art • ( 18 7 5 ) 
"The Cosmic Philosophy, '' ** Meth. Quart. Rev., 58 (Oct., 
1876), pp. 655-678. Art. (1876) 
alphabetical order. Consideration has been given to the 
corrections that Professor Ramsdell has made on the biblio-
graphy prepared by Professor Hildebrand. The present bibli-
ography enlarges the ones prepared by Professor Hildebrand 
and Professor Ramsdell. It includes among the writings of 
Borden Parker Bowne, Philoao5h~ of Christian Sciance, (New 
York: The Abingdon Press, 19 8 , which has been previously 
omitted. To the list of works on Bowne, or relating to Bowne 
in some way, mentioned in the Dissertations of Pr9fessora 
Hildebrand and Ramsdell, addition is ma~ of Andres Osuna, 
"La Filosofia de Borden Parker Bownen l__Luminar, 1 (Autumn, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
'I 
II 
I 
I, 
II 
I. 
I 
,, 
1/ 
II 
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II 
"The Assumption of the Anti-Design Argument, n * Independ.. 1 II 
29 (Mar. 29, 1877), pp. 1-2. Art. (1877) I 
"'The Anti-Design Argument' Stated," * Independ., 29 (Mar. 2 1 22, 1877), pp. 1-2. - Art. (1877) i1 
li 
I 
"The Design Argument, •t * Inde::J2end. , 29 (July 5 1877), 
(1877) 3 ' pp. 2-3. Art. 
I 
"The Design Argument, 't * Inde::J28nd., 29 (Aug. 2, 1877), 
(1877) 4 pp. 2-3. Art. 
II 
"The Conservation of Energy,"* Zion's Her., 54 (Oct. 11, 5 I' 1877), P• 321. Art. (1877) 
"The· New Logic,"* Zion's Her., 54 (Nov. 15, 1877), 6 l'l p. 361. Art. (1:877) 
Improved,"* Zion's Her., 54 (Dec. 20, lj "The 'Prayer Test' 
1877}, pp. 401, 
1877' p. 409). 
409; (continued in ·issue of Dec. 27, 7 \1 
Art. (1877) 8 IJ Art. (1877) I' 
"The New Gospel,n Zion's Her., 55 (Jan. 31, 
p. 33. 1878), 1'1
1 
Art. (1878) 1 
"Shall We Kill Our Advanced Scientists?" Zion's Her., 
55 (Feb. 21, 1878), p. 57. Art. (1878) 2 
"Chauncey Wright as a Philosopher," *New England., 
37 (Sept. 1878), PP• 585-603. . Art. (1878) 3 
"The Divine Foreknowledge,"* Zion's Her., 56 (Mar. 6, 
1879), p. 73. Art. (1879) 1 
"Some Objections to Theism," * Meth. Quart. Rev., 61 
(Apr., 1879), pp. 224-246. Art. (1879) 2 
1937):J, 19-35; G. T. w. Patrick, The Fra e-nts of the Works 
of Heraclitus \Baltimore: N. Murray, 1 ; gar • r g -
man, ff.Al~as Vent"ajas del Pe:;sonisll}o," Luminar, 3 (1939D , 
41-49; Jose A. Franquiz, La F~losofia del Persona1ismo· y los 
Valoree del EBJ2iri'tu (San Juan, P. R.: Cantero y Fernan<lez y 
SJ?mpani"a, 19351; Albert C. Knudson, "Personalism and Theology" I 
~(Personalist 20 ( 1938-1939)) , 256-266; Lewis White Beck~ 
''The Method of Personalismn ~e rsonalist 20 (1937-1938 f) , I 
368-378; and the following dissertations: I 
T. G. Duval, Nature and EEistemological Significance of the 1 
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Studies in Theism, ** (New York: Phillips & Hunt, 1879). 
SIT 
"A Difficulty in the Materialistic Theory of Life,"* 
Inc1epend., 32 (May 20, 1880), p·p. 2-3. Art. (1880) 1 
'
1The Ethics of Evolution,'t * Meth. Quart. Rev., 62 
(July, 1880), pp. 430-455. Art. (1880)2 
"A New Aspect of Natural Selection," * Independ., 
32 (July 22, 1880), pp. 2-3. Art. (1880) 3 
Metaphysics, A Study in First Principles, ** (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1882). MET 
"Evolution in Psychology," * Independ.; 35 (Dec. 27~ 
1883), P• 1641. Art. (1883) 
"Science Must Go,•t * Independ,., 36 (Jan. 24, 1884), 1 p. 98. Art. (1884) 
nManicheism in Advanced Thought," Zion's Her., 61 
(Apr. 23, 1884), P• 129. Art,. (1884)2 
nvVhat ia Truth?" * Independ., 36 (Sept,. 18, 1884), 
p. 1185,. Art. (1884) 3 
nThe Logic of Religious Belief, n * Met h. Quart. Rev,., 
66 (1884), pp. 642"665,. rt,. (1884)4 
"Concerning the 'Christian Consciousness 1 ," * Independ. • 1 37 (Jan. 8, 1885), pp. 35-36. Art. tl885) 
Idea of Necessary Connection (Boston University, 189·2); 
Francis L.- Strickland, Personalism: The Philosophy of Free 
Selfhood (Boston ITniversity, 1905); E. t. Mills, A comparison 
of the Main Pointe in the Epistemology of Bowne and Bergson 
(Boston University, 1914); Borden Bowne Kessler, Personalistic 
Monism Versus Pluralism (Boston University, 1919); R. F. 
Piper, Metaphysics of Personality (Boston University, 1920); 
G~il Cleland, The Relation of Bowne to Berkeley (Boston Uni-
versity, 1924); Doris !sable Frizz.ell, Some Personalistic 
Movements in Philosophy since 1910 (Boston University~ 1925); 
Frederick Robert Isacksen, The Interdependence of Bowne's 
Ethics and Metaphysics (Boston ITniversity, 1930); Edward 
Thomas Ramsdell, Pra matic Elements in the E istemolog of 
Borden Parker Bowne Boston University, 1932 • 
'I 
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lj 
"Comparing Religions" Zion's Her., 62 (Jan. 21, 1885), (
1885
}2 ~~~ p. 17. Art. 
1: 
"'Paradise Found'," Zion's Her., 62 (Apr. 1, 1885}, Ill 
P• 97. Art. (1885} 3 
I 
I 
"A Word About the 'New Education'," Independ., 37 (Apr. 
9, 1885), P• 449. Art. (1885) 4 
"The College :Must Go," Zion's Her., 62 (June 3, 1885)~ I 
p. 169. Art. (1885) 5 
I 
I' I "Nerves as Scientists," Independ., 37 (Aug. 13, 1885), 6 
1 pp. 1029-1030 • Art. ( 1885} 
"Concerning Liberality," Zion's Her., 63 (Jan. 27, 1886), 1 I p. 25. Art. (1886} I 
"An American Philosophy t n * Independ. t 38 (Feb. 4 t II 
1886}, p. 134. Art. (1886} 2 l11 
"The Significance of the Bod) for Mental Action," * 
\. Meth. Rev., 68 (Mar. 1886 , pp. 262.-272. Art. (1886 }3 
"Religion in Education, n Zion's Her., 63 (Mar. 31, 
1886), p. 97. Art. (1886) 4 
"Conn on Evolution," *Zion's Her., 63 (June 2, 1886), 
p. 169. Art. (1886} 5 
"Religion in the Schools," Zion's Her., 63 (July 14, 6 1886), P• 217. Art. (1886) 
"The Mind-Cure," Independ., 38 (July 15, 1886}, 
pp. 875-876 • . Art. (1886 ) 7 
"About Tips," Independ., 38 (Sept. 2, 1886), 
P• 1105. Art. 
Introduction to Psychological Theory, ** (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1886). IPT 
(1886) 8 
I I II 
II 
'I 
jl 
I 
I 
I 
II 
II 
I 
"Religion and Theology," Independ., 38 (Oct. 14, 
1886), p. 1296. Art. (1886) 9 li 
"Second Probation," Zion's Her., 63 (Nov. 10, 1886), 
p. 353. Art. 
"Some Shortcomings of the Labor Debate," Independ., 
38 (Dec. 16, 1886), pp. 1619~1620. Art. 
(1886) 10l 
I 
(1886 )11/ 
----
"'Realistic Philosophy',"* Zion's Her., 64 (Apr. 20, 
1887) t p. 121. Art. (1887) 
Philoso1hl of Theism, ** (New York: Harper & Brothers, I. 
1887 • POT 
!I 
"What is Rationalism?" * Inde:eend., 40 (Jan. 26, 
(1888) 1 I 1888), pp. 99-100. Art. 
"If It Were So, What Of It?" * Independ., 40 (May 24~ 
1888), pp. 641-642. Art. (1888) 2 
"Physiological Psychology,'' * Indeuend., 40 (Aug. 23, 
1888), p. 1062. Art. (1888)3 
nExplanation -A Logical Study," * Meth. Rev., 70 
(Sept., 1888), pp. 649-664. Art. (1888) 4 
"On Evolving Something From Nothing," * Inde12end., 
(1888)5 II 40 (Oct. 18, 1888), P• 1332. Art. 
"Theology and Reason," * Zion's Her., 66 (Dec. 19, 
(1888) 6 
I 
1888), P• 401. Art. 
"Philosophical Idealism," * Meth. Rev., 71 (May-
(1889) 1 II June, 1889), pp. 395-412. Art. 
1
'A .,. A,,. * Inde:eend., 41 (June 20, 1889), I 
(1889) 2 I p. 788. Art. I 
"What Is It To Be a Christian?" Zion's Her., I 67 
(1889) 3 (Nov. 6, 1889), p. 353. _ Art. 
nNotes on Philosophy: I. The Question, ,t * Independ~, 
42 (May 15, 1890), P• 651. Art. (1890)1 
"Notes on Philosophy: II. Idealism - What Is It?" * 
Independ., 42 (May 22, 1890), p. 687. Art. 
"Notes on Philosophy: III. Problem of Knowledge," * 
Independ., 42 (June 5, 1890), P• 772. . Art. 
"Notes on Philosophy: IV. The Problem of Knowledge," * 
Independ., 42 (June 12, 1890), PP• 806-807. Art. 
"Notes on Philosophy: V. Space and Time as Ideal," * 
Independ., 42 (June 26, 1890), pp. 871-872. Art. 
(1890) 2 
I( 
(1890) 3 1 
I 
I, 
(1890 , 4 I 
i 
I 
I 
(1890) 5 ! 
!I i 
I 
!I 
16 
"Notes on Philosophy: VI. Sk.epticism;rr * Independ., 6 42 (July 10, 1890 l , pp. 1018 .... 1019. . Art. (18 90) 
"Notes on Philosophy: VII. Pantheism," * Independ., 7 42 (July 24, 1890), pp. 1018-1019, . Art. (1890) 
"Notes on Philosophy: VIII. Natural and Supernatural," 
* Independ., 42 (July 31, 1890), pp. 1050-1051. 8 Art, (1890} 
nNotes on Philosophy: rx:. The Fallacy of the Universal," 
* Independ., 42 (Aug. 21, 1890}, p. 1155. Art. (1890) 9 
"Cardinal Newman and Science," * Independ., 42 {Oct. II 
9, 1890), pp. 1401-1402. Art, (1890) lO ,, 
The Principles of Ethics, * (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1892). POE 
I 
"Science, Ignorance, and Religion, n * Independ., 11 
45 (Feb. 2, 1893J, pp. 137-138. . Art. (1893)1 
I 
* I "Evolution and Evolution,'' Meth. Rev. • 75 (Sept..... 2 I Oct., 1893), pp~ 681-696. Art. (1893} . 
nsome Popular Mistakes Respecting Evolution, n * ~~· ~ 
Meth. Rev., 75 (Nov.-Dec., 1893}, pp. 849.-866. Art, (1893) 3 , 
* ( il 
"Natural and Supernatural," Meth. Rev.; 77 Jan., J'l 
1895}, PP• 9-24. Art. (1895 )1 · 
"'The Foundations of Belief,"' * Zion 1 s Her,, 73 
{May 1, 1895), P• 274. 
I I 
· J 
2 1,, Art. (1895) 
il 
nThe Speculative Significance of Freedom, rt ** Meth. ,\ 
~., 77 (Sept., 1895), pp~ 681-697. -Art. (1895)3 !I 
rrFaith in Our Immortality,"* Independ., 48 
{Apr. 2, 1896), P• 439 • . 
nThe Christian Revelation," * Zion's .Her., 74 
(June 10, 1896) , pp. 374-375. .. . 
Theory of Thought and Knowledge, ** (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1897). 
I' 
I'! Art. (1896)1 
I! 
Art. (1896 )2 /i 
TTK I 
nThe Inerrancy of the Scriptures, IT * Zion's Her., I' 
76 (Jan. 5, 1898), p. 7. · Art. (1898) 1 
I 
II 
I' 
,I 
II 
I 
I 
I 
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1 Metaphysics, ** (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1898). 2 ~ lMET 
"Ethica l Legislation by the Church,n Meth. Rev., 
_ 80 (May, 1898), pp. 370-386. Art. (1898)2 
"The Divine Irmnanence,n * Independ., 50 (June 30, 
1898), pp. 841-842. Art. (1898) 3 
The Christian Revelation, (New Yo rk : 
1898). 
Eaton & Mains, 
CR 
''Distinguo," * Independ., 50 (Sept. 8, 1898), 
PP• 695-697. Art. (1898) 4 
"Studies in the Christian Life: I," Zion's Her., 
77 {Jan. 18, 1899), pp. 78-79. Art. (1899) 1 
lj "Studies in the Christian Life: II," Zion's Her., 
!1 77 (Jan. 25, 1899), pp. 108-109. Art. (1899) 2 
1, "S tudies in the Christian Life: III, n Zion's Her., II 77 (Feb. 1, 1899), pp . 142-143 . Art. (1899) 3 
"Studies in the Christian Life: IV," Zion's Her., 
7 7 (Feb • 8 , 18 9 9 ) , pp • 17 2 -1 7 3 • Art • ( 18 9 9 ) 4 
"Studies in the Christian Life: V," Zion's Her., 5 77 (Feb. 15, 1899), pp. 206-207. Art. {189 9 } 
The Christian Life - A Study, (New York : Eaton & 
Mains, 1899). CL 
1 "The Atonement: I," Zion's Her., 77 (July 26, 1899), 
pp. 942-943. Art. (1899) 6 
"The Atonement: II," Zion's Her., 77 (Aug. 9, 1899), 
PP• 1006-1007. Art. (1899) 7 
II 
I' II 
I 
I 
I 
i· 
II 
I 
I 
I 
II 
·I 
I 
1-
I 
"The Atonement: III," Zion's Her., 77 (Aug. 16, 1899), \ 
pp. 10_38-1039. Art. (1899) 8 1 
il "Th~P:t~~~~~~73:v," Zion's Her., 77(Aug. 23, 18991;t, 11899 ) 9 ~~ 
Art. (1899)10
1
1 
~·t?_PIDI!l:ents on Dr. Steele's Paper," Zion's Her., 
77 (Oct. 4, 1899}, p. 1265. 
I 
i 
I 
II 
"1 
I 
I 
j 
i 
1( 
!, 
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The Atonement, (New York: Eaton & Mains, 1900). A I I 
i 
"Aberrant Moralizers," * Meth. Rev., 82 (Mar., 1900), I 
pp. 247-261. Art. (1900) 1 
1 
"Thoughts for the Present Distress in Matters Biblical," 2 Zion's Her., 78 (Mar. 7, 1900} pp. 298-300; A~t. (1900) 
(continued in issue of Mar. 14, 1900, pp. 331-333). 
"What is of Faith Respecting the Scriptures?" * 
Independ., 52 (Apr. 19, 1900), pp. 919-921). Art. (1900) 3 
"What is 'Special Creation'?" Independ., 52 (Nov. 8, 
1900), pp. 2684-2686/ Art. (1900) 4 
"The Incarnation," Zion's Her., 78 (Dec. 19, 1900), 
pp. 1631-1632. Art. (1900) 5 
"Prayer," Zion's Her., 79 (Mar. 20, 1901), 
PP• 363-365. Art. (1901) 1 
"The Supremacy of Christ," Zion's Her., 79 (June 5, 
1901), pp. 714-716. Art. (1901) 2 
"Christian Casuistry," Zion's Her., 79 (Sept. 4, 
1901), PP• 1131-1133. Art. (1901) 3 
Theism, ** (New York: American Book Company, 1902). 
THE 
"Obedience the Test of Discipleship," Zion's Her., 
81 (Jan. 7, 1903), pp. 10-11. Art. (1903)1 
"Supernatural in Religion," Zion's . Her., 81 (Jan. 2 
14, 1903), PP• 42-43. Art. (1903) 
"As to Miracles," Independ., 55 (Jan. 15, 1903), 3 PP• 150-152. Art. (1903) 
"Religious Experience," Zion's Her., 81 (Jan. 21, 
1903), pp. 74-75. Art. (1903) 4 
II 
II 
I! 
II 
I 
i 
li 
ll 
!I I. 
!I 
II 
:I 
'· I 
I 
! 
I 
"The Recession of Mechanism," Independ., 55 (Jan. 29, 5 J 
1903), pp. 245~248. . Art. (1903) II 
''Childhood Piety," Zion's Her., 81 (Feb. 4, 1903), I 
pp. 138-139. Art. (1903) 6 II 
I' 
==t= 
II 
,, 
II 
\, 
\I 
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I 
I 
I 
"But Are They Converted?" Zion's Her., 81 (Mar. 11, 1903), 7 pp. 301-302. Art. (1903) 
"The Supernatural and Nature,:- , " Zion's Her., 
81 (Oct. 7, 1903), pp. 1270-1271. 
"The Supernatural and the Bible," Zion's Her., 
81 (Oct. 14, 1903), pp. 1302-1303. 
"The Supernatural and Religion, rt Zion's Her., 
81 (Oct. 21, 1903), PP• 1334-1335. 
"Spencer's Nesoience,'t * Independ., 56 {Jan. 14, 
1904), pp. 67-71. 
"Law of Successful Living," Zion's Her., 82 
(June 15, 1904), pp. 748-749; continued on 
PP• 758-759. 
":Mr. Spencer's Philosophy," * Meth. Rev., 86 
(July, 1904), pp. 513-531. 
"A Remarkable Book," Zion's Her., 82 (Nov. 30, 
1904), pp. 1518-1519. 
"'God's White Throne', by Rev. Byron Palmer," 
Bostonia, 5 (Jan • . 1905), p. 18. 
The Immanence of God, * {Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1905). 
"Address," Zion's Her., 84 (Nov. 21, 1906), 
pp. 1483-1484. 
Philosophy of Christian Science, (New York: The 
Abingdon Press, 1908). 
Personalism, ** (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1909}. 
!\ 
8 II Art. (1903) ~~ 
II Art. (1903) 9 ,I 
I' 
Art. (1903) 10 
Art. (1904) 1 
Art. (1904) 2 1
1
1 
t 
Art. (1904) 3 I 
I 
Art. 
Art. 
IG 
i 
(1904) 4 j, 
II 
(1905) II 
I 
I 
Art. (1906) I I 
PCS II 
I 
I 
J?ER I 
Studies in Christianity, ** (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1909). SIC 
"Morals and Life, rt * Meth. Rev., 91 (Sept., 1909), 
pp. 708-722. Art. (1909) 
"Darwin and Darwinism," * Hib. Journ •• 8 (1909--
1910), PP• 122-138 • . Art. (1910)1 j 
II I· !I 
I· I 
II 
ii 
II 
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!I II 
"Present Status of the Argument for Life after Death," 
*No. Amer. Rev., 191 (Jan., 1910), pp. 96-104. 
Art. (1910) 2 
"Jesus or Christ?" Meth. Rev., 92 (March-April, 
1910), pp. 177-193. Art. (1910) 3 
"Concerning Miracle,'t Harvard Theel. Rev., 3 (Apr., 4 1910), pp. 143-166. Art. (1910) 
"Woman and Democracy, 1' No. Amer. Rev., 191 (Apr., 
1910), PP• 527-536. Art. (1910) 5 
"Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation,'' 6 
* Hib. Journ., 8 (1909·1910), pp. 884-893. Art. (1910) 
' 
I 
II 
II 
I 
I 
I 
II 
"A Letter from Professor Bowne," Meth. Rev., 92 
(July-August, 1910), PP• 619-620. (posthumous) 
Art • ( 1910 ) 7 I 
"Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation,'' 
* The Living Age, 266 (Aug. 20, 1910), PP• 451• 
456. (reprinted from Hib. Journ., 8 {1909-1910}, 
pp • 884-893. (posthumous) Art. 
The Essence of Religion, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co., 1910). (posthumous) EOR 
"The Supremacy of Christ," Meth. Rev., 92 (Nov.-
Dec., 1910), pp. 881-889. (posthumous) Art. 
Kant and syencer, ** (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1912). posthumous) KS 
"Present Status of the Conflict of Faith," * Meth. 
Rev., 105 (May, 1922), pp. 358-369. (posthumous) 
(1910) 8 
(1910) 9 
Art. (1922) 
I
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
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WORKS ON BOWNE 
Beck, Lewis White, 'tThe Method of Personalism," 
Personalist, 20 (1937-1938), PP• 368-378. Art. (1938) 
Brightman, Edgar S., nThe Personalistic Method of 
Philosophy," Meth. Rev., 103 (1920), pp. 368-
380. Art. (1920) 
Brightman, Edgar S., "Sou~~:ces of Bowne 'a Power," I Math. Rev., 105 (1922), pp. 370-371. Art. (1922} 
I 
Brightman, Edgar s., "Personalism and the Influ-
ence of Bowne,tt Proceedings of the Sixth Inter-
national Conoress of Philoso h t 1926, ed. by 
I 
E. s. Brightman, New York: ongman, Green & 
Co., 1927), pp. 161-164. Art. (1926) 
Brightman, Edgar S. t ''Alguna.s Ventajas del Personismo," 
Luminar, 3 (1939J, pp. 41-49. · Art. (1939) 
Cell, George Croft, "Die Philosophie in Nordamerika,n 
in Uebe:rweg's Grundriss der Geschichte der 
Philo sophie, (Berlin: E. S. Hi ttle.r & Sohn, 
1928), Part 5. Art. (1928) 
Cleland, Gail, The Relation of Bowne to Berkelett 
(Ph, D. dissertation, Boston University, 192 J• RB'B 
Coe, George A., "Borden Parker Bowne, n Meth. Rev., 
92 (1910), pp. 513-524. Art. (1910) 
Coe, George A., nThe Empirical Factor in Bowne's 
Thinking," Studies in Philosophy and Theology, 
ed. by E. c. Wilm, (New York: Abingdon Press, 
(1922), pp. 18-21. Art. (1922) 
Eucken, Rudolph, "A Study of the Late Dr. Borden P. 
Bowne," Bostonia, 13 (1913), pp. 86-92. (Repr inted 
in Flewelling's Personalism and the Problems of 
Philosophy, see below.) Art. 
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Flewelling, Ralph Tyler, Personalism and the Problem of 
Philosophy, (New York: Metho dist Book Concern, 1915). 
PPP 
Jnewelling, Ralph Tyler, "Bowne and Present-Day 
Thought, 1' Meth. Rev., 105 (1922), pp. 377-379. Art. (1922) 
" " " Franquiz, Jose A., La Filosofia del Personalismo y los 
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